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High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
T. N. SINGH, K. K. VERMA, R. C. LAHOTI
SARDAR DEORAO JADHAV - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF M.P. - Respondents
MISC. CIV. CASE 93 Of 1981
Decided On : 04/11/1991
STAMP DUTY - INSTRUMENT OF SETTLEMENT - DECLARATION OF TRUST - PROPERTY OF HINDU DEITY - CUSTODY OF PROPERTIES OF DEITY - DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY - SHEBAIT - TRUSTEE - INDIAN STAMP ACT, 1899, SECTION 2(24), ARTICLES 58, 64.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, Sardar Deorao Krishnarao Jadhav, executed a document described as a "trust Deed" on 2-9-1975. The document stated that the petitioner was the karta of the family and that Shri Khandoba Malhari Martand was the family deity. The petitioner had executed a trust deed on 7-10-1971 for the conduct of Pooja and management of the deity. The petitioner had removed the gold idols and other valuable articles from the temple to his residential quarters due to security concerns. The petitioner intended to create a trust in respect of the idols and other articles of the deity and declared himself and others as trustees. The petitioner stated that he had no intention to claim any right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the trust except those available to him as a trustee.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the petitioner, in his capacity as Karta of the family, was executing a trust in respect of the properties of family deities of which he was shebait. The court found that the petitioner continued to function as shebait but made arrangements for the proper custody of idols made of gold and other valuable properties of the family deities. The court held that the petitioner was merely making proper provision for the discharge of duties of his office as shebait and that there was no "disposition" of any of the properties of the deities under the document.
Issues: 1. Whether the property in respect to which the document in question was executed was of the ownership of the deity and in exercise of his right as a Shebait, the executant purported to make proper provision in respect of discharge of duties of his Office of Shebati in regard thereto by constituting himself along with others as co-trustees, for the custody thereof? 2. Whether the document presented for registration as "trust-deed" (Annexure B) was declaration of Trust within the meaning of Article 64 of Schedule I and was liable to stamp-duty in terms of that provision? 3. Whether the document in question was an "instrument of Settlement" within the meaning of Article 58 and was liable to be stamped with duty contemplated thereunder?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the petitioner, in his capacity as Karta of the family, was executing a trust in respect of the properties of family deities of which he was shebait. The court found that the petitioner continued to function as shebait but made arrangements for the proper custody of idols made of gold and other valuable properties of the family deities. The court held that the petitioner was merely making proper provision for the discharge of duties of his office as shebait and that there was no "disposition" of any of the properties of the deities under the document. 2. The court held that the document in question was a declaration of trust within the meaning of Article 64 of Schedule I and was liable to stamp-duty in terms of that provision. The court found that the petitioner intended to create a trust in respect of the idols and other articles of the deity and declared himself and others as trustees. The court held that the object of the trust was the custody of the properties of the family deities and that there was no "disposition" of any of the properties of the deities under the document. 3. The court held that the document in question was not an "instrument of Settlement" within the meaning of Article 58 and was not liable to be stamped with duty contemplated thereunder. The court found that there was no "disposition" of any of the properties of the deities under the document and that the petitioner intended to lose nothing in terms of pecuniary benefit and the co-trustees gain nothing on being saddled with the responsibility of co-custodians of the properties of the deity.
Final Decision: The court answered the questions in the affirmative and held that the document in question was a declaration of trust within the meaning of Article 64 of Schedule I and was liable to stamp-duty in terms of that provision. The court also held that the document in question was not an "instrument of Settlement" within the meaning of Article 58 and was not liable to be stamped with duty contemplated thereunder.
( 1 ) THIS Reference is made on 3-7-1981 by the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior, for short, the 'board', under Section 57 (1), Indian Stamp Act, 1899, for short, the 'act'. With the Reference is annexed as Annexure 'a', copy of the Revision Petition, preferred under Section 56 of the Act by Sardar Deorao Jadhav, to the Board against order dated 27-9-1977, passed by Collector of Stamps, Gwalior. Copy of the document which was presented to Sub-Registrar, Gwalior, for registration and in respect of which, the payment was required to be made by the petitioner, namely, Rs. 7,320/- as deficient stamp fee, came as Annexure 'b' to the Reference.
( 2 ) ALTHOUGH in the Statement of the case, the Board observed that it was in full agreement with the view expressed by the Collector of Stamps and also by the Sub-Registrar, expressed in his report that the document in question attracted Article 58 of Schedule I of the Act and it was not covered by Article 64, following this Court's decision in Chaturbhuj Das, 1975 Jab LJ 833, the Board considered necessary to make the Reference for this Court's final decision on the controversy. We found ourselves confronted, however, by threshold objection to decide the controversy on our attention being drawn to another decision of this Court, Manohar Kunwarbai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1984 0 Jablj 64. It was submitted to us that the Reference was incompetent in view of that decision because the Board did not express its "doubt" and did not refer any "question" for this Court's opinion in regard to the controversy.
( 3 ) SHRI Kelkar, Deputy Advocate General, also cited this Court's decisions in Mahant Ishwari Sharan Deo v. State, AIR 1982 Madh Pra 177 and State of M. P. v. Martandsingh, AIR 1984 Madh Pra 92, to submit that the Board was required to formulate in specific terms, the question of law on which this Court is required to give its opinion and that is not done in the instant case.
( 4 ) WE have to decide, therefore, first if we are at all required under the law to render any decision on the Reference made. It is true that the Board has not framed any specific question to be answered by this Court and has only cited the case of Chaturbhuj Das (supra) to exercise its jurisdiction in making the Reference, but Statement of case is quite exhaustive. The entire document is extracted at para 8 of the Order and in the first para itself is extracted the order of the Collector of Stamps, impugned in the Revision. It is also true that the Board expressed its agreement with the view of the Collector of Stamps, but what is also true is that reference is made in the Statement of Case to a decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Banarasai Das, AIR 1972 Delhi 128 and the contention of the revisionist's counsel that Delhi High Court's decision was not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case was rejected.
( 5 ) CHAPTER VI of the Act is captioned, "reference and Revision" spanning across Sections 56 to 72. As per Section 56 (2), when the Collector "feels doubt as to the amount of duty with which any instrument is chargeable", he draws up a Statement of case and refers it with his opinion to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority for decision and the Collector is required to assess and charge duty in conformity with that decision, as per sub-section (3 ). Relevant portion of Section 57 is extracted: -"57. (1) The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority may State any case referred to it under Section 56, sub-section (2), or otherwise coming to its notice, and refer such case, with its own opinion thereon,- (a) if it arises in a State to the High Court for that State. . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) Every such case shall be decided by not less than three Judges of the High Court to which it is referred, and in case of difference the opinion of the majority shall prevail. " (Clauses (b) to (f) of sub-sec. (1) omitted as not relevant ). Acc
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