2004 (1) JLJ 175
Uma Nath Singh, J.
M.P. State Electricity Board and another v. Smt. Kamla Sharma
and others Civil Revn. No. 124 of 2003; against the order of 9th Civil Judge,
Class I, Gwalior, passed in Civil Suit No. 69-A of 2002;
Decided on 16.7.2003.
It is said that the non-applicants filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction before the trial Court and paid a total court-fee of Rs. 240.00 on valuation of the suit. As the question of court-fee pertains to jurisdiction and thus goes to the root of the matter, the applicant raised certain preliminary objections. It is urged that learned Judge, without going into merits of the issue, has rejected the plea. Now the judgment is assailed mainly on the ground that the second relief, being a prayer for permanent injunction, is consequential, therefore, the non-applicants ought to have paid ad valorem court-fee on valuation amount of Rs. 36,000.00. [Para 2
Held: For the purpose of paying court-fee, only allegations made in the plaint are relevant and not the written statement. That apart, the first relief sought for in the suit appears to be covered under Article 17 of Schedule 2 of the Court-fees Act and thus, only a fixed amount of court-fee is required to be paid and the second relief for a permanent injunction being independent in nature, could be assessed separately for levying the court-fee. Moreover, in view of the ratio of 1997 judgment [1997(1) JLJ 105], the second relief not being consequential, is not required to be taxed for payment of ad valorem court-fee. 1997(1) JLJ 105 and 2000(2) JLJ 75 relied on. AIR 1958 SC 245 followed. 1964 JLJ 424 distinguished. [Paras 3 to 5
(2) Court-fees Act, 1870 -- S. 7(iv) (c) -- suit for declaration and injunction -- valuation put for purposes of jurisdiction -- plaintiff is bound to pay court-fees on same amount -- declaration can only be given if decree is set aside but not when the decree stands. 1964 JLJ 424 relied on. [Para 2
¼1½ U;k;ky; Qhl vf/kfu;e] 1870 && /kkjk 7(iv)¼x½ rFkk vuqlwph 2 vuqPNsn 17 && O;oLFkkfir dCtsnkj O;fDr && ?kks"k.kk vkSj O;kns‘k ds fy, okn dk dqN&Hkh ewY;kadu j[k ldrk gS && ?kks"k.kk d fy, og fu;r U;k;ky; Qhl vkSj O;kns‘k ds fy, ewY;kuqlkj Qhl lanÙk dj ldrk gS && dsoy okni= ds vfHkdFku ns[ks tk,¡xsA dfFkr gS fd vukosndksa us fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds le{k ?kks"k.kk vkSj LFkk;h O;kns‘k ds fy, okn Qkby fd;k vkSj okn ds ewY;kadu ij #- 240-000 dh dqy U;k;ky; Qhl lanÙk dhA D;ksafd U;k;ky; Qhl dk iz‘u vf/kdkfjrk ls lacaf/kr gS rFkk bl izdkj ekeys ds ewy rd tkrk gS] vkosnd ds dqN izkjafHkd iz‘u mBk,A crk;k x;k gS fd fo}ku U;k;k/kh‘k us fook|dksa us xq.kkxq.k ij fopkj fd, fcuk] vfHkokd~ vLohdkj dj fn;k gSA vc fu.kZ;ksa eq[;r% bl vk/kkj ij vk{ksfir gS fd nwljk vuqrks"k] LFkk;h O;kns‘k dh izkFkZuk ds dkj.k] ikfj.kkfed gS vr% vukosndksa dks #- 36]000-00 dh ewY;kadu jde ij ewY;kuqlkj U;k;ky; Qhl lanÙk djuk pkfg, FkhA ¿ iSjk 2À vfHkfu/kkZfjr % U;k;ky; Qhl lanÙk djus ds iz;kstukFkZ okni= esa fd, x, vfHkdFku gh lqlaxr gS] fyf[kr dFku esa fd, x, vfHkdFku ughaA blds vfrfjDr] okn esa bZfIlr izFke vuqrks"k U;k;ky; Qhl vf/kfu;e dh vuqlph 2 ds vuqPNsn 17 ls vkPNkfnr izrhr gksrk gS vkSj bl izdkj] fu;r jde dh U;k;ky; Qhl lanÙk dh tkuk gh visf{kr gS vkSj LFkk;h O;kns‘k dk nwljk vuqrks"k Loar= izd`fr dk gksus ds dkj.k] U;k;ky; Qhl mn~x`ghr djus ds fy, ls i`Fkd~ ls fu/kkZfjr fd;k tk ldrk gSA blds vfrfjDr] lu~ 1997 ds fu.kZ; ¿ 1997¼1½ ts ,y ts 105 rFkk 2000 ¼2½ ts ,y ts 75 voyafcrA , vkb vkj 1985 ,l lh 245 vuqlfjrA 1964 ts ,y ts 424 izHksfnrA ¿ iSjk 3 ,oa 5À ¼2½ U;k;ky; Qhl vf/kfu;e] 1872 ¼e-iz-½ && /kkjk 7
(ORAL) 1. This civil revision calls in question an order dated 24.2.2003 in civil suit No. 69-A12002 passed by learned 9th Civil Judge, Class I, Gwalior, rejecting the preliminary objections raised by the applicant defendant to the valuation of the suit.
2. It is said that the non-applicants filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction before the trial Court and paid a total court-fee of Rs. 240.00 on valuation of the suit. As the question of court-fee pertains to jurisdiction and thus goes to the root of the matter, the applicant raised certain preliminary objections. It is urged that learned Judge, without going into merits of the issue, has rejected the plea.
Now the judgment is assailed mainly on the ground that the second relief, being a prayer for permanent injunction, is consequential, therefore, the non-applicants ought to have paid ad valorem Court-fee on valuation amount of Rs. 36,000.00. In support of the contention, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on a Division• Bench Judgment of this Court reported in the case of Comolata Dutta v. Ishwar Industries (1964 JLJ 424 = AIR 1966 MP 169). The relevant portion of the said judgment on reproduction reads as :
"It is held that when the plaintiff in a suit for declaration and injunction chooses to value the relief at a certain figure for purposes of jurisdiction, he is bound to pay court-fee on the same amount. The present suit in no sense can be construed to be a suit for mere declaration because the relief of injunction flows naturally and essentially from the relief of declaration. It is also obvious that the relief of declaration can only be given if the decree is set aside but not when the decree stands. " (Emphasis supplied)
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the non-applicants (plaintiffs in the suit) submits that they are in possession of the land in question right from 1950 and thus, it is a case of settled possession.
Learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court reported in the case of Sabina @ Farida v. Mohd. Abdul Wasit (1997(1) JLJ 105). The ratio of the judgment says that :
"person in settled possession filing suit for declaration and injunction can put any value for declaration and pay fixed court-fees thereon and for injunction he can 'value the relief under section 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act".
This judgment is said to have been fol lowed in a subsequent decision of this Court reported in the case of Shanti Devi (Smt.) v. Radheyshyam Palod [2000(2) JLJ 75]. It is not said to be a case of settled possession and an objection to the valuation of court-fee has also been taken in the written statement. However, learned counsel for the non-applicants seeks to refer to a judgment of Hon. the Apex Court reported in the case of Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (AIR 1958 SC 245), to resolve the point. The relevant extracts of para 13 of the judgment on reproduction read as under :-
"It is conceded that the question of court-fees must be considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by the final decision of the suit on the merits."
4. Thus, the aforesaid observation demonstrates an admitted position that for the purpose of paying court-fee, only allegations made in the plaint are relevant and not the written statement. That apart, the first relief sought for in the suit appears to be covered under Article 17 of Schedule 2 of the Court-fees Act and thus, only a fixed amount of court-fee is required to be paid and the second relief for a permanent injunction being independent in nature could be assessed separately for levying the court-fee. Moreover, in view of the ratio of 1997 judgment (supra) the second relief not being consequential is not required to be taxed for payment of ad valorem court-fee.
5. The non-applicants are said to have been in a settled possession right from 1950 in terms of 1997 judgment of t
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