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2004 (2) JLJ 18
(FULL BENCH)
Dipak Misra, S.K. Kulshrestha and K.K. Lahoti, JJ.
Mohammad Sagir v. Bharat Heavy Electricals and others
W.P. No. 3993 of 2002;
Decided on 24.2.2004.
‘Whether in view of section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1963 provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply to an application filed under section 62(1) of MPIR Act, 1960 ?‘ [Para 2
Held: (i) The exposition of law set out in the case of Vijay Singh [2000(2) MPLJ 131] to the effect that the provisions of Limitation Act would not apply to an application preferred under section 5 of the Adhiniyam (Act No.3 of 1977) the same being an original proceeding in the nature of a declaratory suit, as a different type of limitation has been prescribed under the special statute, is not correct.
(ii) The decision rendered in the case of Narayan Singh [2002(3) MPLJ 571] does not state the law correctly as far as it pronounces that Limitation Act is not applicable to a proceeding under section 62 of MPIR Act.
(iii) The language employed under section 62 of the MPIR Act does meet the twin requisite ingredients to have the applicability of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and ergo, the said provision does get attracted.
(iv) An employee who prefers an application under section 62 of MPIR Act beyond the limitation prescribed therein can always file an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and it would be open to the Labour Court to condone the delay if sufficient grounds have been shown. 2002(3) MPLJ 571 and 2000(2) MPLJ 131 overruled. AIR 1992 SC 1264 and (1996) 5 SCC 342 followed. W.P. No. 2784/1998 relied on. [Para 31
(2) Samaj Ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi Dharakon Ko Udhar Dene Walon Ke Bhumi Hadapane Sambandhi Kuchakron Se Paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976 (M.P.)--Ss. 5 and 6 -Limitation Act, 1963--S.5--application under S.5 of the Adhiniyam--provisions under S.5 of the Act are applicable--Sub-Divisional Officer can act suo motu under S. 6. 2000(2) MPLJ 131 overruled. AIR 1976 se 2161 discussed. 1989 RN 232 relied on. [Paras 14 to 17
(3) Limitation Act, 1963--S.29(2)--Limitation Act, 1908--S. 29(2) (b)-- important departure has been made in new Act--now provisions under S. 5 have been made applicable to every special or local law.
There is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 in so far as the provision contained in section 29, sub-section (2) is concerned. Whereas under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, section 29, sub-section (2) clause (b) provided that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, other than those contained in sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22, shall not apply and, therefore, the applicability of section was in clear and specific terms excluded. Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 enacts in so many terms that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24, which would include section 5, shall apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. AIR 1976 se 2161 distinguished. AIR 1976 se 105 followed. 1988 JLJ 355 relied on. [Paras 18 & 19
(4) Limitation Act, 1963--S.29(2)--special or local law a complete code in matter of limitation--provisions under are not attracted. AIR 1969 SC 872 and (1994) 1 SCC 64 followed. [Para 20
(5) Limitation Act, 1963--Ss. 5, 29(2) and Schedule I--no limitation in Schedule provided for an Act--limitation provided in special or local law--provisions under S. 29(2) and thus under S. 5 are attracted.
When the First Schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time limit for it, it can be said that under the First Schedule of the Limitation Act all appeals can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period. While the former permits the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to be filed within the prescribed period. It is therefore, different from that prescribed in the former and thus section 29 (2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act. AIR 1995 SC 2272 followed. [Para 22
(6) Court--Labour Court -- performs judicial functions -- thus is a Court. (1998) 2 SCC 688 followed. 2002(3) MPLJ 571 approved. [Paras 5 & 6
¼1½ vkS|ksfxd laca/k vf/kfu;e] 1960 ¼e-ç-½&/kkjk 62¼1½&ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963&/kkjk 5 rFkk 29¼2½&1960 ds vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 62¼1½ ds v/khu Je U;k;ky; ds le{k vkosnu&ikZIr dkj.k n‘kkZ;k tk, rc ifjlhek vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 5 ds v/khu foyac ekQ fd;k tk ldrk gSA
^^D;k ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963 dh /kkjk 29¼2½ dh n`f"V ls ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963 dh /kkjk 5 dk mica/k e-ç- vkS|ksfxd laca/k vf/kfu;e] 1960 dh /kkjk 62¼1½ ds v/khu Qkby fd, x, vkosnu dks ykxw gksxk\** ¼iSjk 2½
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % ¼1½ fot;flag ds ekeys ¿2000 ¼2½ ,e ih ,y ts 131À esa çfrikfnr bl vk‘k; dh fof/k lgh ugha gS fd ?kks"k.kkRed okn ds Lo:i dh ewy dk;Zokgh gksus dk dkj.k ifjlhek vf/kfu;e ds mica/k vf/kfu;e ¼vf/kfu;e Ø- 3 lu~ 1977½ dh /kkjk 5 ds v/khu çLrqr vkosnu dks ykxw ugha gksaxs D;ksafd fo‘ks"k dkuwu ds v/khu fofHkUu çdkj dh ifjlhek fofgr dh xbZ gSA
¼2½ ukjk;.k flag ds ekeys ¿2002¼3½ ,e ih ,y ts 571À esa fn, x, fofu‘p; esa] tgk¡ rd dgk x;k gS fd ifjlhek vf/kfu;e e-ç- vkS|ksfxd laca/k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 62 ds v/khu dk;Zokgh dks ykxw ugha gksrh] fof/k dk lgh dFku ugha fd;k x;k gSA
¼3½ e-ç- vkS|ksfxd laca/k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 62 esa ç;qDr Hkk"kk ls ifjlhek vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 29¼2½ ykxw djkus ds fy, visf{kr ;qxy la?kVdksa dh iwfrZ ugha gksrh] vr%] mDr mica/k vkÑ"V ugha gksrkA
¼4½ e-ç- vkS|ksfxd laca/k vf/kfu;e esa fofgr ifjlhek ds ijs tks deZpkjh ml vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 62 ds v/khu vkosnu çLrqr djrk gS og ifjlhek vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 5 ds v/khu dHkh&Hkh vkosnu Qkby dj ldrk gS rFkk ;fn i;kZIr vk/kkj n‘kkZ, x, gksa rc Je U;k;ky; }kjk foyac ekQ fd;k tk ldsxkA 2002¼3½ ,e ih ,y ts 571 rFkk 2000¼2½ ,e ih ,y ts 131 myVs x,A , vkb vkj 1992 ,l lh 1264 rFkk ¼1996½ 5 ,l lh lh 342 vuqlfjrA fjV ;kfpdk Ø-2784@1998 voyafcrA
¼2½ lekt ds detksj oxks± ds Ñf"k Hkwfe /kkjdksa dks m/kkj nsus okyksa ds Hkwfe gM+ius laca/kh dqpØksa ls ifj=k.k rFkk eqfDr vf/kfu;e] 1976 ¼e-ç-½&/kkjk 5 rFkk 6&ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963&/kkjk 5&1976 ds v/khfu;e dh /kkjk 5 ds v/khu vkosnu&ifjlhek vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 5 ds mica/k ykxw gksrs gSa&mi[kaM vf/kdkjh /kkjk 6 ds v/khu Loçsj.kk ls dkjZokbZ dj ldrk gSA 2000¼2½ ,e ih ,y ts 131 myVk x;kA , vkb vkj 1976 ,l lh 2161 foosfprA 1989 jk fu 232 voyafcrA ¼iSjk 14 ls 17½
¼3½ ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963& &/kkjk 29¼2½&ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1908&/kkjk 29¼2½ ¼[k½&u, vf/kfu;e esa egRoiw.kZ varj yk;k x;k gS&vc /kkjk 5 ds v/khu mica/k çR;sd fo‘ks"k vFkok LFkkuh; fof/k dks ykxw dj fn, x, gSaA
tgk¡ rd /kkjk 29] mi/kkjk ¼2½ esa varfoZ"V mica/k lacaf/kr gS] ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963 esa egRoiw.kZ varj yk;k x;k gSA tcfd Hkkjrh; ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1908 dh /kkjk 29] mi/kkjk ¼2½ [kaM ¼[k½ esa micaf/kr Fkk fd fdlh fo‘ks"k vFkok LFkkuh; fof/k }kjk okn] vihy vFkok vkosnu ds fy, fofgr ifjlhek vof/k vo/kkfjr djus ds ç;kstukFkZ Hkkjrh; ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1908 ds mica/k] /kkjk 4] 9 ls 18 rFkk 22 ds viokn dks NksM+ dj] ykxw ugha gksaxs] vr%] bl /kkjk dk ykxw gksuk Li"V vkSj fofufnZ"V ‘‘kCnksa esa vioftZr FkkA ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963 dh /kkjk 29] mi/kkjk ¼2½ esa lqO;Drr% vf/kfu;fer fd;k x;k gS fd fdlh fo‘ks"k vFkok LFkkuh; fof/k }kjk okn] vihy vFkok vkosnu ds fy, fofgr ifjlhek vof/k vo/kkfjr djus ds ç;kstukFkZ djus ds ç;kstukFkZ /kkjk 4 ls 24 esa varfoZ"V mica/k] ftuesa /kkjk 5 lfEefyr gS] ogk¡ rd rFkk ml lhek rd ykxw gksaxs tgk¡ rd og ,slh fo‘ks"k vFkok LFkkuh; fof/k }kjk vfHkR;Drr% vioftZr ugha gksaA , vkb vkj 1976 ,l lh 2161 çHksfnrA , vkb vkj 1976 ,l lh 105 vuqlfjrA 1988 ts ,y ts 355 voyafcrA ¼iSjk 18 ,oa 19½
¼4½ ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963&/kkjk 29¼2½&fo‘ks"k vFkok LFkkuh; fof/k ifjlhek ds ekeys eas laiw.kZ lafgrk&mica/k vkÑ"V ugha gksrsA , vkb vkj 1969 ,l lh 872 rFkk ¼1994½ ,l lh lh 64 vuqlfjrA ¼iSjk 20½
¼5½ ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963&/kkjk 5] 29¼2½ rFkk vuqlwph 1&vuqlwph esa fdlh vf/kfu;e ds fy, ifjlhek micaf/kr ugha&fo‘ks"k vFkok LFkkuh; fof/k esa ifjlhek micaf/kr&/kkjk 29¼2½ rFkk bl dkj.k /kkjk 5 ds v/khu mica/k vkÑ"V gksaxsA
tc ifjlhek vf/kfu;e dh çFke vuqlwph esa fdlh fof‘k"V vihy ds fy, le;&lhek micaf/kr ugha gks] ijarq fo‘ks"k fof/k esa mlds fy, le;&lhek fofgr gks rc dgk tk ldrk gS fd ifjlhek vf/kfu;e dh çFke vuqlwph ds v/khu lc vihysa fdlh Hkh le; Qkby dh tk ldrh gS] ijarq mls lhfer dj fo‘ks"k fof/k fHkUu vof/k micaf/kr djrh gSA tcfd iwoZorh ¼vuqlwph½ vihy dk fdlh Hkh le; Qkby fd;k tkuk vuqKkr djrh gS] ijorhZ ¼fo‘ks"k fof/k½ mls fofgr vof/k ds Hkhrj Qkby fd, tkus rd lhfer djrh gSA vr% og mlls fHkUu gS tks iwoZorhZ ¼vuqlwph½ esa fofgr gS vkSj bl çdkj] /kkjk 29¼2½ ,sls ekeys esa Hkh ykxw gksxh tgk¡ ifjlhek vf/kfu;e ds v/khu fdlh fof‘k"V dk;Zokgh ds fy, ifjlhek micaf/kr djus esa yksi ls fo‘ks"k fof/k vkSj ifjlhek vf/kfu;e esa varj vk;k gksA , vkb vkj 1995 ,l lh 2272 vuqlfjrA ¼iSjk 22½
¼6½ U;k;ky;&Je U;k;ky;&Ukf;d ÑR;ksa dk fuoZgu djrk gSa&vr% U;k;ky; gSA ¼1998½ 2 ,l lh lh 688 vuqlfjrA 2002¼3½ ,e ih ,y ts 571 vuqeksfnrA ¼iSjk 5 ,oa 6½
Misra, J.--1. Facing difficulty and hindrance with the pronouncement of law in the case of Narayan Singh v. MPEB [2002(3) MPLJ 571], wherein it was held that if an employee seeks relief by preferring an application under sections 31(3), 61 and 62 of Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (MPIR Act) after the expiration of the statutory time limit provided under the said Act, the said application could not be entertained inasmuch as the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable to original proceedings in view of the law stated in the case of Vijay Singh v. Shyam Lal [2000(2) MPLJ 131], the learned Single Judge thought it appropriate to recommend the matter to be placed before a Larger Bench in view of the law enunciated by the Full Bench in the case of Nihalkaran v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bhopal [1988 JLJ 355 = 1987 MPLJ 562] and Somsingh Onkarsingh v. MPSRTC, Bhopal and others [1980 ILJ 392 = 1980 MPLJ 211] and further the MPIR Act being a beneficial statute enacted with a view to ensure social and welfare security had intentionally not expressly excluded the provisions of the Limitation Act. In this factual backdrop the matter has been placed before us.
2. Before we proceed to set out the facts, we think it condign to reproduce the question framed by the learned Single Judge to be answered by the Full Bench :
"Whether in view of section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1963 provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply to an application filed under sections 62(1) of MPIR Act, 1960 ?"
3. Presently, we shall proceed to state the facts in brief so that a clear picture can be frescoed under what circumstances the aforesaid question has emerged. The petitioner was in the employment as Medical Attendant at Habibganj Hospital in the year 1972. He due to his illness went on leave and after he returned to duty, he was slapped with an order of termination. Being aggrieved, he knocked at the doors of the Labour Court by preferring an application under section 31(3) of the MPIR Act. Many a contention was raised questioning the sustainability of the termination which need not be stated in praesenti. A written statement was filed by the Management contending inter alia that the petition filed by the petitioner was barred by limitation. The Labour Court framed many issues including an issue pertaining to limitation. He recorded a finding that the application was barred by limitation. Though the Labour Court recorded such a finding, yet it issued a direction that the workman petitioner be considered for re-employment by the Managment in respect of the future vacancy. The presentableness of the aforesaid order was assailed in an appeal preferred by .the Management respondent No.1 herein before the Industrial Court which set aside the order passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court and directed the matter to be decided afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. After the matter was remitted, the Labour Court came to hold that it had power to condone the delay and accordingly condoned the delay and decided the controversy in favour of the petitioner and directed reinstatement in service without backwages. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, both the parties preferred appeals. The Appellate Authority by order dated 27.6.2002, Annexure P-5, set aside the order of the Labour Court and allowed the appeal preferred by the Management on the foundation that the application was barred by time and provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act were not applicable to such an application.
4. Aggrieved by such an order, the petitioner has preferred the writ petition. In this backdrop as has been indicated hereinabove, the learned Single Judge was required to answer the issue whether the Labour Court has power to condone the delay under the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 or not.
5. To clear the initial maze whether the Labour Court is a Court or not, we would like
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