1. This revision has been filed against the order dated 31.7.1995, passed by Third Additional District Judge, Vidisha in M.C.C. No. 7/95.

2. A claim petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was filed before the Accident Claims Tribunal, Vidisha. It was alleged in the application that the accident occurred on 1.5.1990, which resulted into death of one Shankarlal. Shankarlal died on 10.5.90 on account of the accident. The claimants/non-applicants are the heirs of Shankarlal. The claim petition was filed before the trial Court under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act on 8.9.94 alongwith an application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The ground alleged in the application was that the widow of the deceased lost her mental balance and children being minor the application could not be filed in time.

3. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the claim petition is not maintainable in view of section 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for filing a claim petition within six months from the date of accident and the Claims Tribunal was empowered to condone the delay, which should not be beyond 12 months. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the claim petition itself was not maintainable becuase it was filed beyond the period of one year and the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application.

4. Learned counsel for the non-applicants/claimants submitted that vide Amendment Act No. 54 of Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Amendment Act'), sub-section (3) of section 166 has been deleted. Therefore, no period of limitation is prescribed for filing an application. The claim petition has rightly been held to be in time.

5. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that deletion of sub-section (3) of section 166 cannot take away the valuable right accrued to the applicant. The claim application was not maintainable on the date it was filed. Therefore, the claim petition deserves to be dismissed. Learned counsel dated number of cases and submitted that the law of limitation is a procedural law and its provisions operate retrospectively in the sense that they apply to causes of action arose before their enactment, but if a right to sue becomes barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act then in force, then such a barred right is not revived by the application of the new enactment. He referred to the judgments reported in AIR 1951 Madras 314, Km. Kr. Kr. Ramanathan Chettiar by partner Km Kr. Kr. Lakshmanan Chettiar (died) v. N.M. Kandappa Goudan (died) and others; Vol. XV - 1887-88 Ind. Ap. 167, Appasami Odayar and others and subramanya Odayar and others; AIR 1937 Bombay 392, Frany Barjorji Engineer v. Shapurji Kekobad Modi; and, AIR 1953 SC 1356, S.C. Prashar and another v. Vasantsan Dwarkadas and others. The aforesaid Supreme Court judgments relate to matter relating to income-tax and reference to the question of law of limitation, which is a procedural law and although it is open to the legislature to extend the period of limitation, an important right accrues to a party when the remedy against him is barred by the existing law of limitation and a vested right cannot be affected except by express terms used by the statute or the clearest implication flowing therefrom.

6. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the right to sue was not available to the applicant on the dale of presentation of the claim petition under section 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1981. The learned counsel submitted that once on the date of presentation of the application the right of the claimants was barred, he cannot get any relief on account of Amendment Act.

7. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 consolidated and rationalised various laws regulating road transport, and it came into force with affect from 1st July, 1989. After the af