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1995 Supreme(MP) 366

1995 JLJ 297
D.M. Dharmadhikari and Tej Shankar, JJ.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamarjahan and others
Misc. Appeal No.4 of 1991; Decided on 16.3.1995.

Advocates:
B.N. Malhotra for appellant; R.D. Jain with S.K. Jain and_ V.K. Sharma for respondents.

Headnote:(1) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 -- Ss. 110C (2A) and 96 (2) -- provisions under S. 110-C (2-A) -- are applicable in both the situations where insurer is initially impleaded as party or impleaded after words -- provisions under S. 96 (2) providing limited defences to insurer are also to be considered.

       The provisions under section 110C (2A) are attracted in both the situations where the Insurance Company is not initially made a party and is required to be noticed and impleaded so, as also where the Insurance Company is already before the Tribunal impleaded as a party. The above interpretation is apparently reasonable and sound.

       Section 96 (2) makes only limited defences available to the insurer even when it is served with a notice of institution of proceedings and gets a right to contest it 1995 JLJ 167 relied on. 1990 ACJ 60 dissented from. [Paras 5 to 7

       (2) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 -- S. 110C (2A) -- permission to allow contest on all grounds to the insurer -- should be in writing -- cannot be deemed to have been granted even when insurer is allowed to lead evidence and cross-examine witnesses on all grounds available to the insured. 1989 ACJ 961 dissented from. [Paras 9 to 11

       (3) Practice -- procedure for exercise of powers statutorily prescribed -such requirement is mandatory -- non-compliance would invalidate the action. ‘Principles of Administrative Law‘ by Jain and Jain IV Edn. 560 and ‘Administrative Law‘ by Prof. H.W.R. Wade, relied on. AIR 1980SC 152 followed. Para 11

       (4) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 -- Ss. 1102A) and 96 (2) -- no written permission to contest on all grounds granted -- insurer cannot contest on negligence and quantum. [Para 12

       (5) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 -- S. 110A - negligence -- not specifically proved by leading evidence -- cannot be inferred on the basis of excessive speed -- speed depends on various factors such as condition of road, position of other moving vehicles, etc. [Para 13

       ¼1½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1939 && /kkjk 110x ¼2d½ rFkk 96¼2½ && /kkjk 110x ¼2d½ ds v/khu mica/k && mu nksuksa ifjfLFkfr;ks esa ykxw gksrs gS tgk¡ chekdrkZ vkjaHk esa gh i{kdkj cuk;k tkrk gS rFkk tgk¡ ckn esa i{kdkj cuk;k tkrk gS && /kkjk 96¼2½ ds v/khu chekdrkZ dks lhfer izfrokn miyC/k djkus okys mica/kksa ij Hkh fopkj djuk gksxkA

       /kkjk 110x ¼2d½ ds v/khu mica/k mu nksuksa ifjfLFkfr;ks eas vkdf"kZr gksrs gS tgk¡ chek daiuh vkjaHk esa gh i{kdkj ugha cukbZ tkrh gS rFk mls lwfpr djuk vkSj ,slk i{kdkj cukuk visf{kr gS] rFkk ogk¡ Hkh tgk¡ vf/kdj.k ds le{k gh chek daiuh dks i{kdkj cuk fy;k x;k gSA mi;qZDr fuoZpu izdVr% ;qfDr;qDr rFkk lk/kkj gSA

       /kkjk 96¼2½ }kjk chekdrkZ dks] dk;Zokfg;ksa ds lafLFkr fd, tkus dh lwpuk dh rkehy fd, tkus rFkk mldk izfrokn djus dk vf/kdkj ikus ij Hkh] lhfer izfrokn gh miyC/k gSA 1995 ts ,y ts 167 voyafcrA 1990 ,l lh ts 60 folEerA ¿ iSjk 5 ls 7À

       ¼2½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1939 && /kkjk 110x ¼2d½ && chekdrkZ dks lHkh vk/kkjksa ij izfrokn djus dh vuqKk && fyf[kr gksuk pkfg, && chekdrkZ dks] miyC/k lHkh vk/kkjksa ij lk{; iw‘k djuk lkf{k;ks dh izfrijh{kk djuk vuqKkr gksus ij Hkh nh xbZ ekuh ugha tk ldrhA 1989 ,l lh ts 961 folEerA ¿ iSjk 9 ls 11À

       ¼3½ izFkk && ‘kfDr;ksa ds iz;ksx ds fy, izfØ;k dkuwuh rkSj ij fofgr && ,slh mis{kk vkKkid gS && vuuqikyu ls dkjZokbZ vfof/kekU; gks tk,xhA tSu rFkk tSu —r *fizfUliYl vkQ ,MfefuLVsªfVo yk* prqFkZ laLdj.k] 560 rFkk izks- ,p- MCY;w-vkj- okMs —r *fMfefuLVªsfVo yk* voyafcrA , vkb vkj 1980 ,l lh 1502 vuqlfjrA ¿ iSjk 11À

       ¼4½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1939 && /kkjk 110x ¼2d½ rFkk 96¼2½ && lHkh vk/kkjksa ij izfrokn ds fy, fyf[kr vuqKk ugha nh xbZ && chekdrkZ mis{kk rFkk ek=k ij izfrokn ugha dj ldrkA ¿ iSjk 12À

       ¼5½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1939 && /kkjk 110d && mis{kk && lk{; is‘k dj fofufnZ"Vr% lkfcr ugha dh xbZ && vR;f/kd xfr ds vk/kkj ij vuqfer ugha dh tk ldrh && xfr lM+d dh n‘kk] pyk;eku ;kuksa dh fLFkfr] vkfn vusd ckrksa ij fuHkZj gksrh gSA ¿ iSjk 13À

ORDER

D.M. Dharmadhikari, J. -- 1. This appeal has been preferred by the National Insurance Company, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Insurer') under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, against the Award dated 19.9.1990, passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Guna, for short, the 'Tribunal'.

2. The necessary facts, in brief, are that deceased Ahmad Hussain was driver of a new Fiat car, temporary No. MRV 580. The Fiat car was one amongst the convoy of about 50 new Fiat cars going from Bombay for delivery to Gwalior. The Fiat car mentioned above which was driven by deceased Ahmad Hussain, met with an accident as truck No. MBF 944, coming from the opposite direction between Guna and Shivpuri, dashed against the car. The driver of the Fiat car lost his life instantaneously.

3. In the claim petition, filed by the mother, brothers and sister of the deceased, all other parties, namely, M/s. Premier Automobiles, an Automobile dealer at Gwalior where the cars were to be delivered, the truck driver Pappu, the owner of the truck Daljit Singh and the Insurance Company (New India Insurance Company, Ltd.) with which the truck was insured, remained ex parte, he hence, did not contest the claim. It is also not in dispute that the appellant National Insurance Co., Ltd., being the insurer of the Fiat Car involved in the accident, led evidence and cross-examined the witnesses examined on behalf of the claimants on all defences available to the insured, i.e., owner of the truck. The claimants also raised no objection to the defences raised by the appellant Insurer for itself and on behalf of the insured.

4. The Tribunal, by the impugned Award, held truck driver to be solely responsible for the accident and awarded a total sum of Rs. 1,58,000/- as compensation. The appellant Insurer, by this appeal, assails the Award on several grounds. Firstly, it is contended that there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased who was driver of the Fiat car and the compensation awarded should have been apportioned half and half between the appellant as insurer of the Fiat car as one party and the insurer and insured of the truck as the second party. The appellant insurer also questioned the quantum of Award determined by the Tribunal. It is contended that the deceased driver had no steady and fixed income. The annual dependency arrived at Rs. 950/- per month with the multiplier of 15 taken in arriving at the figure of compensation is too high when the only dependent of the deceased was his mother Kamarjahan who is advance-aged old lady of 72 years and a minor son, Sabir Ali, aged 8 years.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent claimants raised a preliminary objection that as the appellant insurer was not granted by the Tribunal any permission or direction in its favour for raising all defences on behalf of the insured as contemplated by section 110-C (2-A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for short, the 'old Act', the Insurer cannot be heard in this appeal on the defences which were available only to the insured. It was pointed out that in the terms of the policy, the insurer had not reserved expressly any right to itself to defend the claim on all pleas and defences available only to the insured.

6. Before considering the contentions advanced by the counsel for the parties on the issues of negligence and quantum, we first propose to decide the preliminary objection raised by the respondents on the maintainability of this appeal. The learned counsel at the Bar brought to our notice three decisions rendered by three different High Courts on the interpretation and the procedural requirement of section 110-C (2-A) of the Old Act. The section reads as under:--

"(2-A) Where in the course of any enquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that-(i) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made; or (ii) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the clai


































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