Dr. T.N. Singh, J. -- 1. When this appeal came for hearing before one of us (S.K. Dubey, J.), sitting singly, and it was heard at some length by him, he took the view that the interpretation of Section 110 CC, Motor Vehicle Act, 1939, for sport, the 'Act', in the context of Order 41, Rule 33, CPC by another learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co., Ltd. Indore v. Kamla Bai and others (1990 MPJR 140, hereinafter referred to as Kamlabai's case) was required to be examined by Larger Bench. Indeed, according to him, conflicted directly with this Court's decision in Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjushri Raha (1968 JLJ 189) and otherwise also, the question was of general importance to decide whether in appeal, the Court had power, jurisdiction or duty to award interest at a higher rate in the absence of cross-objection in that regard by the claimant.

2. Twin provisions, above-referred, are extracted in the extenso:

Section 110-CC, M.V. Act:

"110-CC. Award of interest where any claim is allowed.- Where any Court or Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under this Act, such Court or Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf."

Order 41, Rule 33, CPC:

"33. Power of Court of Appeal.- The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees :

Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order."

3. On facts, it is not disputed that in this matter, there is no cross-objection. Admittedly also in the award impugned in the appeal, passed by the M.A.C.T. Shivpuri, interest has been awarded at the rate of 6% per annum and that is made payable from the date of award. Therefore, it is necessary to examine first fore-cited Kamlabai's case (supra). The question of enhancement of interest was raised by the claimant/respondent in the appeal preferred by Insurer, assailing his liability under the award. The appeal was dismissed and, at the same time, claim for enhanced interest too was negated. There is no discussion on the import, purport or scope of Section 110-CC of the Act and the decision is based squarely on Order 41, Rule 33, CPC, relying on a Bench decision of this Court in Sumanbai's case ( 1982 JLJ 5 = AIR 1982 MP 62) as also in Rukmani Devi's case (1984 A.C.J. 548). We reproduce, however, the extract which the learned Judge made from Sumanbai's case:

"A reading of O.41, R.33 clearly goes to show that the rule has been made to provide for certain contingency where it may become necessary to pass a decree although a party may not have preferred an appeal but it does not provide that where a decree has become final against the defendant and the defendant has not challenged that decree by way of appeal or cross-objection still it can be set aside because one of the parties has preferred the appeal whereof the question of the decree against the other defendant is not at all raised."

4. The observation fore-quoted, was made by the Bench in rejecting Insurer/respondent's contention challenging the quantum of compensation awarded, relying on Order 41,