( 1. ) IN this batch of civil revisions as singular question has emerged for

consideration, it was thought seemly to hear the cases analogously and accordingly, they were heard together and are disposed of by this common order.

( 2. ) THE spinal issue that has spiraled to this Court is whether a contractor can approach the Final Authority under the contract at any point of time, or should there be an acceptable fixed normative procedure so that the conception of ad infinitum does not get a liberal entry to the arena of adjudication. In the cases at hand, the M. P. Arbitration Tribunal (in short, the Tribunal) has expressed the view that Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable from the date of accrual of cause of action, i. e. , completion of work in question and, therefore, Section 7-B of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (for brevity, the Act) would not save the lis and has to be thrown over board. To put it differently, whether a contractor would be at liberty to approach the Final Authority under the agreement at his pleasure or would he be constricted and restricted by certain acceptable, reasonable and permissible duration. Be it noted, in all these cases where the orders of the Tribunal have been impugned, the Tribunal has rejected the claims of the claimants on the ground that they had not raised the claims under the agreement before the Final Authority within a period or three years from the date of completion of the work in question.

( 3. ) ASSAILING the aforesaid orders, it is submitted by Mr. Rao and Mr. John, learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply since special limitation has been provided under Section 7-B of the Act. It is contended by them, once it is held that the Limitation Act is not applicable, Section 7-B would be allowed to have full play and the Final Authority can be approached at any point of time, as no time has been stipulates for approaching the Final Authority. Submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that when a period of limitation is not provided, it would be inappropriate to provide a limitation as that would tantamount to legislating which is impermissible. To bolster the aforesaid submission, the learned Counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Sakuru v. Tanaji, ,, AIR1985 SC 1279 , 1985 (5 ) ECR2597 (NULL ), 1985 (22 )ELT327 (SC ), 1985 (2 )SCALE304 , (1985 )3 SCC590 , [1985 ]supp2 SCR109 , 1985 (17 )UJ894 (SC ), Lachmandas v. State of M. P. and Anr. , 2002 (3) MPLJ 21 and an unreported decision rendered in Civil Revision No. 922 of 2003, S. Sermon (India) Road Makers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of M. P. and Ors. , 2004 Arb. W. L. J. 461 (MP ).

( 4. ) COUNTERING the aforesaid submissions, it is contended by Mr. S. K. Yadav, learned Govt. Advocate and Mr. Pillai, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Nagar Panchayat, Ramnpur and Nagar Panchayat, Churhat and Mr. Babar, learned Counsel for the Bhopal Development Authority that the Tribunal has erroneously referred to Article 113 of the Limitation Act whereas it should be Article 137. Submission of learned Counsel for the respondents is that though the Limitation Act is not applicable but it would be travesty of justice if no time frame is fixed for raising a dispute before the Final Authority under the agreement as that would give rise to old, stale and unwarranted claims to be put forth before the Tribunal for adjudication. It is also urged by them that when no limitation is prescribed a reasonable period has to be grafted into the scheme of things to raise claims so that uncalled for results do not eventuate. It is also highlighted by them that the decision rendered in the cases of Lachmandas (supra) and Serman (India) Road Makers (supra) is distinguishable on facts. It is their further submission that raising of a dispute for the purpose of cause of arbitration is sine qua non and keeping