The central legal point established in the judgment is that the definition of 'moral turpitude' as interpreted in legal precedents is crucial in determining the impact of a criminal conviction on employment termination.

Hon'ble Mr. Sanjay Yadav, J.

1. Heard.

2. Short question involved in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is whether a conviction for an offence under Sections 147, 149, 323/149, IPC would tantamount to a "moral turpitude" leading to termination of service.

3. Facts, wherefrom the question emanates briefly are that, the petitioner was initially appointed as General Mazdoor in 1975 (on 23-7-1975). He was promoted as Tub Munshi on 1-1-1978 and as Mining Sardar on 1-1-1987. The petitioner was made Senior Mining Sardar, Grade B from 1-1-1995 and Mining Sardar, Grade A, Production-cum-Safety Assistant, Grade A, in the year 2001. Keeping in view the services rendered, petitioner was awarded with "Johilla Samman".

4. That, complaint was lodged against the petitioner by one Mathura Prasad a terminated employee of State Forest Department, which led to registration of offence under Sections 147, 149, 323/149, IPC.

Trial led therein led to passing of order dated 28-3-2005; whereby the petitioner was convicted for an offence under Section 147/149, IPC for six months' RI under Section 323/149, IPC for six months' RI and Rs. 500/- cost. The sentence was, however, suspended and the petitioner was given the benefit of probation on his depositing Rs. 10,000/-. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said conviction whereon by order dated 27-4-2005 Additional Sessions Judge, Umariya enlarged him on bail. The conviction of the petitioner led to issue of show-cause notice on 23/25-6-2005; whereby, the petitioner was called upon to explain as to why because of his conviction he be not terminated from services. The said show-cause notice was purportedly in consonance with Clause 24.1 read with Clause 26.8 of the Certified Standing Orders.

5. These provisions stipulates :-

24.1. For terminating the services of permanent workman having less than 1 year of continuous service notice of one month in writing with reasons for wages in lieu thereof shall be given by the employer :

Provided that no such notice shall be required to be given when the services of the workman are terminated on account of misconduct established in accordance with the Standing Orders.

Clause 26 of the Certified Standing Orders lays down the instances of "Acts of Misconduct" whereof Clause 26.8 stipulates "Conviction in any Court of law for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude.

6. Subsequently, in pursuance to said show-cause notice, the services of the petitioner were terminated by the impugned order for the reason that he was convicted for an offence under Sections 147, 149, 323/149, IPC.

7. Challenging the order of termination, it is contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the termination of service since could only have been if the conviction was for a criminal offence involving moral turpitude and since the petitioner was not convicted of such an offence the termination order is ipso facto bad.

8. To substantiate this submission that an offence under Sections 147, 149, 323/149, IPC does not tantamount to an offence involving moral turpitude, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh and others Vs. Hazarilal, AIR 2008 SC 1300, as also the decision in Shankar Das Vs. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 772.

9. Countering the submission put-forth on behalf of the petitioner, learned Counsel for the respondents has to urge that the petitioner having been convicted for an offence under Sections 147, 149, 323/149, IPC was issued a show-cause notice in pursuance to provisions contained under Certified Standing Orders as to why for the said conviction his services be not terminated. It is contended that conviction for an offence under Sections 147, 149, 323/149, IPC, since involves a criminal offence involving moral turpitude, his services were rightly terminated being in consonance with the provisions contained under Clause 24.1 read with Clause 26.8 of the Certified Standing Orders.

10.