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1999 Supreme(MP) 406

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)
S.C. Pandey, J., R.P. Jain, Adv. Amicus Curiae
Appellants: Oriental Insurance Company
Vs.
Respondent: Balwant Singh and Ors.
Civil Revision No. 727/96
Decided On: 28.06.1999

Advocates Appeared:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: N.S. Ruprah, Adv.
For Respondents/Defendant: None

The omission of Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 had retrospective effect and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.

Headnote:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - SECTION 166(3) - LIMITATION - OMISSION - EFFECT - ARTICLE 137 OF LIMITATION ACT, 1963 - APPLICABILITY - HELD, OMISSION OF SECTION 166(3) OF THE ACT WIPED OUT THE DISABILITY IMPOSED BY IT WITH RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT AND ARTICLE 137 OF THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL.

Fact of the Case:

The applicant filed an application for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the Act) on 8-3-1995, after a period of 3 years, 5 months, and 16 days from the date of the accident. At the time of filing the application, Section 166(3) of the Act stood deleted by the Motor Vehicles Amending Act, 1994 (the Act No. 54 of 1994) with effect from 14-11-1994. The Tribunal held that the applicant was entitled to file the claim application, as if, there was no period of limitation prescribed.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the omission of Section 166(3) of the Act wiped out the disability imposed by it with retrospective effect and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to proceedings before the Tribunal.

Issues: 1. Whether the omission of Section 166(3) of the Act had retrospective effect? 2. Whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to proceedings before the Tribunal?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the intention of the legislature was not to apply Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Therefore, the intention was not to save the operation Section 166(3) of the Act to pending cases or to cases where the 'cause of action' has already accrued. 2. The Court held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to proceedings before the Tribunal because the Act is a special law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Final Decision: The revision petition was dismissed.

ORDER

S.C. Pandey, J.

1. This revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the Order dated 16-11-95 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bhopal (henceforth the Tribunal) in Claim case No. 51/95. The Tribunal by the impugned order has declined to hold that the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (henceforth the Act) was barred by time and consequently it has held that there was no question of condoning the delay in filing the application.

2. The facts of this case giving rise to this revision petition may be stated in short. The non-applicant No. 1 filed the application for compensation against the Non-applicant No. 3, the owner, the Non-applicant No. 2, the driver and the application claiming compensation for the death of Smt. Tulsibai on 20-9-91 under Section 166 of the Act. The application was filed on 8-3-1995, after a period of 3 years, 5 months and 16 days. At the time of filing of the application, Section 166(3) of the Act stood deleted by Motor Vehicles Amending Act, 1994 (the Act No. 54 of 1994) with effect from 14-11-1994. The Section 166(3) of the Act provided that the claim application before 'the Tribunal' should be filed within 6 months from the date of accident failing which a further period of 6 months was provided for filing the application in case the applicant was able to show 'sufficient cause' for filing an application beyond the period of six months. Thus the outer limit for filing the application under Section 166 of the Act would be 1 year at the most prior to the deletion of Section 166(3) of the Act which provided for the period of limitation. The application filed by non-applicant No. 1 was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay.

3. The non-applicant No. 2, the non-applicant No. 3 and the applicants argued that the accident occurred on 20-9-91. Therefore, as per Section 166(3) of the Act, limitation would expire after one year. The 'cause of action' against them stood extinguished, after one year and consequently the question of condonation of delay did not arise. It appears to have been argued before 'the Tribunal' that the deletion of Section 166(3) would have no effect to those cases wherein the time for filing the application under Section 166 of the Act had already expired on the dale of presentation of the application as per Section 166(3) of the Act. The non-applicant No. 1 on the other hand argued that after deletion of Section 166(3) of 'the Act' there was no limitation provided by 'the Act'. The intention of the legislature was to do away with the period of limitation in all cases of Motor accidents. The non-applicant No. 1 could take advantage of the deletion of Section 166(3) by the amending Act No. 54 of 1994 which came into force from 16-11-1994. It could not be argued by the applicant and non-applicant Nos. 2 and 3 that Section 166(3) of the Act was still on the statute book as it was deleted on 16-11-94. On the date of presentation of the application, no period was prescribed by 'the Act' because Section 166(3) of the Act was not on the statute book. The sub-section simply vanished from the statute-book and therefore, it could not be looked into for any purpose.

4. It appears the Tribunal upheld the contention of the non-applicant No. 1 and held that he was entitled to file the claim application, as if, there was no period of limitation prescribed. In other words, the Tribunal held that the non-applicant No. 1 could take advantage of deletion of Section 166(3) of the Act.

5. The learned counsel for the applicant Shri N.S. Ruprah, assails the conclusion of the Tribunal and argues that deletion of Section 166(3) of the Act would not clothe the applicant with the right to file the application under Section 166(1) of the Act beyond one year from the date of accident with an application for condonation of delay as the accident took place on 20-9-91. By the time the amendment came into force the application under

































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