( 1 ) ON a reference the following question came before a Division Bench (S. B. Sen and Kaina, JJ.) for decision

"whether the Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 110 of the Motor vehicles Act is a Civil Court and a revision petition would lie under section 115, Civil Procedure Code,' against an order passed by it in the course of proceedings before it?"

There was a difference of opinion between my learned Brothers S. B. Sen. J. , and raina, J. Hence the case has, been placed before me. Sen, J. , has held that the claims Tribunal is a 'civil Court' and a revision under Section 115 of the Code of civil Procedure lies against its orders, while Raina, J. has taken a contrary view. On careful consideration of the whole matter I am inclined to agree with the conclusion reached by Sen, J. My reasons for agreeing with Sen, J. are these.

( 2 ) UNDER Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure the High Court is empowered to send for the record of any Court subordinate to it and may make such order in the case as it thinks fit if certain conditions specified in the section are satisfied. The revisional power of the High Court thus depends on two conditions, namely, (i) that the order to be revised must be that of a 'court'; and (ii) that the Court must be subordinate to the High Court. The expression 'court' has nowhere been denned in the Code of Civil Procedure. That matter came for consideration before the Privy Council in Raiah Nilmoni Singh Deo Bahadur v. Taranath Mookerjee, (1881) 9 Ind App 174 (PC ). Under Act X of 1859 (Bengal Rent Act) certain rent suits were made cognizable by the Collectors and that except for the appeal provided under that Act no cognizance could be taken of the suits by any other court. The question arose as to whether the decrees in the rent suits passed by the Collectors could be transferred for execution beyond the jurisdiction of that court. The High Court took the view that the Collector's Court not being a Civil court the provisions of transferring the decree from one Court to another contained in the Code of Civil Procedure could not be attracted. Theii Lordships of the Privy Council, after considering the provisions of Act X of 1859, came to the conclusion:

"it must be allowed that In those sections there is a certain distinction between the Civil Courts there spoken of and the Rent Courts established by the Act, and that the Civil Courts referred to in Section 77. and the kindred sections mean Civil Courts exercising all the. powers of Civil Courts, as distinguished from the Rent Courts which only exercise powers over suits of a limited class. In that sense there is a distinction between the terms; but it is entirely another question whether the Rent Court does not remain a Civil Court in the sense that it is deciding on purely civil questions between persons seeking their civil rights, and whether being a Civil Court in that sense, it does not fall within the provisions of Act VIII of 1859 (the Code of Civil Procedure in force at that time ). It is hardly necessary to refer to those provisions in detail. ' because there is no dispute but that, if the Rent Court is a Civil court within Act VIII of 1859, the Collector has under Section 284 (of act VIII of 1859) the power of transferring his decrees for execution into equivalent Citation: another district. "

(PP. 178-179)In this view of the matter, it was held that the provisions of Section 284 of Act VIII of 1859 were applicable to the decrees passed by the Rent Courts. This decision clearly indicates that there may be Civil Courts which enioy general jurisdiction to decide all civil disputes between individuals inter se or between citizens and the state, and there may be civil Courts whose jurisdiction is confined to certain specified disputes and in that sense they are somewhat different from the general civil Courts established in the country. But the special Courts still maintain their character as 'civil Courts' in spite of the fact th