The existence of an arbitration agreement is a mandatory pre-requisite for invoking jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.

Dipak Misra, J.

1. In this appeal preferred under Section 39(l)(iv) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') the appellant has called in question the defensibility of the judgment dated 11-10-1996 passed by the learned District Judge, Raipur in Civil Suit No. 63-A/94 whereby he has invoked the jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act and has taken steps for appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate certain disputes.

2. The essential facts which need to be stated for the purpose of present appeal are that the respondent No. 1 instituted the aforesaid Civil Suit under Section 20 of the Act for calling for the agreement and to refer the disputes to an arbitrator. According to the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 it had to purchase certain electrical equipments for establishment of transformer at Raipur. The defendant No. 1, M/s Asea Brown Boveri submitted a quotation for the said items. The items in respect of which the quotation was submitted by the defendant No. 1 were to be supplied by the defendant No. 2, the appellant herein. The machineries were supposed to be installed and run by the defendant No. 2. It was further stated in the plaint that these conditions were stipulated in the quotation itself. It was also the condition in the quotation that in case any dispute would arise between the parties the same was to be agitated in the courts situate within the territorial jurisdiction of Bombay by way of arbitration. It was also pleaded that there had been violation of terms and conditions in the quotation as the machineries were not installed and run within the stipulated time, and there had been defects/faults in the transformer. It was also set forth that as the dispute had arisen the plaintiff had given a written notice to the defendant for settlement of the disputes.

3. The defendant No. 1 took the plea of territorial jurisdiction and also took further plea that allegations made by the plaintiff were not correct as the terms indicated in the quotation had been duly complied with. It was also put forth that before approaching the Court the plaintiff had not served notice for arbitration.

4. The defendant No. 2 had resisted the plea of the plaintiff on the ground that there was no agreement between the plaintiff and the said defendant. According to the said defendant he had supplied the machinery to the defendant No. 1 at its factory premises at Bangalore. It was further set forth that the plaintiff had no role to play with the arrangement brought into existence between the defendant No. 1 and the defendant No. 2. Existence of agreement as well as any stipulation for arbitration was disputed by the said defendant No. 2.

5. The learned trial Judge framed as many as four issues and came to hold that the Court at Raipur had jurisdiction and, therefore, the controversy could be adjudicated by the said Court. With regard to the contractual relationship between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2, in paragraph 4 of the judgment the learned trial Judge opined that there is no direct contractual relationship between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 but the defendant No. 2 is the agent of the defendant No. 1, and therefore, the arbitration clause which forms the part of the quotation submitted by the defendant No. 2 would also be applicable to him. Being of this view he allowed the prayer of the plaintiff and directed for submission of names for the purpose of appointment of an arbitrator.

6. Assailing the aforesaid judgment Mr. Y. K. Munshi, learned counsel for the appellant has raised a singular contention that in absence of any arbitration clause jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act could not have been invoked.

Mr. J. P. Sanghi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/plaintiff has contended that the defendant No. 2 was the agent of the defendant No. 1 and as such it is bound by the terms and conditions incorporated in the quotation. He has also contended that determination of liability is in the domain of