( 1. ) THIS is an appeal under Section 147 (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Trusts Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the decision of the Tribunal relating to compensation.

( 2. ) LAND belonging to the appellant has been acquired under the Act. As the appellant did not accept the compensation offered by the respondent, the Trust made a reference to the Tribunal under Section 72 (3) of the Act, The Tribunal awarded to the appellant compensation at the rate of Rupees 6,000/-per acre for the land, Rs. 5,000/-for the building, Rs. 3,000/- for the well and Rs. 815/- for the trees. Thus the Tribunal awarded a total sum of Rs. 1,20,060/- inclusive of interest as compensation to the appellant. The contention of the appellant is that he is entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. 20/- per sq. yard for the land, Rs. 20,000/- for the building, Rs. 5,000/-for the well, Rs. 2,500/- for the trees and Rupees 10,000/- for loss of business and earnings. He thus claims a sum of Rs. 13,39,056/ -. He, however, affixed a Court-fee of Rs. 7. 50 on the memorandum of appeal treating it as an appeal under Article 11 of schedule II to the Court-tees Act. The office is of the view that ad valorem Court-fee is payable on the amount of compensation claimed, by the appellant in excess of that awarded by the Tribunal under Article 1-A of Schedule I read with Section 8 of the Court-fees Act, As the appellant did not agree with this view of the office, the matter went before the Taxing Officer who has referred it to the Taxing Judge for a decision whether ad valoren. Court-fee is payable.

( 3. ) THERE are fifteen other connected appeals of a similar nature out of which thirteen have been filed by the Improvement Trust for reducing the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. A similar point is involved in these appeals and has been referred to this Court for decision by the Taxing Officer.

( 4. ) ALTHOUGH the main contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the matter is governed by Article 11 of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act, a feeble argument was advanced at the hearing that such an appeal is not governed by the provi-sions of the Court-fees Act at all. It would be proper to deal with this argument before proceeding to consider by which provisions of the Court-fees Act, these memoranda of appeal would be governed.

( 5. ) IT was urged that Court-fee is not leviable on the memorandum of appeal in question either under Section 3 or under Section 4 of the Court-fees Act. Section 3 provides for levy of fees in High Courts on their original side. It is, therefore, obvious that it is not attracted in this case. The main point for consideration, therefore, is whether Court-fee is leviable under Section 4 of the Court-fees Act. Section 4 provides, inter alia, that no document of any of the kinds specified in the First or Second Schedule of the Act shall be received by the High Court in the exercise of its Jurisdiction as regards appeals from the Courts subject to its superintendence unless in respect of such document there be paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document. It has been urged that the Tribunal cannot be said to be a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court. I find no merit in this contention. The word court has not been defined in the Court-fees Act and must, therefore, be construed in its widest sense as including Tribunals which perform judicial functions. In Secy. of State v. H. C. I. Society AIR 1931 PC 149 their Lordships, while dealing with a case under the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911, expressed a doubt whether the Tribunal constituted under the said Act was a Court; but that was apparently because it was a body free from the control and superintendence of the High Court. Their Lordships expressly observed at page 153 that they did not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the que