1993 Supreme(MP) 760
(1995) ILLJ 318 MP, 1994 (0) MPLJ 571
D.M. Dharmadhikari, R Lahoti J.
M.P. State Road Transport ...
vs
Jaiprakash Narayan Tiwari And ...
DECIDED ON : 7 December, 1993
The amendment to Section 62 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960, prescribing a period of limitation, cannot be given retrospective operation, so as to destroy the vested right of the employee to approach the Labour Court under the unamended provision.
Headnote:
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS - LIMITATION - APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 62 OF THE MADHYA PRADESH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT, 1960 - RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION - VESTED RIGHT OF EMPLOYEE TO APPROACH LABOUR COURT - INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 31(3) AND SECTION 62 OF THE ACT.
Fact of the Case:
The employer challenged the order of the Industrial Court, arguing that the bar of limitation under Section 62 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (the Act) applied. The employee had approached the Labour Court after 13 years from the date of termination of his services.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the employee's application to the Labour Court was not barred by limitation, as the services of the employee were terminated in 1973 when there was no prescribed period of limitation for approaching the employer or the Labour Court. The court also held that the employee's failure to approach the employer in terms of the proviso to Sub-section (b) of Section 62(1) of the Act did not bar his application.
Issues: 1. Whether the bar of limitation under Section 62 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 applied to the employee's application to the Labour Court. 2. Whether the employee's failure to approach the employer in terms of the proviso to Sub-section (b) of Section 62(1) of the Act barred his application.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court relied on the decisions of the Division Benches of this Court in Somsingh Onkar Singh v. M.P.S.R.T.C., Bhopal and Ors., Dwarka Singh Thakur v. The Industrial Court, M.P. and Ors., and M.P.T.S.R.T. Corporation v. Meharban Singh and Ors., which held that the amendment to Section 62 of the Act, prescribing a period of limitation, cannot be given retrospective operation, so as to destroy the vested right of the employee to approach the Labour Court under the unamended provision. 2. The court also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Mishra, which held that a new law of limitation providing for a shorter period cannot certainly extinguish a vested right of action.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed, and the court made no order as to costs.
D.M. Dharmadhikari, J.
1. In this petition filed by the employer against the order of the Industrial Court, the attempt is made to rack up the legal issue of the applicability of the bar of limitation under Section 62 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (in short 'the Act'). In the opinion of this Court, the point of the applicability of the bar of limitation under Section 62 of the Act, as it stands today and on the relevant dale, is squarely covered by three Division Bench decisions of this Court, the first being in the case of Somsingh Onkar Singh v. M.P.S.R.T.C., Bhopal and Ors., 1980 MPLJ 211, followed by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dwarka Singh Thakur v. The Industrial Court, M.P. and Ors., 1989 M.P.S.L.R. 98 and the decision in the case of M.P.T.S.R.T. Corporation v. Meharban Singh and Ors., (1993-II-LLJ-234).
2. The learned counsel appearing for the employer submits that the Division Bench decisions of this Court deserve reconsideration by reference of the legal question of limitation for decision by a larger Bench of this Court, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of C. Beepathuma and Ors. v. Velasari Shankaranarayan, AIR 1965 SC 241 and the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 2156.
3. Before we take up for consideration the legal question raised on behalf of the petitioner, a short legislative history of the provisions contained in Section 31 and Section 62 of the Act need to be reviewed. Prior to the amendment introduced to the Act by ordinance promulgated on July 30, 1976, provision of Section 31 (3) with the proviso thereunder read as under:-
"31. Notice of change-
(3) A representative of employees or an employee desiring a change in respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule 11 or any other matter arising out of such change may make an application to the Labour Court in such manner as may be prescribed.
Provided that no such application shall lie unless the representative of employees or the employee, as the case may be, has in the prescribed manner approached the employer with a request for the change and no agreement has been arrived at in respect of the change within the prescribed period."
The provision for limitation at the relevant time i.e. prior to July 30, 1976 in Section 62(1) of the Act was as under:-
"62. Commencement of proceedings. - Proceedings before a Labour Court shall be commenced-
(1) in respect of dispute falling under (a) of paragraph (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 61 within three months from the date of the last approach under Sub-section (3) of Section 31."
4. It may be seen from the above provisions that the employee could not approach the Labour Court for relief unless he has, in the prescribed manner, approached the employer with a request for change and there is consequent failure of arrival of any agreement between the parties. Prior to July 30, 1976, the limitation prescribed for filing an application to the Labour Court under Section 31 the Act was three months from the date of last approach made to the employer under the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 31. It is to be noticed that prior to the Ordinance of 1976, there was no limitation prescribed for making an approach to the employer under the aforesaid proviso and the limitation for filing case in the Labour Court commenced from last date of approach.
5. The proviso under Sub-section (3) of Section 31 of the Act, requiring an approach as a precondition for taking the dispute to the Labour Court, was deleted with effect from January 26, 1982 by M.P. Act No. 41 of 1981. By the same Act No. 41 of 1981, Section 62, providing limitation, was substituted by the following provision, the relevant part of which is reproduced below:-
"62. Commencement of proceedings - Proceedings before a Labour Court shall be commenced--
(1) in respect of a dispute falling under Clause (a)