Filing of proceedings Under Section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code does not interrupt or arrest the running of time against the respondent so as to bar the claim of the appellant on the ground of adverse possession.

S.C. Pandey, J.

1. This appeal Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the judgment and decree dated 17-4-96, passed by Ist Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Sidhi, in Civil Appeal No. 10-A of 1995, arising out of judgment and decree dated 29-3-1995, passed by First Civil Judge Class-II, Sidhi, in Civil Suit No. 28-A of 1992.

2. This is plaintiff's appeal, whereby he assails the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court, which reversed the decree of the Trial Court, in favour of the appellant, and dismissed his suit. The case of the appellant was that he was in possession of the suit land, aving an area of 21 x 63', approximately, 0.03 acres which is part of new Khasra No. 437 situated at Village Kotarkalan, Tahsil Gopadbanas, District Sidhi. According to the appellant, the old Khasra No. of the aforesaid place of land was 282/1. The claim of the appellant was based on the allegation that he was in adverse possession of the suit land for over 30 years and, therefore, he had perfected his title by adverse possession. It was claimed by the appellant that he had constructed a house on the suit land which belonged to one Mangal Bahelia. Subsequently, this land was acquired by the State. But the ruler of the erstwhile State of Rewa, did not disposses the father and uncle of the appellant as they had already constructed a house upon it. It was also stated in the plaint that earlier, in the year 1968-69 proceedings Under Section 248 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as 'Code' in short), were instituted. These proceedings were decided in his favour. There was second round of proceedings Under Section 248 of the Code in the year 1983-84. These proceedings too were not pursued in view of the earlier order. It was the claim of the appellant that he was in open, hostile and continuous possession of the land in dispute for the last 40 years. The limitation for perfecting title against State is 30 years as per Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963, (hereinafter referred to as 'Act' for short). The period for limitation was to be counted from the day on which Mangal Bahalia placed the appellant's father in possession. Therefore, as per Article 112 of the aforesaid Act, the time began to run against the respondent from that date as per Column 3 of Article 112 of the Act. It was claimed that after 30 years the respondent had no power to evict him from the land involved in suit. The appellant claimed to have perfected his title by adverse possession against the State of Madhya Pradesh, on the date of filing of the suit i.e. on 20-4-1992.

3. The respondent, on the other hand, claimed that the appellant had not perfected the title by adverse possession, even though, the appellant may have been in possession for a long time. It was claimed that running of time was arrested by taking up proceedings against the appellant Under Section 248 of the Code (in the years 1968-69 and 1983-84).

4. The trial Court decreed the suit of the appellant and declared that the appellant had become Bhumiswami of the suit land having perfected his title by adverse possession.

5. In appeal, the order passed by the trial Court was reversed by the lower appellate Court on the ground that there was an arrest of running of time against the respondent because the respondent took steps to evict the appellant by initiating eviction proceedings Under Section 248 of the Code in the year 1968-69, and again in 1983-84. The appellant had already constructed a house on the suit land in the year 1951 and, therefore, it was not in dispute before the lower appellate Court that at least from 1951, the appellant was in possession of the suit land and his actions showed that the possession was adverse to the respondent. This is a finding of fact and is binding on this Court in second appeal. That apart the State also did not challenge the finding of lower Appellate Court. For this reason this Court assumes tha