SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1997 Supreme(MP) 695

T.S. Doabia, J.
Hemant Kumar S/O Rajbiharilal
vs
Shankarlal S/O Jeevanlal And Ors.
Decided On : 1 October, 1997

Legal representatives can substitute the cause of action of their need in a petition under Chapter III-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, and a handicapped person can be considered a landlord under Section 23-J(iv) of the Act.

Headnote:

ACCOMMODATION CONTROL ACT - SECTION 23-J - LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES - SUBSTITUTION OF CAUSE OF ACTION - NEED OF LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES - HANDICAPPED PERSON - LANDLORD - AMENDMENT OF PETITION - ORDER 6, RULE 17 - DISMISSAL OF MAIN PETITION - SURVIVAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION - SUMMARY OF THE ACTS AND SECTIONS REFERENCED AND DISCUSSED BY THE COURT.

Fact of the Case:

Leela Devi filed a petition under Chapter III-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, seeking eviction for her own need. After her death, Hemant Kumar filed an application to continue the proceedings for the need of his son. The Rent Controlling Authority allowed the application, but on revision, the High Court held that Hemant Kumar could not claim eviction for the need of his grandson. Hemant Kumar then filed an application stating that he required the premises for his own need as a handicapped person, but the Court below dismissed the main petition.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that in the event of the death of a landlord, his legal representatives can seek amendment to be substituted as their own need as the basis of the cause of action. The Court also held that the earlier decision of the High Court in C. R. No. 98/97 did not debar the present petitioner from seeking relief.

Issues: 1. Whether legal representatives can substitute the cause of action of their need in a petition under Chapter III-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961? 2. Whether a handicapped person can be considered a landlord under Section 23-J(iv) of the Act?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The High Court held that legal representatives can substitute the cause of action of their need in a petition under Chapter III-A of the Act, relying on the decisions in Nabi Ahmed v. Ramprakash Rastogi and Dinanath v. Dharmendra Kumar. 2. The Court also held that a handicapped person can be considered a landlord under Section 23-J(iv) of the Act.

Final Decision: The High Court allowed the petition and directed the Rent Controlling Authority to consider the application filed by Hemant Kumar in accordance with the law.

ORDER

T.S. Doabia, J.

1. One Leela Devi filed a petition under Chapter III-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). She was seeking eviction for her own need. According to her, she wanted to do some retail business. Her plea was that she is a landlady Under Section 23-J of the Act. This application was taken up by the Rent Controlling Authority. Leela Devi died. Thereafter, an application was filed by Hemant Kumar in which he took a plea that he be permitted to continue with the proceedings as the premises are required for the need of his son. This prayer was allowed by the Rent Controlling Authority (hereinafter referred to as the Authority). This order was challenged in this Court by filing civil revision No. 98 of 1997. In this petition, it was observed that Hemant Kumar was not within his rights to claim eviction under Chapter III-A for the need of a person who was grandson of the original landlord. However, at the same time, in paras 7 and 8 following observations were made :

"From the aforesaid discussion and the law laid down in the case of Nabi Ahmed (supra), it is held that the legal representatives can substitute the cause of action of their need only. In the present case, need of legal representative is not substituted but the need of son of one of the legal representatives is sought to be substituting the cause of action. By way of amendment cause of action is not substituted for the need of legal representatives but that of the son of one of the legal representatives. Smt. Leela Devi could not have filed the application for the need of her son's son. Therefore, the right which was not available to original landlady cannot be invoked by the legal representatives. Therefore, the amendment which was sought could not have been allowed."

A perusal of the para 7 which has been reproduced above, indicates that this Court while deciding Civil Revision No. 98 of 1997 did observe that "the legal representatives can substitute the cause of action of their need only." Armed with the aforesaid observations made by this Court, Hemantkumar filed an application in which he pleaded that he requires the premises for his own need. He also stated that he is a handicapped person and therefore, he would be a landlord as defined in Section 23-J(iv) of the Act. This application was pending. The Court below dismissed the main petition holding that no cause of action survives. It is against the above order, the present petition has been filed.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the very decision which was earlier relied upon by him when Civil Revision No. 98 of 1997 was decided. This decision is Nabi Ahmed v. Ramprakash Rastogi, 1989 MPRCJ 482. In the above case, R. C. Lahoti, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed that in the event of death of landlord, his legal representatives can seek amendment to be substituted as their own need as basis of cause of action. Position in this case is no different. Apart from the aforementioned decision, under somewhat similar circumstances, same view was expressed in Civil Revision No. 16 of 1996. In the above case, a suit was filed Under Section 12(1)(d) and (f) of the Act. The landlord was Mahavir. He died. Later on, his grandsons wanted to participate in the proceedings by filing an application under Order 6, Rule 17. This prayer was disallowed. This order was challenged. It was held that the death of the original landlord and the need of his grandsons would equally be covered by the term "subsequent event" as visualised by the Supreme Court of India in the case reported as Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711. After taking note of the arguments so raised following observations were made in para 7. -

"I am, however, of the view that the decision given by the Supreme Court in the case reported as Hasmat Rai (supra), squarely applies to the facts of this revision petition. As indicated above, the events which have taken plac









Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Judicial Analysis

AI

SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top