An order granting or vacating an interim stay does not finally determine any right or liability of the parties and therefore cannot be elevated to the status of a 'judgment' for the purposes of Clause 10 of Letters Patent.

R.V. Raveendran, C.J.

1. These three appeals involve common questions of law. Therefore, they are heard together by consent and are disposed of by this common order.

2. The twelve appellants in LPA No. 442 of 2004 claim that they were appointed as Bill Collectors by the Fifth respondent-District Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Rewa M.P. (for short the Bank) in the year, 1991. With effect from 1-5-1998, they were paid monthly salary after deducting Provident Fund, Group Insurance etc. They were not absorbed as regular employees in spite of continuously serving for more than 12 years. On the other hand, the Bank terminated their services by order dated 28-2-2003. Appellants filed W. P. No. 1609 of 2003 challenging the same. An interim order was granted on 31-3-2003 and 15-5-2003 directing their continuance.

3. The appellant in LPA No. 456 of 2004 was appointed temporarily as Bill Collector Clerk on 12-10-1999 by the Bank with regular salary with deduction of P.F., Group Insurance etc. He was served an order of termination dated 30-6-2004. The appellant filed W.P. No. 3732 of 2004 where an interim stay of the termination order dated 30-6-2004 was granted.

4. The three appellants in LPA No. 463 of 2004 were appointed as Clerks on 16-4-1992, 16-4-1992 and 11-3-1997 by the Bank, on daily wage basis. By order dated 26-6-2004, their services were sought to be terminated with effect from 30-6-2004 as no longer required. Appellants challenged the said order in W. P. No. 3733 of 2004 and an interim order was made on 30-6-2004 directing continuance of their service.

5. The respondent Bank appeared and applied for vacating stay on the grounds that the appellants were employed in connection with a contract given by the M.P. State Electricity Board for collection of electricity bills; that the Electricity Board had cancelled the said contract from 31-3-2004; that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies had also refused sanction for recruitment; that the Bank was running under loss; and, therefore, not being in a position to continue their employment, it resorted to termination of their service. The learned single Judge vide orders dated 14-7-2004, 15-7-2004 and 15-7-2004 in the respective writ petitions vacated the interim order earlier granted. Feeling aggrieved, the writ petitioners have filed these appeals.

6. A preliminary objection is raised by Shri R. K. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the Bank, about the maintainability of these Letters Patent Appeals. It is submitted that having regard to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Raymond Cement Works vs. State of M.P. and others, 1999 (2) MPLJ 689, a Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable against an order, passed by a single Judge in a writ proceeding; vacating an interim stay. In Raymond Cement, the Division Bench considered the scope of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent which provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the 'judgment' of a Single Judge, as detailed in that clause. As the term 'judgment' was not defined in the Letters Patent, the Division Bench considered the matter with reference to the definition of 'judgment' and 'decree' in section 2(9) and section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Relying on the said definitions, the Division Bench held that to be termed as 'judgment', there should be an adjudication which finally and conclusively determines the rights of parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy. The Division Bench held that a Letters Patent Appeal would lie only in cases where there was a final adjudication of the rights of parties, or controversy involved in the matter; and as an interlocutory order granting or vacating stay does not finally decide any of the rights of parties in controversy, and the writ petition in which the interim order was passed will be pending, a Letters Patent Appeal would not be maintainable.

7. There is no dispute that if Raymond Cement is applied, these appeals are not maintainabl