K.L. Shrivastava, J.

1. This order shall also govern the disposal of Criminal Revisions Nos. 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 all of 1986 preferred respectively by Kaliya, Vestiya, Khimchand, Bhursingh and Ditliya.

2. Circumstances giving rise to the revision petitions are these. Complaints were filed against the petitioners in respect of offences under Section 26(1)(h) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (for short 'the Act') for having cleared and broken the land of the reserved forest on 30-6-1983.

3. At the conclusion of the respective trial, each of the petitioners was convicted of the said offence and sentenced to undergo R. I. for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 25/-.

4. According to the prosecution Khasra Nos. 129/124 and 129/136 of village Ponchi Imli, Tahsil Bhabra, District Jhabua have been declared reserved forest vide notification under Section 20(1) of the Act (vide Ex. P-5 dt. 28-4-1972).

5. The contention of the petitioners' learned counsel is that as there is nothing in the evidence of Shantilal to prove that the lands under cultivation were cleared in June 1983 and that they form part of the Khasra numbers referred to above the offence is not constituted. In support of his contention he places reliance on the decision in Deb Ram's case, AIR 1952 All. 33 wherein it has been held that where the clearing or breaking up of the land is prior to the dale of notification, no offence under Section 26(1)(h) of the Act is constituted. He next contends that in the appellate Court the petitioners were not informed about the availability of free legal assistance at State cost and this constitutes infraction of their fundamental right of free legal assistance at State cost guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the case deserves to be remanded to the appellate court. In support of this submission reliance has been placed on the decisions in Suk Das's case, AIR 1986 SC 991 and Hiralal's case, 1988 Cri.L.J. 457.

6. The point for consideration is whether the revision petitions deserve to be allowed.

7. It is not in dispute that at the hearing in the appellate Court the petitioners were not represented by any counsel. In the decision in Suk Das's case (supra) it has been observed as under:

Free legal assistance at State cost is a fundamental right of a person accused of an offence which may involve jeopardy to his life or personal liberty. This fundamental right is implicit in the requirement of reasonable, fair and just procedure prescribed by Article 21. The exercise of this fundamental right is not conditional upon the accused apply in for free legal assistance so that if he does not make an application for free legal assistance the trial may lawfully proceed without adequate legal representation being afforded to him. On the other hand the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge before whom the accused appears is under an obligation to inform the accused that if he is unable to engage the services of a lawyer on account of poverty or indigence, he is entitled to obtain free legal services at the cost of the State. The conviction reached without informing the accused that they were entitled to free legal assistance and inquiring from them whether they warned a lawyer to be provided to them at State cost which resulted the accused remaining unrepresented by a lawyer in the trial is clearly a violation of the fundamental right of the accused under Article 21 and the trial must be held to be vitiated on account of a fatal constitutional infirmity.

8. It may be pointed out that the expression 'trial' does not merely connote 'trial' as is commonly understood but includes even investigation and appeal. In this connection the following observations in relation to the fundamental right of speedy public trial implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution, made in paragraph 25 of the Full Bench decision in Madheshwardhari Singh's case, AIR 1986 Pat 324 may profitably be reproduced:

On principle I am clearly of the opinion that in the majesti