G.G. Sohani, J.

1. This petition, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against an order dated 7th January, 1970, passed by the Board of Revenue in Revision No. 170 2/68.

2. The brief facts giving rise to this petition are as follows :-

One Nandibai widow of Jala died on 9-9-1953. Respondents No. 2 and 3 made an application to the Tahsildar, Dhar, for mutation of their names in place of the deceased Nandibai. A similar application was also made by the petitioner. Both these applications were heard together as Mutation Case No. 56/1962 x 110. The tahsildar, by his order dated 31-12-1966 allowed the application of the petitioner. Against that order respondents No. 2 and 3 preferred an appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dhar, on 13-3-1967, being Appeal No. 70/ 1966-67. The Sub Divisional Officer, by his order dated 13-9-1967, dismissed the appeal on the short ground that it was barred by time as it was filed beyond the period of forty-five days prescribed by section 47 (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code'. This decision was affirmed by the Additional Commissioner, Ujjain, in Second Appeal No. 171/1967-68, Respondents No. 2 and 3 than filed a revision petition No. 170-11/ 1968-A before the Board of Revenue. By an order dated 7-1-1970, the Board held that the period of limitation applicable to the appeal preferred before the sub-Divisional Officer was sixty days as provided by the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), and hence the appeal was filed within the period of limitation. In this view of the matter, the Board set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Additional Commissioner and directed the Sub-Divisional Officer to hear the appeal on merits. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has preferred this petition.

3. Shri Chaphekar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the impugned order suffered from an error apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as the Board held that the period of limitation prescribed by the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, was applicable to an appeal presented against an order dated 31-12-1966 by the Tahsildar, even though the Act had been repealed and the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 had come into force on 2-10-1959 prescribing by section 47 (a) thereof a period of forty-five days for filing an appeal. On behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3 Shri S. D. Sanghi, learned council fully supported the order of the Board. He contended that by virtue of clause (d) of the first proviso to section 261 of the Code, the procedure prescribed under the repealed law in respect of the enforcement of vested rights, was saved and as the respondents No. 2 and 3 had a vested right of appeal prevailing on 1-10-1953, the date of institution of proceeding for mutation by them, the provisions of the Act providing a period of sixty days for filing first appeal would be applicable. The question for consideration therefore is whether the period of limitation for filing an appeal against an order which was passed after the coming into force of the Code would be that which is prescribed by the Code or would be one prescribed by the Act which was in force when the proceedings in question were instituted.

4. Now, the law of limitation is a law relating to procedure. Salmond, in his authoritative work on Jurisprudence, has put the matter thus :-

Whether I have a right to recover certain property is a question of substantive law for the determination and the protection of such rights are among the ends of the administration of justice; but in what Courts and within what time I must institute proceedings are questions of procedural law, for they relate merely to the modes in which the Courts fulfill their function.

As observed by Sulaiman Ag. C. J. (as he then was in Hazari Tewari v. Mt. Maktulla Chaubain and others AIR 1932 All 30], it cannot be said that t