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2015 Supreme(MP) 169
MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Sujoy Paul, J.
Jai Prakash Agrawal v. Anand Agrawal and others
Writ Petition No.1342 of 2015 (Gwalior) : against the order
dated 13.2.2015, passed by Third Additional District Judge, Vidisha
in Case No.26-A of 2013; Decided on 20.3.2015.
D.D. Bansal for petitioner;
K.S. Tomar with J.S. Kaurav for respondents No.1 to 3.
Headnote:Public Trusts Act, 1951 (M.P.) -- Ss.2(1) and 25 -- M.P. Civil Courts Act, 1958 -- Ss.3, 7(1) and 15(2)(3) -- Civil P.C., 1908 -- O.7 R.10, O.7 R.11 and S.151 -- civil jurisdiction under M.P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 -- civil suit filed for declaration and injunction directly before ADJ -- objection under section 151 of CPC filed by petitioner which was rejected -- as per section 7(1) of the Act, 1958 District Judge is a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction -- function of District Judge can be discharged by Additional District Judge if there is exists a general or special order by District Judge assigning him said work -- impugned order is liable to be interfered with and set aside -- ADJ directed to submit record of instant suit to District Judge -- District Judge shall pass orders either transfer concerned record to appropriate Court as per order of distribution of business or to any other Court of competent jurisdiction -- petition allowed.
Held : A plain reading of section 7 makes it clear that sub-section 1 of section 7 declares the District Judge as Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. This function of District Judge can be discharged by Additional District Judge if there exists a general or special order by the District Judge assigning him the said work.
[Para 19
The impugned order dated 13.2.2015 is set aside. Learned ADJ is directed to submit the record of instant suit to the District Judge for appropriate orders. District Judge, in turn, shall pass orders either transfer the concerned record to the appropriate Court as per order of distribution of business or to any other Court of competent jurisdiction. Learned District Judge will be at liberty to exercise his power flowing from section 7(2) read with section 15(3) of the Act of 1958. 1993 JLJ 565, 1988(II) MPWN 98, 1991 JLJ 711, AIR 2008 SC 3174, AIR 1956 SC 391 and 2001(2) MPLJ 82 referred to.
[Para 20
yksd U;kl vf/kfu;e] 1951 ¼e-iz-½ & /kkjk 2¼1½ rFkk 25 & e-iz- flfoy U;k;ky; vf/kfu;e] 1958 & /kkjk 3] 7¼1½ rFkk 15¼2½¼3½ & flfoy izfdz;k lafgrk] 1908 & vk-7 fu-10] vk-7 fu-11 rFkk 151 & e-iz- yksd U;kl vf/kfu;e] 1951 ds v/khu flfoy vf/kdkfjrk & ?kks”k.kk ,oa O;kns’k ds fy, flfoy okn lh/ks vfrfjDr ftyk U;k;k/kh’k ds le{k izLrqr & ;kph }kjk flfoy izfdz;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 151 ds v/khu vk{ksi izLrqr & tks vLohd`r fd, x, & vf/kfu;e] 1958 dh /kkjk 7¼1½ ds vuqlkj ftyk U;k;k/kh’k vkjafHkd vf/kdkfjrk dk iz/kku flfoy U;k;ky; gS & ftyk U;k;k/kh’k ds d`R; vfrfjDr ftyk U;k;k/kh’k }kjk fd, tk ldrs gSa ;fn ftyk U;k;k/kh’k dk dksbZ lkekU; ;k fo’ks”k vkns’k dfFkr dk;Z dks mls lkSairs gq, fo|eku gSa & vk{ksfir vkns’k gLr{ksi fd, tkus ;ksX; gS rFkk vikLr fd;k tkrk gS & vfrfjDr ftyk U;k;k/kh’k dks bl okn dk vfHkys[k ftyk U;k;k/kh’k dks izLrqr djus ds fy, funsf’kr fd;k x;k & ftyk U;k;k/kh’k vkns’k ikfjr djsxk ;k rks dk;Z forj.k ds vkns’k ds vuqlkj lacaf/kr vfHkys[k leqfpr U;k;ky; dks ;k fdlh vU; l{ke vf/kdkfjrk okys U;k;ky; dks varfjr djsxk & ;kfpdk eatwj dh tkrh gSA
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % ljy :i ls /kkjk 7 dks i<+us ls ;g Li”V gksrk gS fd /kkjk 7 dh mi/kkjk ¼1½ ftyk U;k;k/kh’k dks vkjafHkd vf/kdkfjrk dk iz/kku flfoy U;k;ky; ?kksf”kr djrh gSA ftyk U;k;k/kh’k dk ;g d`R; vfrfjDr ftyk U;k;k/kh’k }kjk fd;k tk ldrk gS ;fn ftyk U;k;k/kh’k dk dksbZ lkekU; ;k fo’ks”k vkns’k dfFkr dk;Z dks mls lkSairs gq, fo|eku gSA
ifj.kkeLo:i] vk{ksfir vkns’k fnukad 13-2-2015 vikLr fd;k tkrk gSA fo}ku vfrfjDr ftyk U;k;k/kh’k dks bl okn dk vfHkys[k mfpr vkns’k ds fy, ftyk U;k;k/kh’k dks Hkstus ds fy, funsf’kr fd;k tkrk gSA ftyk U;k;k/kh’k okn esa vkns’k ikfjr djsxk ;k rks lacaf/kr vfHkys[k dk;Z&forj.k vkns’k ds vuqlkj leqfpr U;k;ky; dks ;k fdlh vU; l{ke vf/kdkfjrk okys U;k;ky; dks varfjr djsxkA fo}ku ftyk U;k;k/kh’k vf/kfu;e 1958 dh /kkjk 7¼2½ lgifBr /kkjk 15¼3½ esa izokfgr ‘kfDr ds iz;ksx ds fy, Lora= gksxkA 1993 ts ,y ts 565] 1988 ¼2½ e-iz- ohDyh uksV~l 98] 1991 ts ,y ts 711] , vkb vkj 2008 ,l lh 3174] , vkb vkj 1956 ,l lh 391 rFkk 2001 ¼2½ ,e ih ,y ts 82 fufnZ”VA
1. This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution challenges the order dated 13.2.2015 passed by third Additional District Judge, Vidisha in Case No.26-A/13.
2. The respondents No.1 to 3 filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction (Annexure P-2). Admittedly, the said suit was filed on the basis of the Special Act, i.e., M.P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 (Act of 51). In the course of proceedings, the present petitioner-defendant No.2 filed an application under section 151 CPC (Annexure P-4). In the said application, it is contended that the learned District Judge has issued a distribution memo for the years 2013-2014 and 2015. As per memo, cases under the Special Acts needs to be heard only by the District and Sessions Judge, Vidisha. On the basis of aforesaid stand, it is contended by the petitioner that this fact was suppressed by the plaintiff and the suit was directly filed before the Court of Additional District Judge. It is contended that as per the M.P. Public Trusts Act, the jurisdiction is vested with the Principal Civil Court. The Court of Additional District Judge cannot be treated as the Court of Principal Civil Court. Lastly, it is prayed that the suit be returned to plaintiff by reserving liberty to him to present it before the appropriate Court. The Court below by impugned order has rejected the said application.
3. Criticizing this order, Shri D.D.Bansal, learned counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this Court on section 2 of the M.P. Public Trusts Act which defines the word “Court”. He submits that definition of the “Court”, means Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district. By taking this Court to section 7 of the Civil Courts’ Act, 1958 (Act of 58) it is contended that the Court of District Judge shall be the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the Civil District. To elaborate, he contends that the Additional District Judge can discharge any of the functions of District Judge including functions of Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, provided there exists a general or special order of the District Judge assigning this work for the purpose of discharging the said function by the Additional District Judge. He contends that a conjoint reading of section 2 of M.P. Public Trusts Act with section 7 of the Civil Courts’ Act leaves no room for any doubt that the instant suit, in absence of any general or special order of the District Judge, could not have been presented before the Additional District Judge. The attention is also drawn on the distribution memo dated 2.4.2012 (Annexure P-6). It is contended that if the instant suit is examined only on the anvil of pecuniary jurisdiction, no doubt, the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. It is contended that the matter need not be examined in the light of pecuniary jurisdiction because it is a matter which is squarely covered under clause 1(4) of the distribution memo which makes it clear that if it is otherwise described, it is only the District Judge under the special act who can try the suit. In support of his contentions, Shri D.D. Bansal relied on following judgments :
1993 JLJ 565=1993 MPLJ 603 (Vinod Kumar Jajodia and others v. Brij Bhushan Agarwal), 1988(II) MPWN 98 (Gomti Bai (Smt.) v. Shivnaraian), 1991 JLJ 711=1992 MPLJ 607 (Rasheed Khan and another v. Peer Mohammad), AIR 2008 SC 3174 (Kamla and others v. K.T. Eshwara Sa and others), and AIR 1956 SC 391 (Kuldip Singh v. The State of Punjab and another).
4. Per contra, Shri K.S.Tomar, learned senior counsel drew the attention of this Court on section 3, section 7 and section 15(2) of the Act of 1958. In addition, he submits that section 3(1)(2) stood omitted by M.P. Act of 1996 w.e.f. 1.2.1997. Putting it differently, Shri Tomar, learned senior counsel submits that earlier the words “the Court of Ad
