The main legal point established in the judgment is that the valuation of a suit should be based on the share claimed by the plaintiff, not the total value of the property, and it should be filed before the court with the appropriate pecuniary jurisdiction.

Sujoy Paul, J.

1. This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution assails the order dated 5.2.2015 whereby the petitioner's application under Section 151 CPC is rejected by court below.

2. The respondent No. 1/plaintiff filed a suit for partition, declaration and permanent injunction. Admittedly, an amendment application dated 8.2.2013 (Annexure P-3) was filed in the said civil suit which was allowed by the court below. As per the amended paragraph 11, the value of the disputed building is shown as Rs. 25 lakhs. The plaintiff has claimed 1/4 share of the said building and, therefore, assessed the value as 6,25,000/-. The amendment application was allowed by the court below by the impugned order dated 5.2.2015. In the application under Section 151 CPC, the petitioner contended that as per para 11 of the amended pleading, the plaintiff has valued the suit for 6,25,000/-. As per the civil court rules, the jurisdiction to try such suit is with Civil Judge Class-I. This objection of the petitioner is rejected by the Court below by holding that value of the building is Rs.25,00,000/- and, therefore, A.D.J Court has jurisdiction to entertain the same.

3. The learned counsel for the parties have taken diametrically opposite stand in the present matter. Shri Gupta submits that valuation has to be on the basis of and to the extent share is assessed by the plaintiff, whereas Shri C.P. Singh contended that there is no error in the order of Court below in quantifying it on the basis of value of total building. In addition, Shri N.K. Gupta, learned senior counsel submits that the point involved has a direct relation with the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court below. If contention of other side is accepted, the matter will be dealt with by the A.D.J. Court. It will ultimately deprive the plaintiff from a right of appeal.

4. No other point is pressed by the learned counsel for the parties.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.

6. A plain reading of relief claimed in the plaint shows that the plaintiff is seeking a declaration on the undivided co-parcenary property. She is claiming 1/4th share of the said property. In addition, she is seeking a declaration that the property in question is an ancestral property and being daughter of Ganpat Rao Shinde, plaintiff be declared as 1/4th owner of suit property and possession holder. Injunction is also prayed for restraining the other side to create any hindrance on the possession and title of the plaintiff. Certain other ancillary reliefs are also claimed.

7. The question of court fee in these kind of matters is a vexed question. The Apex Court in AIR 1958 SC 245 (five Judge Bench) (S.Ram Ar. S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar) had opined that the question which still remains to be considered, is whether the Division bench was justified in directing the appellant to pay court-fees both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal on the basis of the valuation for Rs.15,00,000. In our opinion, the appellant is justified in contending that this order is erroneous in law. Section 7, sub-s.(iv) (b) deals with suits to enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property and the amount of fees payable on plaints in such suits is "according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal". Section 7 further provides that in all suits falling under Se.7 (iv) the plaintiff shall state the amount at which the value of the relief is sought. If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covers by the several sub-sections of S.7 is considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling under section 7(iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of court-fees. The theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is g