IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
P.K. Jaiswal, Virender Singh, JJ.
Smt. Radhika @ Deepali - Petitioner
Versus
Rishiraj - Respondent
First Appeal No. 37 of 2014
Decided On : 18-11-2016
Divorce - Hindu Marriage Act - 1955 - Section 13-B - Waiver of cooling period
Fact of the Case:
The parties filed for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking waiver of the minimum cooling period of six months. The husband had deposited a sum towards permanent alimony, and the parties had agreed on the terms and conditions of settlement.
Finding of the Court:
The court allowed the application for divorce by mutual consent, set aside the impugned judgment, and granted a decree of divorce to the parties. The marriage was dissolved subject to the agreed conditions, and the parties were restrained from making further claims arising from the dissolved marriage.
Issues: Application for divorce by mutual consent, waiver of cooling period, settlement terms, dissolution of marriage
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on various judgments and interpretations to establish that the cooling period under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act can be waived in cases where the marriage has irretrievably broken down and there is no possibility of reconciliation between the parties.
Final Decision: The court allowed the application for divorce by mutual consent, granted a decree of divorce, and restrained the parties from making further claims arising from the dissolved marriage.
P.K. Jaiswal, J.
Rishiraj Maheshwari are present in person and they have been identified by their respective Counsels.
2. They have filed an application under Order 23, Rule 3 read with Section under Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for the divorce by mutual consent vide I.A. No.6896 of 2016. They have also admitted their signatures on the application and affidavit filed by them along with the application as well as terms and conditions of settlement as mentioned in Para-10 of the application. Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that today the respondent-husband has deposited Rs. 4 lakhs to the State Bank of India account of the appellant (Account No. 32517853310) through RTGS towards permanent alimony which has been successfully transmitted in her account as per receipt/reference No. 1083061729.
3. The marriage between the appellant and her husband was solemnized on 15th May, 2010. Due to some differences they have started living separately from September, 2011. Respondent-husband filed an application under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal rights. By the impugned judgment, the aforesaid application has been allowed by the learned Trial Court.
4. It is submitted that now they have decided to live separately and, therefore, preferred this application for granting decree of divorce by mutual consent.
5. Learned Counsel for the parties prays for waiving off the minimum cooling period of six months provided under Section 13-B of the Act.
6. Para 7 to 9 of the judgment in the case of Virendra Singh Rajak v. Seema Rajak reported in 2015 (3) MPLJ 188, wherein period of six months has been waived off read as under:-
"7. The other issue which crops up is as to whether at this appellate stage can this court treat this appeal as an application under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act for grant of divorce by consent and waive off the minimum cooling period of six months provided under Section 13-B of the Act. In this respect we profitably refer the Division Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of K. Omprakash v. K. Nalini reported in AIR 1986 Andhra Pradesh 167 (DB). The relevant extract of the above said judgment is reproduced below:
"9....That question is whether the Legislature intended that Section 13-B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act should be treated as a mandatory provision of law or the Legislature intended that section to be treated merely as a directory provision of law. We have already noticed the language of Section 13-B (2). On first impression it is not impossible to hold Section 13-B (2) to be mandatory. As a mandatory provision of law calls for its pound of flesh and requires to be complied strictly and it not being satisfied with offerings of more substantial compliance of its commands, we will have to adjourn this matter for six months and postpone the deliverance to the parties from this deadlock by the that period of time (sic). It is well settled preposition of law that a statutory provision, though mandatory in form, can yet be treated as directory in substance. The question then arises whether there is anything in the text of Section 13-B (2) of its context or purpose or design that calls for Section 13-B (2) being interpreted as directory? In our opinion, there are weighty reasons warranting the reading of Section 13-B Clause (2) as directory. In that context, we must first call attention to the design of the law expressed in its liberalizing tendency of providing relief to parties on the basis of their mutual consent from their broken marriages. We must remember that this relief is granted by bringing about a profound alteration in the concept of a Hindu marriage from that of a sacrament to a contract. By that alteration, law has definitely set its face against forcible perpetuation of the status of matrimony between unwilling partners. Next, we must note that this six month's time fixed by Section 13-B (2) is not a rule relating to the ju
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