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2018 Supreme(MP) 344

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Sujoy Paul, J.
Motilal @ Munna Sen v. Brigadier, Mahar Regiment Centre and another
Writ Petition No. 10442 of 2017 (Jabalpur); Decided on 19.4.2018

Advocates:
Suyash Thakur for petitioner in WP and respondents in all MPs;
Ms. Kanak Gaharwar for Union of India.

Headnote:(1) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 -- S. 33 (1) (a) -- initial order granted without hearing employer -- cannot be said to be a bi-parte order -- employer had every right to seek vacation of that order. [Para 13

       (2) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 -- S. 33 (1) (a) -- form of application is not material or decisive when petitioner properly understood impact of reply and contested prayer for vacation of stay by advancing arguments -- strict principles of Code of Civil Procedure and Evidence Act are not applicable in adjudication under industrial jurisprudence. (1975) 1 SCC 774, (1976) 1 SCC 719, (1984) 3 SCC 46 and (2005) 4 SCC 480 followed. [Para 13

       (3) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 -- S. 33 -- proceeding before Tribunal commences only after receiving terms of reference -- Tribunal itself assumes jurisdiction when said terms of reference is received -- no material on record to show that when petitioner-workman was allegedly discontinued, industrial dispute was pending either before Conciliation Officer or Tribunal -- he was not protected under section 33 (1)(a). (1977)2 SCC 350 followed. (1999)6 SCC 275, (1978)2 SCC 144 and AIR 1962 SC 1500 discussed and distinguished. [Paras 17 & 18

       (4) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 -- S. 33A -- can be pressed into service only when contravention of S. 33 is duly established. [Para 20

        ¼1½ vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 && /kkjk 33 ¼1½¼d½ && vkjafHkd vkns'k fu;kstd dks lqus fcuk çnku fd;k x;k && f}i{kh; vkns'k ugha dgk tk ldrk && fu;kstd dks ml vksn'k dh fjfä dh bZIlk djus dk iw.kZ vf/kdkj gSA¼iSjk 13

       ¼2½ vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 && /kkjk 33 ¼1½¼d½ && vkosnu dk çk:i rkfRod ;k fu.kkZ;d ugha tc ;kph us mÙkj dk çHkko Bhd ls le>k vkSj cgl dj jksd dh fjfä dh çkFkZuk dk fojks/k fd;k && vkS|ksfxd fof/k 'kkL= ds v/khu U;k;fu.kZ;u esa flfoy çfØ;k lafgrk vkSj lk{; vf/kfu;e ds vfrfu;efu"B fl)kar ykxw ugha gksrsA ¼1975½1 ,l lh lh 774] ¼1976½1 ,l lh lh 719] ¼1984½3 ,l lh lh 46 rFkk ¼2005½4 ,l lh lh 480 vuqlfjrA ¼iSjk 13

       ¼3½ vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 && /kkjk 33 && vf/kdj.k ds le{k dk;Zokgh funsZ'k&fuca/ku çkIr djus ds i'pkr~ gh vkjaHk gksrh gS && Lo;a vfèkdj.k vf/kdkfjrk rc xzg.k djrk gS tc mä funsZ'k&fuca/ku çkIr gksrs gSa && vfHkys[kxr dksbZ lkexzh ugha ftlls nf'kZr gks fd tc ;kphZdeZdkj vfHkdfFkr :i ls jksdk x;k rc lqyg vf/kdkjh ;k vf/kdj.k ds le{k vkS|ksfxd fookn yafcr Fkk && og /kkjk 33 ¼1½¼d½ ds v/khu lajf{kr ugha FkkA ¼1977½2 ,l lh lh 350 vuqlfjrA ¼1999½6 ,l lh lh 275] ¼1978½2 ,l lh lh 144 rFkk , vkb vkj 1962 ,l lh 1500 foosfpr vkSj çHksfnrA¼iSjk 17 ,oa 18

       ¼4½ vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 && /kkjk 33d && dsoy rc ç;ksx esa ykbZ tk ldrh gS tc /kkjk 33 dk mYya/ku lE;d~#is.k fl) gksA ¼iSjk 20

       

ORDER

1. These matters were analogously heard on the joint request of the parties.

2. Writ Petition No. 10442/2017 assails the interlocutory order dated 14.2.2017 passed by Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court.

3. In short, the relevant facts about this case are that the petitioner filed an application under section 10/12 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for initiation of conciliation proceedings. The conciliation proceedings commenced and employer was put to notice. At this stage, the workman filed an application under section 33 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Conciliation Officer by order dated 25.1.2016 invoked section 33 of the said Act and protected the workmen. The conciliation proceedings ended with failure report dated 23.2.2016. After receiving the report, the Central Government sent the terms of reference dated 2.6.2016 for its adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. The workman along with his statement of claim filed an application under section 33 of Industrial Disputes Act before the Tribunal. The Tribunal issued notices to the employer. In spite of receiving notices, the employer did not turn up before the Tribunal on 3.8.2016 and, therefore, the Tribunal heard workman and passed a detailed order dated 3.8.2016 (Annexure-P-5). The management was directed not to obstruct workman from performing duties of Barber until further orders. The management subsequently filed its reply to the statement of claim. Thereafter, the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 14.2.2017, the earlier order for maintaining status quo was rejected.

4. Criticizing this order, Shri Suyash Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that a conjoint reading of sections 10, 12 and 33 of Industrial Disputes Act, makes it clear that intention of legislature was to protect the workmen during pendency of an industrial dispute. Industrial dispute remained pending from the date of application for initiation of conciliation proceedings was filed till the date the Tribunal passed the order dated 14.2.2017. The legislative intent is clear whereby the employer cannot be permitted to alter the service condition of workman connected with the dispute during pendency of conciliation proceedings or the proceedings before the Tribunal. Reliance is placed on a Full Bench Judgment of Supreme Court reported in (2002)2 SCC 244 (Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and others).

5. Shri Thakur submits that the impugned order suffers from a procedural impropriety because the earlier order dated 3.8.2016 was passed after putting the other side to notice and no application seeking review of the said order was filed. Employer did not challenge the earlier order dated 3.8.2016 before a higher forum. Thus, the Tribunal has erred in deviating from its earlier order for no valid reason. In nutshell, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 14.2.2017 suffers from a manifest procedural impropriety and illegality. Illegality, because the order passed, runs contrary to statutory mandate ingrained in section 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In support of his argument, Shri Thakur placed reliance on 1960 1 SCR 473 (Kamarhatty Co. Ltd. v. Shri Ushnath Prakash), AIR 1962 SC 1500 (The Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Saharanpur v. Govind), AIR 1969 MP 200 (Sital Sukhiram v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur and others), 1977(2) SCC 350 (The Bhavnagar Municipality v. Alibhai Karimbhai and others), 1978(2) SCC 144 (M/s. Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. Chandigarh v. Suresh Chand and another), 1985(4) SCC 71 (Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation), Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and others decided on 17.1.2002, 1972 AIR 1343 (Air India Corporation, Bombay v. V.A. Rebellow and another) and 2005(3) L.L.N. 690 (General Manager,










































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