The central legal point established in the judgment is that subsequent events impacting the bonafide need for eviction can be considered, and the definition of 'member of the family' under Section 2 (e) of the Rent Act is crucial in determining the entitlement to relief.

ROHIT ARYA, J.

1. Heard on IA No.4653/2016, an application under Order 22 Rule 4, 10 read with Order 1 Rule 10 CPC filed by one Smt. Rachna Agrawal W/o Shri Krishna Mohan Agrawal, reply whereto has been filed by the appellant vide document No.4088/2016.

2. Facts relevant for consideration and disposal of the aforesaid IA are that one Ganesh Prasad Agrawal had filed a suit for eviction against the present appellant/tenant on the ground of bonafide need under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rent Act") vide civil suit No.321A/1983. The suit was decreed by the trial court vide judgment and decree dated 23/5/1994.

During pendency of suit Ganesh Prasad Agrawal passed away. Thereafter, his wife Smt. Rampyaribai and their daughters were substituted for the original plaintiff. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, appellant/defendant preferred an appeal. During pendency of the appeal an application under Order 41 Rule 27 as well as Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was filed bringing to the notice of appellate court that the entire suit property except suit shop has been transferred to three different persons, namely, Prahladbabu Agrawal, Ritesh Garg and Madan Mohan Agrawal vide even dated sale deeds dated 15/9/1994. As such, the need, if any, stood extinguished and, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree of the trial court deserves to be set aside. Applications were replied by plaintiffs inter alia contending that plaintiff-Rampyaribai since has not sold the suit property, shall do business with her daughter-Sangeeta and, therefore, the need of plaintiff subsists. The first appellate court upon consideration of rival contentions concluded that as the need of Rampyari subsists qua the suit shop, which continued to be of her ownership, therefore, even if remaining part of the entire property has been sold by sale deeds, the need cannot be said to have extinguished and proceedings may continue and consequently, decreed the suit.

3. On appeal before this Court by the appellant/defendant, this Court admitted the second appeal on the following substantial question of law on 16/7/2008:-

"Whether in the giving facts a decree for ejectment on the ground of bona fide need can be passed and Courts below committed error in decreeing the suit under section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act?"

It appears that during pendency of second appeal Rampyaribai passed away on 22/3/2014, therefore, an application for deleting the name of Rampyaribai was filed vide IA No.2423/2014. The same was allowed vide order dated 23/6/2015. Thereafter, the instant application under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC vide IA No.4653/2016 has been filed by the present applicant, namely, Smt. Rachna Agrawal styling herself to be daughter-in-law of Shakuntala, who is daughter of Late Rampyaribai, in other words she claims to be the granddaughter-in-law of Late Rampyaribai and sought her substitution for Rampyaribai on the strength of a Will dated 5/7/2013, wherein, according to the applicant, the entire house in question have been bequeathed to her by Late Rampyaribai during her lifetime.

4. The application is replied, wherein following objections have been taken:-

i. Rampyaribai and her daughters arrayed as plaintiff in the suit including Shakuntala have already sold the entire house in question to different persons by way of different registered sale deeds of the same date 15/9/1994. Nothing was left for Rampyaribai to bequeath by way of Will in favour of the applicant, who claims to be the daughter-in-law of Shakuntala.

ii. That apart, consequent upon transfer of the suit house in favour of three subsequent buyers, the municipal records have also been corrected and the name of subsequent buyers are recorded.

iii. Even otherwise, the applicant, who claims to be the granddaughter-in-law of Rampyaribai and daughter-in-law of Shakuntala, even remotely does not fall within the definition of