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2020 Supreme(MP) 943
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Sujoy Paul, J.
Virendra Jatav v. State of M. P.&Others
Writ Petition No. 27106 of 2018(Jabalpur); Decided on 20.8.2020
K.C. Ghildiyal for petitioner; Akshay Pawar, Panel Lawyer for respondents/State.
Headnote:
(1) Constitution of India -- Art. 226 (2) -- maintainability of petition -- territorial jurisdiction -- cause of action would arise where impugned order is made and also where its consequence falls on person concerned -- even if part of cause of action has arisen within territory of this Bench, petition can be entertained. 1987 JLJ 341 (FB) relied on. [Para 10]
(2) Civil Service -- appointment -- acquittal of candidate -- does not give right to be appointed even if selected -- employer needs to examine ‘suitability’ on various facets including (i) nature of job needs; (ii) nature of department; (iii) status of post; (iv) nature of accusation and acquittal etc. -- nostrict parameters regarding judging such suitability can be reduced in writingwith accuracy and precision -- vary from post to post and from department to department. (2013) 7 SCC 685 and (2016) 8 SCC 471 followed. [Para 20]
(3) Review -- scope -- suitability of candidate -- no flaw pointed out in decision making process -- ultimate decision is ‘opinion’ of employer -- beyond scope of judicial review. (2018) 1 SCC 797, 2015 (1) JLJ 79 (SC), (2016) 8 SCC 471, (2018) 15 SCC 796, (2013) 14 SCC 304, (2013) 7 SCC 685, 2006 (1) JLJ 91, 2004 2018 (1) JLJ 169 (FB), W. P. No. 21231 of 2017 decided on17.4.18 (Jabalpur) referred to. [Para 23]
(4) Constitution of India -- Art. 226 -- judicial review -- decision of screening committee regarding suitability of candidate -- mere allegation of mala fide not sufficient unless there is sufficient foundation -- whenever allegations as to mala fides are levelled, sufficient particulars and cogent materials making out prima facie case must be set outin pleadings -- vague allegation or bald assertion that action wasmala fide and malicious -- not enough --Court is not expected to make ‘fishing’ inquiry. (1986) 4 SCC 566 (SC), (2010) 9 SCC 437 and (2009) 13 SCC 758 referred to. [Paras 24 & 25]
(5) Civil Service -- appointment -- antecedents -- while considering ‘antecedents’, employer can consider judgment of criminal trial -- even if candidate is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was honourably acquitted/completely exonerated -- decision of screening committee must be taken as final unless it isshown to be mala fide. (2013) 7 SCC 685 and (2018) 1 SCC 797 followed. 1994 JLJ 795 (FB) and W.A. No.46 of 2018 decided on 24.1.2018 (Gwalior) relied on. W. A. No.1954 of 2019 decided on 1.5.2020 (Gwalior) discussed. [Paras 26 & 28]
(6) Constitution of India -- Art. 226 -- judicial review -- scope -- decision of expert bodies like selection committee -- existence of bias, mala fide and arbitrariness can be examined -- scope of judicial review is very limited -- Court cannot sit in appeal and examine ‘suitability’ of candidate. (2018) 15 SCC 796 and (2018) 1 SCC 797 followed. W. A. No.1954 of 2019 decided on 1.5.2020 (Gwalior) distinguished. [Paras 27 & 28]
(7) Constitution of India -- Art. 226 -- judicial review -- service matter -- appointment -- suitability -- decision ofdepartment declaring petitioner ‘unsuitable’-- not malicious -- petitioner failed to point out any manifest, procedural impropriety in decision making process -- no breach of circular/rules etc. established -- decision of ‘unsuitability’ is ‘opinion’ of screening committee/department -- Court cannot sit in appeal to disturb it -- more so, when it is not palpably wrong. (2018) 1 SCC 797, 2015 (1) JLJ 79 (SC), (2016) 8 SCC 471, (2018) 15 SCC 796, (2013) 14 SCC 304, (2013) 7 SCC 685 and 2006 (1) JLJ 91 (SC)followed. 2018 (1) JLJ 169 (FB) relied on. (2013) 1 SCC 598, AIR 1964 SC 787, (2009) 13 SCC 758 and (2013) 7 SCC 150 referred to. [Para 29]
¼1½ Hkkjr dk lafo/kku & vuqPNsn 226¼2½ & ;kfpdk dk pykus ;ksX; gksuk & {ks=h; vf/kdkfjrk & okn gsrqd ogk vn~Hkwr gksxk tgk vkf{kIr vkns'k fd;k x;k rFkk ogka Hkh tgka lac} O;fDr dks mlds ifj.kke Hkksxuk iM+s & okn gsrqd dk ,d Hkkx Hkh bl [kaM ihB ds {ks= ds Hkhrj mn~Hkwr gqvk gks rks ;kfpdk xzg.k dh tk ldrh gSA 1987 ts ,y ts 341 ¼iw.kZ U;k;ihB½ voyafcrA ¼iSjk 10½
¼2½ flfoy lsok & fu;qfDr & vH;FkhZ dh nks"keqfDr & p;u gks x;k gks rc Hkh fu;qDr fd, tkus d vf/kdkj ÁkIr ugha gks tkrk & fu;kstd dks fofHkUu igyqvksa ij mi;qDrrk ij[kuk gksrh gS ftuesa ¼d½ dk;Z dh vko';drkvksa dh Ád`fr; ¼[k½ foHkkx dh Ád`fr; ¼x½ in dh gSfl;r; ¼?k½ vfHk;skx rFkk nks"keqfDr dh Ád`fr vkfn lfEefyr gSa & ,slh mi;qDrrk dk fu.kZ; djus ds ckjs esa dksbZ vfrfu;efu"Bk ekunaM lVhdrk vkSj lqfuf'prrk ds lkFk ys[kc} ugha fd, tk ldrs & ÁR;sd in vkSj foHkkx ds fy, fHkUu gksrs gSA ¼2013½ 7 ,l lh lh 685 rFkk ¼2016½ 8 ,l lh lh 471 vuqlfjrA ¼iSjk 20½
¼3½ iqufoZyksdu & O;kfIr & vH;FkhZ dh mi;qDrrk & fofu'p;u ÁfØ;k esa dksbZ =qfV bafxr ugha & vafre fofu'p; fu;kstd dh ^jk;* gS & U;kf;d iqufoZyksdu dh O;kfIr ls ijs gSA ¼2018½ 1 ,l lh lh 797] 2015 ¼1½ ts ,y ts 79 ¼mPpre U;k;ky;½] ¼2016½ 8 ,l lh lh 471] ¼2018½ 15 ,l lh lh 796] ¼2013½ 14 ,l lh lh 304] ¼2013½ 7 ,l lh lh 685] 2006 ¼1½ ts ,y ts 91 ¼mPpre U;k;ky;½] 2018 ¼1½ ts ,y ts ¼169½ ¼iw.kZ U;k;ihB½ fjV ;kfpdk Øekad 21231 lu~ 2017 fu.khZr fnukad 17-4-2018 ¼tcyiqj½ fufnZ"VA ¼iSjk 23½
¼4½ Hkkjr dk lafo/kku & vuqPNsn 226 ¼2½ & U;kf;d iqufoZyksdu & vH;FkhZ & dh mi;qDrrk ds ckjs esa Nkuchu lfefr dk fofu'p; & vln~Hkko dk vfHkdFku ek=- i;kZIr ugha & tc rd fd i;kZIr vk/kkj ugha gks & tc Hkh vln~Hkko ds vfHkdFku fd, tkrs gSa rc vfHkopuksa esa ÁFken`"V~;k ekeyk fl} djrs gq, i;kZIr fof'k"V;ka vkSj rdZiw.kZ lkexzh nh tkuk vko';d gS & vLi"V vfHkdFku ;k dksjk Ák[;ku fd dkjZokbZ vln~Hkkfod vkSj }ks"kiw.kZ Fkh & i;kZIr ugha & U;k;ky; }kjk ijks{k :i ls [kkst dh tkuk visf{kr ughaA ¼1986½ 4 ,l lh lh 566 ¼mPpre U;k;ky;½] ¼2010½ 9 ,l lh lh 437 rFkk ¼2009½ 13 ,l lh lh 758 fufnZ"VA ¼iSjk 24 ,oa 25½
¼5½ flfoy lsok & fu;qfDr & iwoZo`Rrksa ij fopkj djrs le; fu;kstd nakfMd fopkj.k ds fu.kZ; ij fopkj dj ldrk gS & vH;FkhZ nks"keqDr ;k mUeksfpr fd;k x;k gks rc Hkh ;g mi/kkj.kk ugha dh tk ldrh fd og lEeku nks"keqDr iw.kZr foeqDr fd;k x;k gS & Nkuchu lfefr dk fofu'p; vafre ekuk gh tkuk pkfg, tc rd fd mldk vln~Hkkfod gksuk ugha n'kkZ;k x;k gksA ¼2013½ 7 ,l lh lh 685 rFkk ¼2018½ 1 ,l lh lh 797 vuqlfjrA 1994 ts ,y ts 795 ¼iw.kZ U;k;ihB½ rFkk fjV vihy Øekad 46 lu~ 2018 fu.khZr fnukad 24-1-2018 ¼Xokfy;j½ voyafcrA fjV vihy Øekad 1954 lu~ 2019 fu.khZr fnukad 1-5-2020 ¼Xokfy;j½ foosfprA ¼iSjk 26 ,oa 28½
¼6½ Hkkjr dk lafo/kku & vuqPNsn 226 & U;kf;d iqufoZyksdu & O;kfIr & p;u lfefr tSls fo'ks"kK fudk;ksa dk fofu'p; & i{kikr vln~Hkko rFkk euekuh ds vfLrRo dh ijh{kk dh tk ldrh gS & U;kf;d iqufoZyksdu dh O;kfIr vR;fèkd lhfer gS & U;k;ky; vihy esa cSBdj vH;FkhZ dh mi;qDrrk dh ijh{kk ugha dj ldrkA ¼2018½ 15 ,l lh lh 796 rFkk ¼2018½ 1 ,l lh lh 797 vuqlfjrA fjV vihy Øekad 1954 lu 2019 fu.khZr fnukad 1-5-2020 ¼Xokfy;j½ ÁHksfnrA ¼iSjk 27 ,oa 28½
¼7½ Hkkjr dk lafo/kku & vuqPNsn 226 ¼2½ & U;kf;d iqufoZyksdu & lsok dk ekeyk & fu;qfDr & mi;qDrrk ;kph dks vuqi;qDr ?kksf"kr djus dk foHkkx dk fofu'p; & }ks"kiw.kZ ugha & ;kph fofu'p;u ÁfØ;k esa dksbZ Hkh ÁdV ÁfØ;kRed vukSfpR; minf'kZr djus esa vlQy & ifji= fu;e vkfn dk Hkax fl} ugha & vuqi;qDrrk dk fofu'p; Nkuchu lfefr foHkkx dh jk; gS U;k;ky; vihy esa cSBdj mls fo{kqC/k ugha dj ldrk & rc vkSj Hkh tc og ÁR;{kr% xyr ughaA ¼2018½ 1 ,l lh lh 797] 2015 ¼1½ ts ,y ts 79 ¼mPpre U;k;ky;½] ¼2016½ 8 ,l lh lh 471] ¼2018½ 15 ,l lh lh 796] ¼2013½ 14 ,l lh lh 304] ¼2013½ 7 ,l lh lh 685 rFkk 2006 ¼1½ ts ,y ts 91 ¼mPpre U;k;ky;½ vuqlfjrA 2018 ¼1½ ts ,y ts 169 ¼iw.kZ U;k;ihB½ voyafcrA ¼2013½ 1 ,l lh lh 598] , vkb vkj 1964 ,l lh 787 ¼2009½ 13 ,l lh lh 758 rFkk ¼2013½ 7 ,l lh lh 150 fufnZ"VA ¼iSjk 29½
ORDER
1. This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, calls in question the legality, validity and propriety of the order dated 26.10.2018 (Annexure-P/5) whereby the respondent No.5 declared the petitioner as “unsuitable” for employment in the Police Department.
2. The relevant facts are in narrow compass. The petitioner submitted his candidature pursuant to an advertisement issued for the post of Constable (GD). After cracking the physical test, written test etc., the petitioner was selected. He was required to fill up a verification form. In Col. 12 of the verification form (Annexure-P/2), the petitioner clearly disclosed that he was facing a criminal case for allegedly committing offences under sections 363, 366, 376 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sehore decided the said case (ST No.43/2008) by judgment dated 20.10.2008. The Court acquitted the petitioner from all the charges. Copy of the judgment aforesaid is filed as Annexure-P/3.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner criticized the impugned order dated 26.10.2018 (Annexure-P/5) and urged that since petitioner’s acquittal by judgment dated 20.08.2008 is an “acquittal on merits”, the Scrutiny Committee and the respondent No.5 have committed an error in treating the petitioner as “unsuitable”. The reason assigned in the operative para of the impugned order dated 26.10.2018 is liable to be interfered with in view of judgment of Supreme Court report in 2013 (1) SCC 598 (Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram).
4. Shri Ghildiyal urged that the expression “honourable acquittal” has a different meaning. In case of mere acquittal, an employee is not entitled to be reinstated whereas in case of “honourable acquittal” he is entitled to. Reliance is placed on the judgment of R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787, which was considered in the case of S. Samuthiram (supra) wherein it was held that if a person is acquitted fully and completely, then it can be said that he is “honourably acquitted”. It is argued that if the judgment dated 20.10.2008 is examined with sufficient care, there will be no doubt that the petitioner’s acquittal amounts to “honourable acquittal”.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on 2016 (8) SCC 471 (Avtar Singh vs. Union of India). Much emphasis is placed on Para 38.4.3 and 38.5. It is urged that in cases of “honourable acquittal”, it is no more open to the employer to treat the candidate as “unsuitable”. The “antecedents”, in the opinion of Shri Ghildiyal, relates to larger incidents which have taken place prior to the relevant crime, which was disclosed in the verification form (Col. 12). For this purpose, he placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Gwalior Bench in W.A. No.46/2018 (Bhupendra Yadav Vs. State of M.P. and others) decided on 24.01.2018.
6. By placing reliance on 2009 (13) SCC 758 (Swaran Singh Chand v. Punjab SEB), he further submits that in a case of this nature where respondents have acted contrary to the governing circular dated 24.07.2018 (filed as Annexure-P/11 with I.A. No.7028/2020) coupled with the aforesaid paragraphs of judgment of Avtar Singh (supra), rejection order amounts to ‘malice in law’. Whether or not there are specific pleadings alleging malice by the petitioner and whether or not the person concerned is impleaded eo nomine, this Court can interfere because such act falls within the ambit of “malice in law”.
7. The next reliance is on the judgment of Supreme Court reported in 2013 (7) SCC 150 (G. Jayalal v. Union of India). It is urged that in view of this judgment also, the impugned order falls within the four corners of “malice in law”. Shri Ghildiyal placed reliance on the judgment of Gwalior Bench passed in A. No.1954/19 (Devendra Singh Gurjar v. State of M.P.) to submit that after clean acquittal of petitioner from criminal case, department has committed an error in rejecting the candidature by declaring the petitioner as
