ORDER

With the consent of the parties, heard finally.

1. This petition is directed against the order of learned District Magistrate, Dewas whereby he has detained the petitioner by exercising power under section 3 of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980. The singular ground to assail the impugned order is that in the detention order, the learned District Magistrate has not mentioned that petitioner has a valuable right to prefer a representation against the detention order before the same authority namely District Magistrate. The matter is covered by Full Bench decision in WP No.22290/2019 (Kamal Khare v. State of MP) 2021(2) MPLJ 554. [Reported in 2021 (2) JLJ 389 (FB)]

2. Shri Vivek Dalal, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents/State fairly admitted that the detention order does not contain any such stipulation that petitioner can prefer representation against the detention order before the same authority. He further agreed that on this ground, Full Bench in Kamal Khare (supra) has held that the detention order stands vitiated because of infringement of said right.

3. There is no dispute between the parties that the singular point involved is covered by Full Bench in Kamal Khare (supra) which is consistently followed by this Court in various cases including WP No.9792/2021 (Yatindra Verma v. State of MP & Ors.). In WP No.9792/2021, this Court opined as under:-

(31) Indisputably, the detention order does not contain any stipulation that the detenu has right to prefer representation before the same authority namely, District Magistrate. The reliance is placed on the recent Full Bench judgment of this Court passed in the case of Kamal Khare (supra). To counter this argument, the bone of contention of learned AAG was that the said Full Bench decision is distinguishable. Full Bench judgment is based on a Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India, (1995) 4 SCC 51. In Kamleshkumar (supra), the apex Court was dealing with the provisions of COFEPOSA Act and the PIT NDPS Act and not with NSA Act. Hence, the said Constitution Bench judgment could not have been relied upon.

(32) We do not see much merit in this argument because similar argument was advanced by the Govt. before Full Bench in the case of Kamal Khare (supra) which is reproduced in extenso in para-14 of the said judgment. The similar argument could not find favour by the Full Bench.

(33) In Kamleshkumar (supra), apex Court opined as under:-

“6. This provision has the same force and sanctity as any other provision relating to fundamental rights. (See: State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya [1951 SCR 167, 186 : AIR 1951 SC 157] .) Article 22(5) imposes a dual obligation on the authority making the order of preventive detention: (i) to communicate to the person detained as soon as may be the grounds on which the order of detention has been made; and (ii) to afford the person detained the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. Article 22(5) thus proceeds on the basis that the person detained has a right to make a representation against the order of detention and the aforementioned two obligations are imposed on the authority making the order of detention with a view to ensure that right of the person detained to make a representation is a real right and he is able to take steps for redress of a wrong which he thinks has been committed. Article 22(5) does not, however, indicate the authority to whom the representation is to be made. Since the object and purpose of the representation that is to be made by the person detained is to enable him to obtain relief at the earliest opportunity, the said representation has to be made to the authority which can grant such relief, i.e., the authority which can revoke the order of detention and set him at liberty. The authority that has made the order of detention can also r