JUDGMENT :

Sheel Nagu, J.

1. This appeal filed under Section 37(1)(b) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity "the 1996 Act") by the appellant-Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. assails the order dated 03.09.2021 passed in MJC AV No.73 of 2021 by Commercial Court, Jabalpur allowing an application of the respondent preferred under Section 9(1)(d) of the 1996 Act restraining the IOC from cancelling MS (HD)(B Site) retail outlet dealership.

2. Learned counsel for the rival parties are heard on the question of admission and so also on final disposal.

3. The sole argument of the learned senior counsel for the appellant-IOC is that in the given facts and circumstances where amere show cause notice dated 31.03.2021 for termination of the dealership was issued and a reply was taken from the respondent and personal hearing was afforded to the respondent. But since no decision as regard termination of dealership was reached by the IOC, no cause arose to the respondent to invoke Section 9(1)(d) of the 1996 Act. It is submitted that in the given facts and circumstances since there was no dispute between the parties in the absence of any final decision taken by the IOC, the question of approaching the Court under Section 9 of the 1996 Act was not there.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that though the expression 'dispute' is not defined in the definition clause contained in Section 2 of the 1996 Act but by its very dictionary meaning and the usage to which it is put in common parlance it is evident as daylight that dispute is not unilateral but arises when one party asserts and the other refutes the assertion and a decision is taken which is not to the liking of one of the party who can then triggered the mechanism under Section 9 of the 1996 Act. It is submitted that unless and until the IOC took a decision regarding termination after taking the reply of the respondents and affording him personal hearing, the respondent has no cause of action in the absence of arising of any dispute to approach the Court under Section 9 of the 1996 Act.

5. Reliance is placed by the learned senior counsel on the provision of Section 7 of the 1996 Act.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent relying upon the decision of AIR 1952 SC 119 (Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pearey Lal Kumar and another), 2007 (3) SCC 686 (M/S. Agri Gold Exims Ltd vs. M/S. Sri Lakshmi Knits & Wovens) and 2021 (2) SCC 1 (Vidya Drolia and others vs. Durga Trading Corporation) contends that the very fact of a show cause notice having been issued to the respondent and the respondent having refuted the same, they have rise to the concept of dispute thereby opening the doors of Section 9 to the respondent to seek the remedies provided therein before commencement of arbitral procedure.

7. The only question before this Court is that in the absence of any termination of the dealership, any dispute had arisen between the rival parties to enable the respondent to invoke Section 9 of the 1996 Act.

8. Surprisingly, the expression 'dispute' is not defined in the 1996 Act though the expression find reference in number of provisions contained in the 1996 Act, and the principal object behind the Act is to resolve dispute between rival parties through different modes including arbitration.

Since the 1996 Act does not define the expression 'dispute', this Court has to fall upon the dictionary meaning of the said expression which is as follows:

Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition, page 424 defines 'dispute' as under :

"to argue about, to contend ... words; an argument; a debate; a quarrel".

Cambridge Dictionary defines 'dispute' as under :

"a disagreement or argument between two people, groups or countries."

Collins' Dictionary defines 'dispute' as under :

"A dispute is an argument or disagreement between people or groups."

9. From the aforesaid dictionary meaning of expression 'dispute', it is evident as daylight that for a dispute to arise there should exist an assertion/