SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2023 Supreme(MP) 351

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Ravi Malimath, CJ, and Vishal Mishra, J.
Ashwini Pradhan v. Union of India Through Chief Secretary Law and Legislative Department & Another
Writ Petition No. 18589 of 2023 (Jabalpur); Decided on 8.8.2023

Advocates:
Ashok Kumar Jain for petitioner; Pushpendra Yadav, Deputy Solicitor General for respondent No. 1/Union.

Headnote:

(1) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 -- Ss. 21, 31, 26, 28, and 36 -- vires of Ss. 21 and 31 -- anomalies in Act stand covered by S. 36 -- all provisions are in addition to and not in derogation of provisions of any other law -- any such relief could also be initiated in any other Court of law -- only because wrong order is passed by concerned authority, would not render statute itself unconstitutional --neither S. 21 nor 31 can be quashed as being ultra vires Constitution. (2016) 10 SCC 165, (2016) 11 SCC 774 and (2017) 14 SCC 373 followed. 2016 SCC Online Bom. 10047 relied on. [Paras 4, 17, 22 & 23

(2) Interpretation of Statute -- doctrine of harmonious construction -- in order to avoid conflict, statutes must be interpreted harmoniously -- expressions used in statute should ordinarily be understood in sense in which they best harmonise with object of statute, and which effectuate object of legislature. 1960 SCC Online SC 16, (1989) 4 SCC 378 and (2002) 4 SCC 297 followed. [Para 18

¼1½ ?kjsyw fgalk ls efgykvksa dk laj{k.k vf/kfu;e] 2005 & /kkjk 21] 31] 26] 28 rFkk 36 & /kkjk 21 vkSj 31 dh 'kfDreÙkrk vf/kfu;e dh fo"kerk,¡ /kkjk 36 }kjk vkPNkfnr gSa & leLr mica/k fdlh vU; fof/k ds mica/kksa ds vfrfjDr gSa] muds vYihdj.k esa ugha & ,sls fdlh Hkh vuqrks"k ds fy, dk;Zokgh fof/k ds fdlh vU; U;k;ky; esa Hkh vkjaHk dh tk ldrh gS ek= blfy, fd lac) Ákf/kdkjh }kjk xyr vkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;k gS] Lo;a dkuwu vlaoS/kkfud ugha gks tk,xk & u rks /kkjk 21 vkSj u /kkjk 31 gh lafo/kku ds vf/kdkjkrhr gksus ds vkèkkj ij vfHk[kafMr dh tk ldrh gSA ¼2016½ 10 ,l lh lh 165] ¼2016½ 11 ,l lh lh 774 rFkk ¼2017½ 14 ,l lh lh 373 vuqlfjrA 2016 ,l lh lh vkWuykbu cacbZ 10047 voyafcrA ¼iSjk 4] 17] 22 ,oa 23½

¼2½ fof/k dk fuoZpu & lkeatL;iw.kZ vFkkZUo;u dk fl)kar & fojks/kkHkkl ls cpus ds fy, dkuwuksa dk lkeatL;iw.kZ fuoZpu vko';d & dkuwu esa mi;ksx dh xbZ vfHkO;fDr;ksa dks lkekU;r% ml vFkZ esa le>k tkuk pkfg, ftlls mudk dkuwu ds mís'; ls loZJs"B lkeatL; cSBrk gS] rFkk ftlls fo/kku eaMy dk mn~ns'; ÁHkkoh gksrk gSA 1960 ,l lh lh vkWuykbu ,l lh 16] ¼1989½ 4 ,l lh lh 378 rFkk ¼2002½ 4 ,l lh lh 297 vuqlfjrA ¼iSjk 18½

ORDER

1. This petition is filed seeking for a writ of certiorari to quash sections 21 and 31 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short "the DV Act") as being ultra vires the Constitution.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the provisions of section 21 and 31 of the DV Act are unconstitutional. So far as section 21 of the DV Act is concerned, the same would refer to the custody of the child being given by the orders of the Magistrate. section 21 of the DV Act which reads as follows :--

"21. Custody orders - Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Magistrate may, at any stage of hearing of the application for protection order or for any other relief under this Act grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person or the person making an application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child or children by the respondent :

Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any visit of the respondent may be harmful to the interests of the child or children, the Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit."

3. It is further pleaded that in terms of section 12 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 (for short "the Guardians and Wards Act") the provisions are quite different. The same reads as follows :--

"12. Power to make interlocutory order for production of minor and interim protection of person and property.

1. The Court may direct that the person, if any, having the custody of the minor, shall produce him or cause him to be produced at such place and time and before such person as it appoints, and may make such order for the temporary custody and protection of the person or property of the minor as it thinks proper.

2. If the minor is a female who ought not to be compelled to appear in public, the direction under sub-section (1) for her production shall require her to be produced in accordance with the customs and manners of the country.

3. Nothing in this section shall authorise- (a) the Court to place a female minor in the temporary custody of a person claiming to be her guardian on the ground of his being her husband, unless she is already in his custody with the consent of her parents, if any, or

(b) any person to whom the temporary custody and protection of the property of a minor is entrusted to dispossess otherwise than by due course of law any person in possession of any of the property."

4. Therefore, the Guardian and Wards Act would apply for a manner in which an order could be passed. That recording of evidence is necessary before an order could be passed by the Court. That a child is required to be produced at such place and time and before such person as the Court deems appropriate for the purposes of granting temporary custody. None of this is present in section 21 of the DV Act. Therefore, this provision is ultra vires the Constitution.

5. Reference is also made to section 31 of the DV Act with regard to penalty for breach of protection order by the respondent. That in the absence of any opportunity being given, a person can be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to Rs.20,000/-, or with both.

6. However, on considering the contentions, we do not find that any of the pleas of the petitioner could be accepted.

7. It is apposite to mention herein the Statements of Objects and Reasons of the DV Act, which reads as follows :

"Statement of Objects and Reasons.—Domestic violence is undoubtedly a human right issue and serious deterrent to development. The Vienna Accord of 1994 and the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (1995) have acknowledged this. The United Nations Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in its General Recommendation No. XII (1989) has recommended that State parties should act to prote

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top