The main legal point established in the judgment is that an arbitration award passed under the Act of 1999 is not a decree but is only executed as a decree of the Civil Court on the certificate issued by the Council, and therefore, stamp duty is payable on the award.

1. By this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged the order of the executing court dated 3.3.2017, whereby the executing court has rejected the petitioner’s application under Section 33 of the Stamp Act.

2. The short facts are that the award dated 10.12.2010 (Annexure P/2) was passed by the Arbitration Council under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Swayatta Sahakarita Adhiniyam, 1999 (for short “Act of 1999”) and the certificate on that basis as per the Act was issued, which is sought to be executed by the respondent before the executing court. The petitioner by filing an application under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act had raised an objection that the respondent is seeking execution of award of a sum of Rs.27,11,14,559/-and the award does not bear any stamp, therefore, the respondent is liable to pay the stamp duty as per the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act. The executing court by the impugned order dated 3.3.2017 has rejected the objection.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the award passed by the Arbitration Council under the Act of 1999 is not a decree but it is only executed as a decree, therefore, the stamp duty as per the provisions of the Indian Stamp act is required to be paid.

4. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and on perusal of the record, it is noticed that the executing court by the impugned order dated 3.3.2017 has rejected the petitioner’s application on the ground that the award under execution is a decree of the court and for executing the decree, no stamp duty is payable and also that the proceedings are not for executing the award but for an order passed under the Act of 1999.

5. Section 56 of the Act of 1999 deals with the disputes and the manner of its resolution. Sub-section(4) of Section 56 provides for execution of the award or order of the Arbitration Council in the following manner:-

“Section 56. Disputes-

(1) ***************

(2) ***************

(3) ***************

(4) Every order or decision made under this section, shall be executed by Civil Court having jurisdiction, as if such order is a decree of that Court, on a certificate issued by the Arbitration Council.”

6. In terms of the aforesaid sub-section an order or the decision of the Arbitration Council under Section 56 is not a decree but it is only executed as a decree of the Civil Court on the certificate issued by the Council.

7. A perusal of the order dated 10.12.2010 passed by the Arbitration Council reveals that it is an order passed under Section 56 of the Act, hence it is not a decree but is only executable as a decree of the court. Section 56(4) treats the order of the Arbitration Council as decree only for the purpose of its execution by the civil court but for all practical purposes the order of the Arbitration Council is a mere decision of the Council in the arbitration proceedings and it cannot be held to be a decree.

8. Section 2(2) of the CPC defines decree as under:-

“Section 2. Definitions.-

(1) **************

(2) “decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not include-

(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or

(b) any order of dismissal for default.”

9. A bare reading of above provision makes it clear that the decree is passed by the court in a suit on adjudication, but Arbitration Council is neither the court nor the proceedings before the Arbitration Council fall within the meaning of suit as contemplated in the CPC, therefore, the executing Court in the impugned order is not justified in holding that the order of the Arbitration Council is a decree and, therefore, stamp duty is