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2018 Supreme(MP) 581
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
(FULL BENCH)
Hemant Gupta, CJ, Vijay Kumar Shukla and Subodh Abhyankar, JJ.
Principal, Maharshi Vidya Mandir v. Labour Court, Sagar and another
Writ Appeal No. 489 of 2017 (Jabalpur); arising from order dated 19.2.2018 referring the matter for the opinion of the Larger Bench;
Decided on 15.3.2018
Rajneesh Gupta for appellant; Amit Seth as Amicus Curiae.
Headnote:(1) Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 (M. P.) -- Rr. 10-A, 10-B (1) and 10-B (2) -- once party has put in appearance, it is not expected to be served with another notice of hearing of dispute -- purpose of notice -- parties must be aware of proceedings -- Labour Court is not expected to follow party after notice was served upon it. [Paras 12 & 21
(2) Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 (M. P.) -- R.10-B (3) -- pertains to matter of procedure -- separate notice is not contemplated after parties have put in appearance before Labour Court -- not a mandatory provision. W. P. No. 20647 of 2017 decided on 25.1.2018 referred to. AIR 1957 SC 912, (2003)8 SCC 498, (2017)8 SCC 746, (2017)16 SCC 143, (1994)3 SCC 569, (2006)1 SCC 46, (2015)7 SCC 601, (2018)2 SCC 674 and AIR 1961 SC 882 followed. Division Bench order in Miscellaneous Petition No. 473 of 1975 and Single Bench order in Writ Petition No. 3667 of 2001 overruled. [Paras 13 & 21
(3) Interpretation of Statutes -- for a provision to be mandatory, language alone is not decisive -- Court must have regard to context, subject-matter and object of provision -- factors to be considered laid down. Writ Petition No. 20647 of 2017 decided on 25.1.2018 referred to. AIR 1957 SC 912, (2003)8 SCC 498, (2017)8 SCC 746 and (2017)16 SCC 143 followed. [Para 15
(4) Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 (M. P.) -- R. 10-B (3) -- object of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Rules made thereunder -- expeditious disposal of dispute -- deferment of hearing after parties had notice of dispute by notice from Labour Court -- is not conducive to industrial disputes resolution. [Para 22
(5) Interpretation of Statute -- interpretation of Rules -- has to be keeping in view the object of Act -- interpretation which defeats purpose of Act -- cannot be accepted. [Para 22
¼1½ vkS|ksfxd fookn fu;e] 1957 ¼e&iz&½ && fu& 10&d] 10&[k¼1½ rFkk 10&[k¼2½ && i{kdkj milatkr gks tk, rc mls fookn dh lquokbZ dh ,d vkSj lwpuk dh rkehy djkuk visf{kr ugha && lwpuk dk iz;kstu && i{kdkjksa dks dk;Zokgh dh tkudkjh gksuk pkfg, && Je U;k;ky; ls visf{kr ugha fd i{kdkj ij lwpuk dh rkehy gksus ds i'pkr~ mldk ihNk djsA ¼iSjk 12 ,oa 21
¼2½ vkS|ksfxd fookn fu;e] 1957 ¼e&iz&½ && fu&10&[k¼3½ && izfØ;k ds fo"k; ls lacaf/kr gS && Je U;k;ky; ds le{k i{kdkjksa ds milatkr gks tkus ds i'pkr~ i`Fkd~ ls lwpuk vuq/;kr ugha && mica/k vkKkid ughaA fjV ;kfpdk Ø& 20647 lu~ 2017 fofuf'pr fnukad 25&1&2018 fufnZ"VA , vkb vkj 1957 ,l lh 912] ¼2003½8 ,l lh lh 498] ¼2017½8 ,l lh lh 746] ¼2017½16 ,l lh lh 143] ¼1994½3 ,l lh lh 569] ¼2006½1 ,l lh lh 46] ¼2015½7 ,l lh lh 601] ¼2018½2 ,l lh lh 674 rFkk , vkb vkj 1961 ,l lh 882 vuqlfjrA izdh.kZ ;kfpdk Ø& 473 lu~ 1975 esa [kaM U;k;ihB dk vkns'k rFkk fjV ;kfpdk Ø& 3667 lu~ 2001 esa ,dy U;k;ihB dk vkns'k myVk x;kA ¼iSjk 13 ,oa 21
¼3½ fof/k dk fuoZpu && mica/k vkKkid gksus ds fy, dsoy Hkk"kk fu'pk;d ugha && U;k;ky; dks mica/k ds lanHkZ] fo"k;&oLrq vkSj mís'; dks /;ku esa j[kuk vko';d gS && fopkj.kh; dkjd vf/kdfFkrA fjV ;kfpdk Ø& 20647 lu~ 2017 fofuf'pr fnukad 25&1&2018 fufnZ"VA , vkb vkj 1957 ,l lh 912] ¼2003½8 ,l lh lh 498] ¼2017½8 ,l lh lh 746 rFkk ¼2017½16 ,l lh lh 143 vuqlfjrA ¼iSjk 15
¼4½ vkS|ksfxd fookn fu;e] 1957 ¼e&iz&½ && fu&10&[k¼3½ && vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 vkSj rn~/khu fojfpr fu;eksa dk mís';&fookn dk 'kh?kz fuiVkjk && Je U;k;ky; dh lwpuk ds ek/;e ls i{kdkjksa dks fookn dh tkudkjh gksus ds i'pkr~ lquokbZ dk vkLFkxu &&*vkS|ksfxd fooknksa ds lek/kku ds fy, lgk;d ugha gSA ¼iSjk 22
¼5½ fof/k dk fuoZpu && fu;eksa dk fuoZpu && vf/kfu;e dk mís'; n`f"V esa j[krs gq, fd;k tkuk gksrk gS && fuoZpu ftlls vf/kfu;e dk mís'; foQy gks && Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk ldrkA ¼iSjk 22
Gupta, C.J. -- 1. A Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 19th February, 2018 has referred the following question for the opinion of the Larger Bench expressing prima facie disagreement with the view of the earlier Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhagwan Das v. Radhey Shyam Gupta and others on 8th March, 1976 in Misc. Petition No. 473/1975.
2. In Bhagwan Das’s case (supra), the Division Bench of this Court while examining sub-rule (3) of rule 10-B of the M.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 (for short “the Rules”) framed in terms of section 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act”) held that in terms of sub-rule (3) of rule 10-B read with rule 13 of the Rules, it is clear that the notice informing the parties of the first date of hearing of the dispute has to be given. Since the Labour Court fixed the date of first hearing of the dispute on 21st March, 1975 for 24th March, 1975, and that no information was given by the Labour Court to the employer of date of hearing in spite of the fact that the employer’s counsel was not present on an earlier date, therefore the ex parte Award is not legal. The relevant extract from the judgment reads as under :
“6. Sub-rule (3) of rule 10-B (hereinafter called the rules) requires the fixing of a date of hearing ordinarily within 6 weeks of the date on which the dispute was referred to it for adjudication. The proviso therein enables the Labour Court to fix a later date for reasons to be recorded in writing. Thus, this provision clearly requires the fixing of date for the first hearing of the dispute. Rule 13, which provides for the place and time for hearing, also requires information thereof to be given to the parties. From these provisions it is clear that a notice informing the parties of the first date of hearing of the dispute has to be given. From the undisputed facts of the present case, it is clear that this was not done by the Labour Court. It was only on 21.3.1975 that the Labour Court, for the first time, fixed the date of first hearing of the dispute and that date was 24.3.1975, i.e. only 3 days thereafter. Admittedly no information was given by the Labour Court to the employer of the date of hearing in spite of the fact that the employers’ counsel was not present on 21.3.1975, his presence being not necessary that day, the case being fixed on 24.3.1975 only for filing of the employees’ rejoinder. Thus, the Labour Court could not proceed with the hearing of the case on 24.3.75 unless the employer was willing to participate in the same without any objection. In fact appearance on behalf of the employer was not necessary on 24.3.75, of which date no information had been given to him by the Labour Court. The position of the employer could not become worse merely because a junior counsel appeared on his behalf on getting information of the date from some other source, to seek adjournment. The non compliance of the provision already indicated renders the proceedings of the Labour Court on 24-3-75 and thereafter to be invalid. For this reason alone, this petition must succeed.”
3. A perusal of the said order shows that the appropriate Government made a reference on 25th February, 1974 to the Labour Court for adjudication. The Labour Court issued a notice to the employer to file its statement of claim. The Labour Court required the employee to file his rejoinder but the employee did not file the rejoinder. On 21st March, 1975, which was the date fixed for employees’ rejoinder, the employer’s counsel was not present and the case was fixed for recording of evidence of both parties on 24th March, 1975. No notice was given to the employer of the said date, which was said to be the first date of hearing, therefore, the Court held that the proceeding initiated against the employer was not legally sustainable.
4. In terms of Sub-section (c) of section (10)(1) of the Act, if an appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exis
