Misra, J. -- 1. In this appeal preferred under section 2 (1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaya Peeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, the correctness and soundness of the order dated 21.1.2008 passed by learned Single Judge in WP No. 5173/2007 (S) is called in question by the M.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation").

2. The facts which are requisite to be exposited for appreciating the stands put forth in appeal are that the respondent who was an employee of the appellant Corporation, was put under suspension as per order dated 16.1.1996, Anl1exure P-I, on the base that a charge-sheet was filed against him in Crime No. 2411 989 for the offences punishable under sections 408,409, 161, 477-k and 120-B of Indian Penal Code read with section. 5 (1) (d)/13 (2) and section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act,1988. The respondent faced trial and eventually, by judgment dated 7.3.2007.He was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the competent criminal Court. After being acquitted, the respondent preferred WP No. 4220/2007 (S) on 8.8.2007 for revocation of the order of suspension and this Court had directed to consider the representation preferred for revocation of the said order After the order was passed in the writ petition, the employer by order dated 1.9.2007 rejected the representation on the ground that against the order of acquittal, an appeal has been preferred before the competent Court and till the decision is taken in criminal appeal, the order of suspension was to remain in vogue. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present writ petition was filed for quashment of the same appropriate direction.

3. Before the learned Single Judge was contended that the order of suspension could not be allowed to stand as the respondent has been acquitted in the criminal case and there is no other proceeding pending against him. To buttress the said stand, reliance was placed on the decision in Ram Ratan Tiwari v. State M.P.and others [2002 (4) MPLJ 401]. The said submission was critised on the foundation that clue to the conduct of the respondent, the appellant Corporation had been put to loss and once an appeal has been filed, there was no warrant for revocation of the order of suspension.

4. Learned Single Judge took note of the fact that the respondent had been acquitted; that the employee was put under suspension as per Rule 9 (1) (b) of M.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1966 which entitles the employer to put an employee under suspension where a criminal case has been instituted against him or any criminal offence which is under investigation or trial: that there is no provision enabling the employer to put the employee unclear suspension under these circumstances; and that the order of suspension during the pendency of appeal against the judgment of acquittal is impermissible. Being of this view, the learned Single Judge quashed the order of suspension and directed appellant employer to reinstate the respondent and settle all the consequential benefits within four months by passing a reasoned and speaking order.

5. We have heard Mr. Vinay Zelawat learned counsel for appellant -Corporation on the question of admission. It is submitted by Mr. Zelawat that the appellant has inherent jurisdiction to put an employee under suspension by not taking work from him and therefore, the order passed by learned Single Judge is erroneous and deserves to be interfered with in this intra-Court appeal. It is also his submission that the respondent would not be entitled to all consequential benefits as the Fundamental Rules would come into play.

6. It is not in dispute that the respondent was put under suspension because of the initiation of the criminal case against him. It is not controverted that he has been acquitted on 7.3.2007. There is no cavil over the fact that the respondent was suspended taking recourse to the provisions contained in 1966 Rules. Under these circ