1. This civil revision has been preferred against the impugned order dated 22.1.2008 passed by the Court of I Civil Judge, Class I, Chhindwara in Civil Suit No.8-B/05 deciding thereby the preliminary issues No.1 and 2 and holding thereby the suit of the plaintiff to be within limitation.

2. Short facts involved herein are that the plaintiff/respondent No.1 instituted a civil suit for recovery of damages to the tune of Rs.50,000/- from the defendant-revisionist with the allegation that he was a registered contractor of forest department and used to purchase wood from the Government. He further used to transport it after its cutting in different sizes in his saw mill situated at Rambag, Chhindwara on the basis of transit pass. Once he was taking wood in this manner to Chennai through Nagpur. Revisionist at the relevant time was posted as Town Inspector at Police Station, Chhindwara. He stopped the truck of the plaintiff bearing registration No.NHG-4187 at Nagpur Naka, Chhindwara on the ground that the wood was being carried in violation of conditions of transit pass issued by the forest department. An offence under section 379 and 420 of IPC read with sections 41, 42 and 52 of the Forest Act was registered at Crime No.90/86. Plaintiff was exonerated from the charges under section 379 and 420 of IPC. However, a criminal case bearing No.443/02 was registered against him in the Court of JMFC, Chhindwara. Learned JMFC vide his judgment dated 16.6.2003 acquitted the plaintiff from the offence under the aforesaid sections of Indian Forest Act with a finding that no offence was committed by the plaintiff. Truck was delivered to the truck owner under Supardginama despite opposition by the revisionist. Plaintiff further alleged that the revisionist acted deliberately with an intent to cause monetary and professional loss to the plaintiff knowing fully well that there was no illegality in the transportation of wood with the requisite transit pass. It is further alleged that the revisionist further insisted the Government Advocate to file an appeal challenging the acquittal as well as Supardginama. Appeal so preferred was dismissed on 7.10.2004. Thus, it is stated that the plaintiff was forced to defend a false case for 17 years. He was prosecuted with a malicious intention. Thus, he suffered mental agony as well as professional loss and claimed damages to the tune bf Rs.50,000/-.

3. Defendant-revisionist submitted his written statement. He inter alia pleaded that the acquittal by JMFC was made vide judgment dated 16.6.2003 whereas the suit for damages was instituted on 5.4.2005. Thus, it was stated that the suit being barred by limitation is liable to be dismissed.

4. Learned trial Judge raised issue No.1 and 2 on the aforesaid objections and decided them in favour of the plaintiff vide the impugned order dated 22.1.2008. Hence, this revision.

5. Heard the learned counsel and perused the record.

6. Suit for compensation for a malicious prosecution is governed by Article 74 of the Limitation Act; 1963 which reads as under :

Description of suitPeriod ofTime from whichlimitationperiod begins to run74. For compensation for a One yearWhen the plaintiff is acquitted or malicious prosecution.the prosecution is otherwiseterminated 7. Shri A.D. Mishra, learned counsel contended that the plaintiff was acquitted by JMFC, Chhindwara on 16.6.2003 and the limitation for the suit for damages on account of malicious prosecution commenced from that day. The suit in question having been instituted beyond one year after such acquittal is barred by limitation. Reliance has been placed by him on the decision of Bombay High Court in BhaskarNarhar Deshmukh v. Kishanlal Sadasukhdas and another [AIR 1968 Bombay 21], and of Allahabad High Court in the case of Madho Lal v. Hari Shanker and another [AIR 1963 Allahabad 547). Bombay High Court in Bhaskar Narhar Deshmukh's case (supra), has observed that the scheme of the Limitation Act suggests that once the peri