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2015 Supreme(Tri) 416
IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AGARTALA
U.B. SAHA and S. TALAPATRA, JJ.
Laxman Debnath - Appellant
Versus
State of Tripura - Respondent
Crl. A. (J) No.44 of 2011
Decided On : 24.06.2015
Advocate Appeared:
For the appellant :Mr. Ratan Dutta, Advocate.
For the respondent: Mr. R.C. Debnath, Addl. P.P.
The central legal point established in the judgment is the requirement to prove the accused's intention to commit murder under Section 307 of the IPC, and the distinction between the act and its result in determining the offense of attempt to murder.
Headnote:
Section 307 - Attempt to murder - [IPC Section 307] - The court discussed the evidence and legal principles related to the intention to kill or cause grievous hurt, as well as the interpretation of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. The court emphasized the importance of proving the accused's intention to commit murder and the distinction between the act and its result. It also referred to relevant case laws to support its decision.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant was convicted under Section 307 of the IPC for attempting to kill the victim by inflicting a hacking blow on the victim's neck. The appellant denied the intention to kill and claimed that the blow was a result of a sudden altercation.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant's intention to kill the victim beyond a reasonable doubt. It concluded that the evidence did not establish the appellant's intent to commit murder, and therefore, the conviction under Section 307 of the IPC was interfered with. The court converted the charge to Section 324 of the IPC and convicted the appellant for causing voluntarily hurt by a dangerous weapon.
Issues: The key issue was whether the appellant had the intention to kill the victim or the knowledge that the blow might cause death, as required under Section 307 of the IPC.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the lack of evidence to prove the appellant's intention to commit murder, as well as the interpretation of Section 307 of the IPC and relevant case laws. It emphasized the importance of establishing the accused's intention and the distinction between the act and its result.
Final Decision: The appeal was partly allowed, and the appellant's conviction under Section 307 of the IPC was interfered with. The court converted the charge to Section 324 of the IPC and convicted the appellant for causing voluntarily hurt by a dangerous weapon, sentencing him to suffer R.I. for 1 year with a fine of Rs. 20,000/- in default of payment of fine.
S. TALAPATRA, J.
1. This is an appeal by the convict, hereinafter referred to as the appellant, against the judgment dated 13.09.2011 delivered in S.T. 55(NT/D) of 2010 by the Assistant Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar. By the said judgment and order dated 13.09.2011 the appellant has been convicted under Section 307 of the IPC and sentence to suffer R.I for 10 years with fine of Rs. 9,000/- with default imprisonment.
2. The genesis of the prosecution case is rooted in the written ejahar filed by the Smt. Sushila Debnath (PW-8) on 02.05.2009 disclosing that when her husband namely, Krishna Debnath (PW-7), was approaching towards Pechartahal market place with a bag containing fish by riding a bicycle. Laxman Debnath, the appellant herein, in a premediated manner attempted to kill her husband to settle the score in respect of previous animosity. He had dealt hacking blow in the backside of his neck of the victim with a sharp dao and fled away. She received the information from Adhir Debnath (PW-4) and rushed, with her relatives, to the place of occurrence. They transported her injured husband to Pachartahal Hospital. No sooner had they reach the hospital, the injured was referred to RGM Hospital at Kailashahar.
3. Based on the said written ejahar (Exbt-2), Pechartahal P. S. Case No.18 of 2009 under Section 307/326 of the IPC was registered on 02.05.2009 and taken up for investigation. On completion of the investigation the final police report had been filed and the case was committed to the court of the Additional Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar for trial. In the course of time, the case was transferred to the court of the Assistant Sessions Judge, North Tripura. The Assistant Sessions Judge, hereinafter referred to as the Trial Judge or the trial court framed charge against the appellant under Section 307 of the IPC in the following terms:
“That you on or about the 2nd day of May, 2009 at about 3 pm., while Sri Krishna Debnath of Ambercharra P.S. Pechartahal was going to Pechartahal market from home on his bycycle you stood on his way and assaulted him with a dao (a sharp cutting weapon) and in the course of assault you gave a blow with the sharp edge of the dao on his neck intending to kill him and caused grievous hurt to him and by that act you would have bear guilty of murder if Sri Krishna Debnath died due to the assault and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this court”.
The appellant reiterates his innocence and claimed to face the trial.
4. To substantiate the charge the prosecution adduced as many as 14 witnesses including the injured (PW-7) and the Medical Officer, Dr. Gitesh Bhattacharjee (PW-12), Dr. Subhankar Nath (PW-11), the Sr. Scientific Officer in the State FSL and the Investigating Officer, Sri. Bapi Debbarma (PW-14).
5. On recording the prosecution's evidence which also included 11 documentary evidence (Exbts-1 to 9), the Trial Judge examined the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., for having his response towards the incriminating materials surfaced in the evidence. The appellant denied those but did not explain anything nor did he claim to adduce any witness.
6. Mr. R. Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has precisely contended that even if the entire prosecution evidence is relied, there would be no evidence beyond reasonable doubt to demonstrate that the appellant had intention to kill the injured or had he the knowledge that the act may constitute murder. He has also relied on the statement of the injured (PW-7) to show that there was no premeditation orchestration or preparation as stated in the written ejahar. He has submitted that PW-7 had engaged in altercation with the appellant and due to sudden anger, he dealt the blow and as such there was no intention to kill or knowledge that blow might cause the murder.
7. To nourish such submission, Mr. Dutta, learned counsel appe
