The court emphasized the binding nature of medical opinions on age determination and the necessity for employers to adhere to established procedures in maintaining accurate employment records.

JUDGMENT :

S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA, J.

1. Heard Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and also heard Mr. K. De, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the State-respondent nos.1 & 2 as well as Mr. P. Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos.3 & 4.

2. The case of the petitioner in brief is that he was engaged as worker in Tripura Jute Mills Limited on 04.01.1985 and at the time of joining in the service, he filled up his personal datasheet by mentioning his date of birth to be 15.01.1962, but he could not produce any document in support of his date of birth and, therefore, as per Clause 23 of the Standing Order of Tripura Jute Mills Limited (Annexure-1 of the Writ Petition) he was referred to the Standing Medical Board, GBP Hospital, Agartala along with some other employees of the Jute Mills Limited for age determination and the Standing Medical Board vide their report dated 02.03.2002 determined the age of the present petitioner to be 37 years on that day and thereafter the petitioner also took loan from the State Bank of India, Amtali Branch and in the ‘Employer’s Certificate for Applicant/Guarantor’ as counter signed by the DDO of the respondent nos.3 & 4 in respect of said loan (Annexure-4 of the Writ Petition), his date of birth was also mentioned to be 02.03.1965 showing his date of retirement to be 31.03.2025 which co-relates with the age as determined by said Medical Board.

3. But suddenly he received a letter dated 30.03.2022 from the Managing Director of Tripura Jute Mills Limited (Annexure-5 of the Writ Petition) as impugned herein mentioning that on scrutiny of dossier of the petitioner as was authenticated by the petitioner himself at the time of entry in the service, it was detected that his date of retirement was 31.01.2022, but, despite the same, by mistake he continued to work and, therefore, it was ordered that the petitioner would be deemed to have retired from the service w.e.f. 31.01.2022. Then the petitioner filed one representation dated 26.05.2022 (Annexure-6 of the Writ Petition) to the Managing Director for correction of his date of birth as 02.03.1965, but getting no response in respect of said representation, he filed WP(C) No.530 of 2022 which was disposed of by the coordinate bench of this Court on 25.04.2023 with a direction to the present respondents to consider and dispose of his said representation dated 26.05.2022 within a period of 01(one) month. Thereafter the respondent no.4 disposed of said representation by rejecting the same and result of such disposal was communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 30.05.2023 (Annexure-8 of the Writ Petition). Being aggrieved thereby now the petitioner has approached this Court again.

4 . Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel submits that as per the Clause 23 of the Standing Order itself, the opinion of the Medical Board is binding upon the respondents and, therefore, it was the duty of the respondent nos.3 & 4 to correct the date of birth in terms of said opinion of Medical Board and the petitioner himself also produced one School Certificate (Annexure-3 of the Writ Petition) later on to the said respondents which reflects the date of birth of the petitioner as per the admission register of the school to be 02.03.1965.

5. Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel further contends that even in the form for taking loan from the SBI, the department itself attested his date of birth to be 02.03.1965, but despite the same, the action of respondent nos.3 & 4 suddenly changing of their own stand and forcing the petitioner to go on retirement on a premature date, is highly illegal and arbitrary.

6. Finally, Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel urges for reinstatement of the petitioner in the service treating his date of retirement to be 31.03.2025.

7. Mr. P. Gautam, learned counsel representing the respondent nos.3 & 4 strongly argues that the personal datasheet itself was filled up by the petitioner and was signed by him a