IMPORTANT POINT
The central legal point established in the judgment is that a body representing individual tribals may also be regarded as a tribal for the purpose of attracting the jurisdiction of the District Council Court machinery.

JUDGMENT

Sanjib Banerjee; CJ. - The present civil reference has been made by the District Council Court in Jowai in Civil Appeal No.2 of 2015 pending before such court.

2. The exact question that has been framed in the reference of May 31, 2018 by the relevant District Council Court is as follows:

'Whether the Dorbar Shnong (Village Dorbar) is a tribal or nontribal?'

3. The relevant appeal before the District Council Court arose out of a suit filed by the petitioner Dorbar Shnong herein against another Dorbar Shnong, being the first respondent herein. Both the Dorbar Shnongs were sued by or through their respective headman and secretary. Such suit was filed before the Subordinate District Council Court. Quite naturally, the petitioner in the present reference submits that the machinery of the District Council Courts, including its subordinate forum, is empowered in view of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution to take up adjudication of disputes between one Dorbar Shnong and another.

4. The basis of the petitioner's submission is that since a Dorbar Shnong is a representative body of members all of whom are tribals, a Dorbar Shnong should also be regarded as a tribal. In other words, the petitioning Dorbar Shnong asserts that since a Dorbar Shnong which brings an action against any party is, essentially, a collective of tribal persons, and, similarly, when a Dorbar Shnong is sued, it is a collective of its tribal members, such an action is an action by a number of tribals against another set of tribals. The underlying submission of the petitioning Dorbar Shnong is that when a Dorbar Shnong sues or when a Dorbar Shnong is sued, it is a matter of convenience that the Dorbar Shnongs are made eo nomine parties, since the disputes are between one set of tribal people and another set of tribal people. As such, the petitioner maintains that such an action brought by a Dorbar Shnong on behalf of its member tribals against the member tribals of another Dorbar Shnong would be a tribal versus tribal matter as envisaged in paragraph 4 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution.

5. Indeed, the respondent Dorbar Shnong expressly agrees that in such a scenario a Dorbar Shnong has to be regarded as a tribal and, as such, the Subordinate District Council Court had due authority and jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The defendants to the suit submit that the suit and interlocutory proceedings arising therefrom need to be decided on merits.

6. In view of there being no difference of view between the parties to the lis in which the reference has arisen, there may not be any need to conclusively answer the reference.

7. While it is appreciated that parties by agreement may not confer jurisdiction on a forum which otherwise does not possess jurisdiction, the issue involved in the present proceedings is not one of inherent lack of jurisdiction but a matter of interpretation of whether a representative body of a set of individuals, all of whom are tribals, needs also to be regarded as a tribal for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of the machinery in the District Council Courts in accordance with the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. The same argument would apply in case such a representative body were being sued as would when such representative body sues.

8. In view of the submission made on behalf of the parties to the lis and the fact that the proceedings instituted before the Subordinate District Council Court cannot be regarded as completely without basis, though an arguable case to the contrary can also be made out, it is best that the suit and all proceedings arising out of the same be decided by the Subordinate District Council Court and the District Council Court in accordance with law and on merits without seeking to rake up the issue that has been referred in this reference in course of such proceedings.

9. It is clarified that it is only in view of the unanimity of view between the rival parties that the reference does not require to be