IMPORTANT POINT
The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of fair and unbiased recording of the accused's statement under section 313 Cr.PC, and the interpretation of the provisions of the POCSO Act, 2012, in cases of sexual assault.

JUDGMENT

1. On 17. 11.2013, an FIR came to be lodged with the Officer Incharge, Nongstoin Police Station, West Khasi Hills District by Shri Khreshland Wanniang to the effect that it was informed that on 16.11.2013 at about 4.30 pm, the appellant herein who was engaged with the construction of the house of Smti Plintidian Wanniang had attempted to rape her minor daughter when, while the mother had gone to the market, he called the minor girl who was in the kitchen, to the bedroom requesting her to bring the nail extracting tool, however as soon as she came, he pushed her on the bed and took off her pant but the\ictim girl shouted and was heard by her sibling who found her.

2. Accordingly, on receipt of the said FIR, the police registered a case being Nongstoin PS Case No 112(11) of 2013 under section 354A(1)(i) IPC read with section 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act,2012 and investigation commenced. The appellant/ accused was then arrested on 17.11.2013.

3. The Investigating Officer on completion of the investigation filed the final report/charge sheet on 30.11.2013 on finding that a prima facie case under section 354A(1)(i) IPC read with section 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act,2012 is found well established against the appellant herein, he was accordingly send up before the Court to stand trial.

4. On the Court of the learned Special Judge(POCSO) taking cognizance of the offence, charges under the relevant sections of law was framed on 07.08.2015 to which the accused/appellant pleaded not guilty and demanded to be tried.

5. The prosecution then produced as many as 8 witnesses who were duly examined before the Court and discharged thereafter. On conclusion of the examination of the prosecution's witnesses, the statement of the appellant under section 313 Cr.PC was then recorded and at the end of it, the appellant was asked as to whether he wishes to adduce evidence from his side to which he refused.

6. Upon hearing the learned counsels for the parties, the learned Special Judge proceeded to pronounce the judgment on 24.04.2019 holding that the appellant is found guilty of the offences alleged and further was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of three years and six months with fine of Rs. 10,000/- (rupees ten thousand) and in default thereof, to undergo an additional three months' imprisonment.

7. Being highly aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgment and sentence, the appellant has approached this Court with an appeal under section 374(2) Cr.PC with a prayer to set aside and quash the impugned judgment and sentence.

8. Heard Mr. S.D. Upadhaya, the learned Legal Aid counsel for the appellant who has submitted that the only limited argument in this appeal is directed at the manner in which the learned Trial Court has recorded the statement of the accused/appellant under section 313 Cr.PC, the same not having been recorded with fairness inasmuch as the incriminating materials found in the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses were not put forward to the appellant to enable him to explain the circumstance or to put forth a meaningful defence against the same.

9. It is submitted that the learned Trial Court had put questions to the appellant beginning with the phrase '....It transpired from...' which is an apparent act of bias for instead of confronting the appellant with the incriminating circumstances appearing against him, the questions put to him are only to compel him to confirm the same which is unfair and thus the trial is vitiated in this regard.

10. Citing the case of: -

i) 'Man Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh' (2011) 15 SCC 2016, para 3;

ii) 'Ganesh Gogoi v. State of Assam' (2009) 7 SCC 404, para 20 and

iii) 'Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar' (2009) 6 SCC 595, para 10.

the learned Legal Aid Counsel has submitted that on the basis of the above mentioned authorities, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and the sentence imposed quashed which should result in the acquittal of the appellant herein.

11. Mr. H. Kharmih, the lea