The trial court's premature discharge of the accused in a POCSO case was improper due to incomplete evidence and procedural irregularities, necessitating a re-trial.

JUDGMENT :

1. The case of the appellant is that in a case under the POCSO Act, 2012, wherein the respondent was facing trial being charged for committing an offence under Section 3(a)/4 of the said Act, the matter had proceeded to the stage of recording of evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses before the Special (POCSO) Court at Shillong.

2. The learned Special Judge at the stage of recording of evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses, on the appearance of the complainant and the survivor, has recorded their evidence as PW1 and PW2 respectively. This was done on a date fixed for the same, that is, 18.07.2019 where the Special P.P. and the Defence Counsel were present to conduct such examination.

3. In course of examination of the two witnesses mentioned above, the deposition of the said witnesses was not supportive of the prosecution’s story and on the prayer of the learned Special P.P., they were declared as hostile witnesses and were accordingly cross-examined.

4. After the evidence of the said two witnesses were recorded, the learned Special Judge on the basis of the contents thereof has come to the conclusion that PW2 (mother) of PW1(survivor), has filed a false and fabricated FIR implicating the accused/respondent herein in a case of sexual assault which is a very serious charge. However, from the evidence recorded, it is found that whatever allegations made against the accused/respondent was not for an offence of commission of sexual assault on a minor girl, but only because the complainant was angry with the accused/respondent since he has uttered slang and curse words against her and her minor daughter. Accordingly, the learned Special Judge has discharged the accused/respondent from all liabilities in the case and he was set free from custody.

5. The appellant being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said impugned order dated 18.07.2019 has accordingly approached this Court with an appeal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. with a prayer for setting aside and to quash the said impugned order.

6. Mr. R. Gurung learned GA appearing for the State appellant has submitted that the appellant has approached this Court for necessary orders or directions to prevent abuse of the process of the court and the irregularity apparent in the conduct of the case wherein proper procedure has not been adhered to.

7. The learned GA has also submitted that on the charge sheet being filed by the Investigating Officer coming to a finding that a prima facie case under Section 3(2)/4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 exists against the accused/respondent herein, charges under Section 4 of the POCSO Act read with Section 376(2)(i) IPC have been framed by the learned Special Court and on the accused/respondent pleading not guilty, the matter proceeded for trial.

8. The learned Special Court has taken up the recording of evidence of the prosecution witnesses and after recording the evidence of PW1 the survivor and PW2 the complainant the proceeding was suddenly stopped and the learned court without recording any further evidence as far as the remaining prosecution witnesses are concerned and also without considering the medical evidence, on the basis of the evidence of PW1 and PW2 respectively has acquitted the respondent vide the impugned order dated 18.07.2019.

9. This has caused prejudice to the prosecution’s case and it is a fit case for this Court to consider the overall impact of the impugned order on procedural law and the fact that grave injustice has been occasioned by the passing of the impugned order. Therefore, the matter may be remanded to the trial court for re-trial. In support of this contention, the learned GA has referred to a suo moto writ proceeding before the Hon’ble Supreme Court being ‘Suo Moto Writ (Crl.) No.(S) 1/2017, In Re: To Issue Certain Guidelines Regarding Inadequacies and Deficiencies in Criminal Trials v. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,” paras 12, 13 and 15.

10. Per contra, Mr. N.M. Mansuri, learned counsel for the respondent has submi