BOMBAY HIGH COURT
P.R. Bora, J.
Vilas Trimbak Sanap —Appellant
versus
Shriram Rajendera Sanap
and Ors. —Respondents
Appeal from Order No.30 of 2016 with Civil Application No.6171 of 2016
Decided on 20.10.2016
AIR 2006 SC 2628; (2013) 16 SCC 607 – Relied upon
(b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 96(3) – Appellant filing suit for partition on ground that defendants refused to give him his share – Defendants appearing in the suit without any court nptice or summons the same day and entered into a compromise – Suppressing fact of earlier two suits and attempts of respondents 1 to 3 to intervene therein claimimg a share in the suit property – Trial court passing a consent decree in terms of compromise – Held the consent decree was not a consent decree but a collusive decree to deprive responcents 1 to3of their share – Bar u/s 96(3) not applicable. (Para 19, 20, 21, 24)
AIR 1966 Mysore 1 – Relied upon
(c) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 96(3) – Applicability – Merely statin g a decree to be consent decree will not attract bar u/s 96(3) – Open to appellate court to find out whether the compromise arrived at between the parties is genuine and lawful or otherwise – Instantly, appellant and Respondent Nos. 4 and 6 in collusion procuring the decree from the trial court – Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, held, had every right to challenge said decree by – First appellate court setting aside the decree – No error. (Para 25, 26)
Result: Appeal dismissed.
P.R. Bora, J.—Heard. The appellant has filed the present appeal against Judgment and Order dated 12th January, 2016 passed by District Judge1, Beed in Regular Civil Appeal No.50/2015.
2. The appellant had filed Regular Civil Suit No.499/2014 for partition against his father and brothers claiming his 1/4th share alleging that father and brothers had refused to give him his share in the suit properties. In the aforesaid suit, compromise took place between the parties and on the basis of the said compromise-deed, the aforesaid civil suit came to be decreed by the learned trial court.
3. Present Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, who were not party to the aforesaid suit, filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 50/2015 assailing the Judgment and Decree dated 29th December, 2014 passed by the Trial court. It was the contention of these respondents that along with the plaintiff and defendants in the subject suit, they also possess share in the suit properties and as such without their presence in the said suit, impugned decree could not have been passed merely on consent of the plaintiff and defendants therein.
The appellant appeared in the appeal filed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and resisted the same. The appellant denied the claim of the respondents that they have share in the suit properties and also objected to filing of the appeal by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 on the ground of its maintainability. It was the contention of the present appellant before the first appellate court that the decree passed by the trial court on 29th December, 2014 being a consent decree, Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein, were not having any right to challenge the said decree by filing an appeal in view of the specific bar provided under Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, C.P.C.). The learned first appellate court, however, vide the impugned judgment, allowed the Regular Civil Appeal No.50/2015 and thereby remanded the matter to the trial court for deciding it afresh with a further direction to implead present Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as parties to the suit. Aggrieved by, the original plaintiff has filed the present appeal.
4. Shri Satyajeet Bora, The learned Counsel for appellant has assailed the impugned Judgment and Order mainly on the ground that the first appellate court failed in appreciating that the decree, which was challenged before it, was a consent decree, and as such, could not have been challenged by a third party in view of the specific bar provided under Section 96(3) of the C.P.C. In support of the contention so raised, learned Counsel relied upon two judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, first in the case of Daljit Kaur and Anr. Vs. Muktar Steels Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. (2013) 16 SCC 607 and another in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat (dead) through L.r. Smt. Sadhana Rai Vs. Rajinder Singh and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 2628.
5. Shri K.U.More, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, supported the impugned Judgment and Order. The learned Counsel submitted that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 do have their share in the suit properties. The learned Counsel further submitted that Govind Genu Sanap was the original ancestor, who had two sons, viz.– Tulshiram Trimbak and three daughters. The learned Counsel further submitted that Tulshiram had a son viz. Rajendra, who was husband of present Respondent No.3 and father of Respondent Nos. 1 & 2. The learned Counsel further submitted that Govind Genu Sanap and one Hari had purchased the suit properties from one Chandulal Kankriya vide registered sale deed executed on 24th September, 1958 and after death of Govind, name of his sons were recorded in the revenue record to the extent of Govind’s share.
The learned Counsel further submitted that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 being the legal heirs of Tulshiram, after death of their father, their names were recorded in the revenue records vide mutation entry No. 741 dated 13th January, 2006. The learned Counsel further submitted that after death of Rajendra, names of sons
Daljit Kaur and Anr. v. Muktar Steels Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
Pushpa Devi Bhagat (dead) through L.r. Smt. Sadhana Rai v. Rajinder Singh and Ors.
SupremeToday
The main legal point established in the judgment is the binding effect of the settlement between the parties, the waiver of the right to seek re-employment by the workmen, and the entitlement of the ....
A lockout is justified if it is declared in response to an illegal strike or a strike that is in breach of a settlement or award.
The combination of eyewitness testimonies, recovery of the weapon used, and forensic examination results can establish guilt in criminal cases, even based on circumstantial evidence.
The conviction of an accused person under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act is not permissible in law if the accused is also charged with committing murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The court can enhance compensation based on the deceased's income and family dependency, and adjust the multiplier used by the Tribunal if found unjustified.
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.