IMPORTANT POINT
The document to which the lessee is not a party, or the one, which does not accord with the provisions of law, cannot be taken into account.

L.Narasimha Reddy, J.— The appellant is the lessee of the premises bearing No.2-20-3 of Tenali owned by the respondent. The lease is said to have commenced in the year 1998, and that was to be for a period of ten years. The respondent got issued a notice, dated 6.4.2009 (Ex.A1), requiring the appellant to vacate the premises. The appellant got issued a reply, dated 20.4.2009 (Ex.A3), stating that the lease is for manufacture of footwear, and Ex.A1, through which, he was required to vacate the premises, within one month, is not tenable in law. Thereafter, the respondent filed O.S.No.168 of 2009 in the Court of Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tenali, for eviction of the appellant. .

2. The appellant filed a written statement, opposing the suit. He pleaded that initially; the premises were given on lease by the respondent to one Mr. Kantilal in the year 1990 for running a cloth shop, and said Kantilal, in turn, put the appellant in possession of the premises as a lessee, with the knowledge and permission of the respondent. It was pleaded that an agreement (Ex.B1), in that behalf, was executed by Kantilal in favour of the appellant on 1.10.1998, and a specific mention to the effect that the purpose of the lease is to manufacture of footwear, and that Ex.A1 is not tenable in law.

3. The trial Court decreed the suit through judgment, dated 13.3.2012. Aggrieved by that, the appellant filed A.S.No.87 of 2012 in the Court of XI Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Guntur at Tenali. The appeal was dismissed on 3.4.2013. Hence, this Second Appeal.

4. Sri P. Venu Gopal, learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, submits that the purpose, for which, the premises were taken on lease, is to manufacture of footwear, and that the notice issued by the respondent under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short ‘the Act’), requiring the appellant to vacate the premises within one month, does not bring about any obligations in law. He contends that the views taken by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court, regarding the nature of the relationship between the parties, or the terms of lease, are contrary to the evidence. Learned counsel further submits that the lower appellate Court committed irregularity, inasmuch as the judgment was rendered by the learned Presiding Officer, after he received the orders of transfer.

5. Sri N. Srirama Murthy, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that there is nothing on record to disclose that the premises were given on lease for manufacturing purpose, and that the ground pleaded by the appellant is not correct. He contends that the respondent is not a party to Ex. B1, much less; it can be treated as a lease deed. Learned counsel further submits that even if there exists any defect in Ex. A1, the same does not become material, in view of the amendment caused to Section 106 of the Act in the recent past, through which, sub-section (2) was introduced. He further submits that the learned Presiding Officer received the orders of transfer, after the arguments in the appeal were heard and the matter was reserved for judgment, and pronouncement of judgment, after the orders of transfer are received, cannot be treated as improper or illegal.

6. Though there is some dispute as to the terms of lease, there is no denial of the fact that the appellant is the tenant of the suit schedule premises owned by the respondent.

7. On the basis of the pleadings before it, the trial Court framed the following issues for consideration:

(1) Whether plea of fresh lease or extension of lease as contended by defendant is true?

(2) Whether quit notice is valid?

(3) Whether plaintiff is to entitled to recovery of possession as prayed for?

(4) Whether plaintiff is entitled damages as prayed for?

(5) To what relief?

8. On behalf of the respondent, PWs1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A1 to A6 were file on behalf of the appellant, DWs1 to 3 were examined and E