DELHI HIGH COURT
Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.
Surender Rode —Appellant
versus
Madan Mohan Rode & Ors. —Respondents
RFA No.765 of 2006
Decided on 25.10.2013
Important Points
Though Section 69 requires fulfillment of two conditions but the emphasis therein is on fulfillment only of the condition of proof of attestation by one of the attesting witnesses and which when proved is evidence of everything upon the face of the instrument since it is to be presumed that the witness would not have subscribed his name in attestation of that which did not take place.
Subject
Wills - PROOF OF WILL
Act Referred
EVIDENCE ACT : S.68, S.69
Headnote
Held: Not only is the language of Order 41 Rule 26 clear and the entire purposes of providing for filing of objections against the findings would disappear if an independent appeal were to be required to be filed to challenge the said findings but I also do not find the question to be res integra. This Court in Amarjit Kaur Vs. Kishan Chand 17 (1980) DLT 225 has held that no separate appeal lies against such findings on remand and the only remedy thereagainst is of preferring objections under Order 41 Rule 26. The position in law is that the findings received from the Trial Court are not final and binding on the Appellate Court merely because objections are not filed and the Appellate Court is required to examine the findings on their merits and can take a different view. (Para 22)
(ii) Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 68 and 69 — Trial Court found Will propounded by defendants in a partition suit not proved as none of the attesting witness was examined — Appeal — Daughter of one of the deceased attesting witness appealed and deposed that she identified signatures of her father — Defendant on his own evidence identified signatures of her mother testator on Will — There was no bar in signatures of executant of Will being proved by propounded of Will — Uncrossed testimony of defendant that other attesting witness on Will was not traceable was to be accepted — Will stood duly moved
Held: The learned Addl. District Judge has for the first of the aforesaid reasons referred only to Section 68 of the Evidence Act and has held that since none of the attesting witnesses had been examined, the Will had not been proved. No reference was made to Section 69 of the Evidence Act to which the counsel for the respondents/defendants no.1&2 has adverted to and which permits proof, where none of the attesting witnesses can be found, by proving the attestation by one of the witnesses and by proving the signatures of the executant of the document.
No challenge is made by the appellant/plaintiff to the proof of the signatures of one of the attesting witnesses, by examining his daughter. I have examined the testimony of Ms. Aswati Michael who has deposed that the attesting witness Mr. M.K. Michael was her father; that he died on 25th January, 2011; his death certificate was proved as Ex.DW3/1 and she identified the signatures of her father on the Will dated 21st September, 1994 of Smt. Devki Devi Rode. In cross examination, she deposed that her father was an Advocate; her testimony to the extent of the demise of her father and the attestation of the Will by her father could not be shaken; on asking, she offered her passport to prove her parentage as well as the identity card of her father as well as the cheque book of her father containing cancelled cheque, bearing signatures identical to that bearing on the Will.
The respondent/defendant no.1 in his own evidence has identified the signatures of the mother Smt. Devki Devi Rode on the said Will. I do not find any bar to the signatures of the executant of a Will being proved by the propounder of the Will. A Division Bench of this Court recently in Subhash Nayyar Vs. Registrar, University of Delhi MANU/DE/0246/2013 concurred with the decision of the Madras High Court in Jambunatha Iyer Vs. Sankari Ammal MANU/TN/0735/1993 laying down that though Section 69 requires fulfillment of two conditions but the emphasis therein is on fulfillment only of the condition of proof of attestation by one of the attesting witnesses and which when proved is evidence of everything upon the face of the instrument since it is to be presumed that the witness would not have subscribed his name in attestation of that which did not take place. It was further held that Section 69 nowhere prescribes that both requirements have to be fulfilled by the same witnesses and the propounder of the Will can identify the signatures of the executant.
As far as the aspect of proof of neither of the attesting witnesses being found is concerned, the contesting respondent/defendant no.1 has deposed having personally visited the address of the other attesting witnesses mentioned under his signatures on the Will and the said attesting witness being not found thereon and new address not being available with any of the neighbours also. Not a single question was put to him in cross examination on the said aspect. The inference in law from non-cross examination of a witness on a particular aspect of his deposition is well settled i.e. that the cross examining party is deemed to have accepted the said part of the deposition. (Paras 24 to 27)
(iii) Will — testamentary capacity of executant of Will — It is for a person challenging a Will to not only plead but prove that the testator lacked testamentary capacity and give specific reasons therefor— Merely from old age or testator suffering from some ailment it could not be presumed that he lacked testamentary capacity.
Held: As far as the testamentary capacity of the mother Smt. Devki Devi Rode is concerned, merely from the factum of old age and her suffering from cancer it cannot be presumed that she lacked testamentary capacity; the Will was executed in 1994 but she fell ill with cancer only in 1996. It is for a person challenging a Will to not only plead but prove that the testator/testatrix lacked testamentary capacity but also to give specific reasons therefor. Admittedly there are no pleadings of the lack of testamentary capacity of Smt. Devki Devi Rode. The wife of the appellant/plaintiff appearing as a sole witness on his behalf in her affidavit by way of examination-in-chief did not even utter a word of Smt. Devki Devi Rode not having testamentary capacity. In her cross examination she admitted the photograph on the registered Will to be of Smt. Devki Devi Rode. In her cross examination also, nothing came out challenging the testamentary capacity.
I am of the view that in the absence of any challenge to the testamentary capacity, the Will cannot be disbelieved on that ground. Rather in the cross examination of the contesting respondent/defendant no.1 it has come to light that Smt. Devki Devi Rode at the time of execution of the Will was able to walk and she used to read newspapers. No further cross examination was done on the said aspect. To hold that a Will can be disbelieved on the ground of lack of testamentary capacity without even the person propounding the Will being put to notice of such challenge, would be contrary to the basic principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court in Niranjan Umesh Chandra Joshi Vs. Mrudula Jyoti Rao (2006) 13 SCC 433 has held that there exists a distinction where the suspicions are well founded and cases where there are only suspicions and that existence of suspicious circumstances alone may not be sufficient and the Court may not start with a suspicion and a resolute and impenetrable incredulity is not demanded from the Judge even if there exist circumstances of grave suspicion. (Paras 28 & 29)
Result: Appeal dismissed.
For the Appellant:Mr. Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Galib kabir & Mr. Anurag Jain, Advocates.
For the Respondents Nos.1 & 2:Mr. Mukul Talwar & Mr. S. Mohapatra, Advocates.
Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.—The appeal impugns the judgment and decree dated 15th November, 2006 of the Court of the Addl. District Judge, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi of dismissal of Suit No.63/06/98 filed by the appellant. The said suit was filed by the appellant/plaintiff against his two brothers and two sisters, (i) for partition of property No.21-B, Bara Bazar Marg, Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi and the remaining estate left behind by the mother of the parties Smt. Devki Devi Rode including cash, bank deposits, shares, debentures, vikas patras gold and silver ornaments etc., claiming 1/5th share therein; (ii) for rendition of accounts of the estate left behind by the mother Smt. Devki Devi Rode and/or father Shri Labh Chand Rode; and, (iii) for permanent injunction restraining the respondents/defendants from dealing with the said estate or from disrupting or disturbing in any manner the essential supply of water and electricity to the portion of property No.21-B, Bara Bazar Marg, Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi in his possession, pleading:-
(a) that Shri Labh Chand Rode father of the parties had acquired leasehold rights in property No.21-B, Bara Bazar Marg, Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi for the benefit and use of his entire family and had constructed a 2 ½ storeyed building thereon where he along with his wife Smt. Devki Devi Rode and the parties to the suit were residing;
(b) that Shri Labh Chand Rode died intestate on 16 th February, 1983 leaving the appellant/plaintiff and the respondents/defendants no.1&2 as his sons, the respondents/defendants no.3&4 as his daughters and Smt. Devki Devi Rode as his widow and all of them acquired 1/6th share each in the Rajinder Nagar property;
(c) that the mother Smt. Devki Devi Rode also died intestate on 3 rd May, 1998 leaving the parties to the suit as her only heirs and upon her demise the share of each of the five parties to the suit in the Rajinder Nagar property became 1/5th ;
(d) that the appellant/plaintiff on 9th July, 1998 called upon the respondent/defendant no.1 to partition the property but was shown a Release Deed dated 1st October, 1981executed by the appellant/plaintiff and execution whereof the appellant/plaintiff did not remember;
(e) that it appeared that the love and affection of the appellant/plaintiff for the father Shri Labh Chand Rode and his brothers respondents/defendants no.1&2 had been misused for having the said Release Deed executed and it was also possible that signed blank papers given by the appellant/plaintiff for use for other purposes had been misused for preparing the same;
(f) that the Release Deed was bad in law and illegal and not binding on the appellant/plaintiff and no amount of Rs.1 lac stated to have been paid thereunder to the appellant/plaintiff had in fact been paid;
(g) in the alternative it was pleaded that the right of the appellant/plaintiff as an heir of his father could not have been transferred by the said Release Deed and therefore the said Release Deed dated 1st October, 1981 i.e. of a date prior to the demise of the father could not take away the rights of the appellant/plaintiff as an heir, to the said Rajinder Nagar property; and,
(h) that the appellant/plaintiff had also learnt that the parents had left a lot of moveable properties in the form of cash, bank deposit, shares, stocks, vikas patras, ornaments and which had also not been disclosed by the respondents/defendants no.1&2 to the appellant/plaintiff.
2. The respondents/defendants no.1&2 filed a written statement contesting the suit on the grounds:-
(i) that the wife of the appellant/plaintiff Smt. Sangeeta Rode who had instituted the suit and signed and verified the plaint was not entitled to do so;
(ii) denying that the father Shri Labh Chand Rode had died intestate; it was pleaded that he had left a registered Will dated 28th June, 1973 whereunder the property at Rajinder Nagar was bequeathed to the respondents/defendants no.1&2 and the mother Smt. Devki Devi Rode wi