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PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J.
Gurdeep Singh —Petitioner
versus
Balbir Singh & Ors. —Respondents
Civil Revision No. 3720 of 2009
Decided on 22.7.2010

Advocates:
Counsel for the Parties:
For the Petitioner:Ms. Bindu Goel, Advocate.
For the Respondent No. 1:Mr. P.K. Longia, Advocate.
For the Respondents No 2 to 6: None.

IMPORTANT POINT
Protection under Section 60 (1) (ccc) from attachment of one main residential house came to end with the death of judgment debtor.

Headnote:Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 60(1)(ccc)—Attachment of residential house—Inherited by the petitioner—Held—Protection from attachment of one main residential house under Clause (ccc) was available to judgment debtor in person—His legal heir being not judgment debtor cannot avail of the protection—Protection came to end with the death of judgment debtor. (Paras 7 to 13)

       Result: Petition dismissed.

JUDGMENT (ORAL)

Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J.—Gurdeep Singh, legal representative of Gurmail Singh, judgment debtor, has approached this Court for setting aside the order dated 22.1.2007 (Annexure P4), passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), acting as the Executing Court, Samrala, District Ludhiana, whereby the objections, raised by the petitioner that the residential house inherited by him, being exempted under Section 60(i) (ccc) CPC, cannot be attached, were rejected. The said order was made subject matter of appeal and the Court of Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Ludhiana, vide its order dated 12.2.2009 (Annexure P6), upheld the order under appeal (Annexure P4). Thus, the objections, raised by the petitioner, were rejected.

2. Hence, the present revision petition.

3. Respondent No. 1 instituted a suit for possession by way of specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 1.6.1994 against Gurmail Singh, father of the petitioner. In the suit, it was pleaded that father of the petitioner had executed an agreement to sell dated 1.6.1994 and received a sum of Rs.75,000 as earnest money, in advance. The suit was contested. The trial Court, vide its judgment dated 21.12.1998 (Annexure P1) concluded that a decree of specific performance against the defendant cannot be passed, however, granted an alternative relief in favour of the plaintiff/respondent No.1, which is reproduced below:

“... 16. In view of my findings on above issues, suit of the plaintiff is decreed with costs for the recovery of Rs.80,000 as claimed in the alternative relief. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to future interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of decision till the realization of decretal amount. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. File be consigned to record room.”

4. The judgment of the trial Court (Annexure PI) was assailed by father of the petitioner by filing an appeal. Respondent No.1 had also filed cross-objections. Vide its judgment dated 25.1.2002 (Annexure P2), the Court of District Judge, Ludhiana, while upholding the judgment of the trial Court (Annexure P1), had dismissed the appeal of Gurmail Singh, father of the present petitioner and cross-objections filed by plaintiff/respondent No.1.

5. Respondent No.1, being a decree holder, filed an execution petition. An objection petition was filed, wherein it was pleaded that the objector has got only residential house and there is no other house to reside in with the family. Therefore, the same cannot be attached.

6. The Executing Court relied upon a judgment rendered in Sikandar Singh v. Harjitpal Singh, 2005 (1) PLR 591 to hold that since this very house was being sold in pursuance of an agreement to sell, the objections, filed by the petitioner, cannot be sustained. While rejecting the objections, the Executing Court observed as under:

“...In my considered view in the present case also the JD has knowingly created a lien over the house in dispute at the time when he executed the agreement to sell in favour of the DH. It was well within the knowledge of the JD at that time that it was the only residential house of the JD. Even then if the JD executed the agreement to sell it means that the JD was ready to suffer the hardship by divesting himself of the only residential house. If at this stage, the JD is allowed to wriggle out of his liability by taking the benefit of Section 60(ccc) of the CPC, that would be a mockery of the legal provisions. It would deliver a wrong message that those persons who own only one residential house that they can easily execute an agreement to sell and then to wriggle out of their liability they can take benefit of Section 60(ccc) CPC that they would not be divested of the house being the only residential house. In such like cases, the sufferer is always the DH, who has neither got a decree for specific performance in his favour nor he is able to reap the fruits of alternate decree of recovery of damages. It is to be r



















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