KERALA HIGH COURT
M.N. Krishnan, J.
Gopalakrishna Pillai —Petitioner
versus
Devaswom Trust —Respondent
F.A.O. No. 5 of 2010
Decided on 2.2.2010
For the Petitioners:S. Sreekumar, P. Martin Jose and P. Prijith, Advocates.
For the Respondent:Dr. K.P. Kylasanatha Pillay, Sreedevi Kylasanath, V.J. Safeena and K.G. Balasubramanian, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
Court cannot appoint Receiver on a mere averment.
Headnote:(i) Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 92—Jurisdiction of Court—Public charity—Jurisdiction exercised by Sub-Judge and District Judge is of concurrent jurisdiction— Having chosen to take jurisdiction of Sub-Judge’s Court— necessarily appellate forum cannot be District Judge but only appellant forum of District Judge which is High Court-Appeal before High Court is maintainable. (Paras 3 to 5)
1980 KLT 645—Applied.
1971 KLT 550—Relied on.
(ii) Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 92—Public Charities—When a petition is moved under Section 92 Court is only prima facie concerned with averments in plaint—Mere granting of sanction under Section 92 cannot be used to militate against defendant in the case to shut doors of a contest as a private temple. (Para 7)
(iii) Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order XL, Rule 1—Appointment of Receiver— Dismissal of application— Very object of Order XL, Rule 1 is to see that property is not vested or shattered—There are interim orders passed by Court with respect to several matters therein—Just because a leave is granted and admittedly when people have no right over management of temple but they claim to be interested in temple as members of public, Court shall not on a mere averment appoint a Receiver which will result in disastrous consequences. (Para 7)
Result: Appeal disposed of with direction.
M.N. Krishnan, J.—This appeal is referred against the order of the Sub-Court, Chengannur in IA No. 393 of 2009 in OS No. 54 of 2009. It was an application for appointment of a receiver which has been dismissed by the court below and aggrieved by the same, plaintiffs in the suit have come up in appeal.
2. Before entering into the facts of the case, the first objection raised by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents in the appeal deserve consideration. Learned counsel would submit that the appeal herein is valued for the purpose of jurisdiction as below Rs.1,00,000. He would contend that the suit has been instituted in the Sub-Court and when the jurisdictional value does not exceed Rs. 2,00,000 under the provisions of the Civil Courts Act, the jurisdiction to file an appeal is the District Court and not the High Court and so the appeal is not maintainable and therefore it has to be returned.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellants would submit before me that a reading of Section 92 C.P.C. would enable the court to understand that it is a matter of concurrent jurisdiction for the Sub-Judge as well as the District Judge and when one of such forum is chosen by the party then the other forum cannot be made use of for filing the appeal and therefore the only competent forum is the High Court to entertain the same.
4. So, let me first consider whether the jurisdiction of the Sub-Judge and that of the District Judge are concurrent in nature. I need not elaborate much on the same for the reason that the matter is squarely covered by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Pazhukkamattom Devaswom v. Lekshmikutty Amma, 1980 KLT 645. In that case, this Court very clearly held that the jurisdiction exercised by the Sub-Judge and the District Judge is of a concurrent jurisdiction. Then what will be the impact, if it is of a concurrent jurisdiction has been considered in a criminal proceeding by a learned Judge of this Court in the decision reported in Mohassan v. Poulose, 1971 KLT 550. It was a case where an application under Section 520 Cr.P.C was moved before a District Magistrate. Under Section 520 there is concurrent jurisdiction for the District Magistrate as well as for the Sessions Judge. When a parry, after failing to obtain an order from the Magistrate, wanted to challenge it a revision was preferred before the Sessions Court. This Court held that under Section 520, the jurisdiction conferred on the District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge is concurrent and when once the applicant elects one or the other forum, the remedy is exhausted and no appeal or revision could be ceased when once the matter is taken up by the court of corresponding jurisdiction. The remedy against an order passed by such a court will be by way of revision to the High Court. As against these, learned counsel for the respondents invites the attention of this Court to various decisions under the Civil Courts Act and the Court Fees Act. There cannot be any quarrel about the proposition that it is the valuation that is given by the suit at the inception will determine the jurisdiction not only at that stage but till the end. But the said principle cannot be applied in this particular case obviously for the reason that there is a concurrent jurisdiction and the selection of one of the forums really militates against opting other forum as an appellate or revisional forum and by virtue of the decisions referred to above by me only the highest forum will have the jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal.
5. Now going by Section 92 C.P.C the District Court and by a notification of 1966, the Sub-Court have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Having chosen to take the jurisdiction of the sub-Judge’s Court, necessarily the appellate Forum cannot be the District Judge but only the appellate forum of the District Judge which is the High Court and therefore from these discussions, I hold that the appeal is maintainable a