IMPORTANT POINT
Maintenance – Right of a Muslim divorced woman to invoke secular statutory provision of Section 125 of Cr.P.C. (Section 144 of BNSS) is not entirely barred, even if her former husband discharges his obligations under provisions of Muslim Women Protection Act, 1986.

ORDER

The order of the Family Court declining the prayer for maintenance by a divorced Muslim woman under Section 125 of Cr.P.C on the ground that the husband has discharged his obligation under personal law is the main challenge in this revision petition.

2. The 1st petitioner was the wife of the respondent. Their marriage was solemnised on 31.01.2010 as per the Muslim customary rites. The 2nd petitioner is the daughter born in the said wedlock. The respondent divorced the 1st petitioner on 03.07.2010 by pronouncing talaq. The 1st petitioner, represented by her father, and the respondent entered Ext.D1 agreement on the same day, stipulating the post-divorce rights. In the said agreement, it was recited that 1st petitioner received a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- towards matah and Rs.25,000/- towards maintenance during the iddat period from the respondent. It was also recited that the 1st petitioner shall not claim any future maintenance from the respondent.

3. After the execution of Ext. D1 agreement, the petitioners filed M.C.No.351/2010 before the Family Court, Palakkad, invoking Section 125 of Cr.P.C against the respondent, claiming maintenance at the rate of Rs.6,000/- and Rs.3,500/- respectively. The respondent resisted the claim of the 1st petitioner for maintenance mainly on the ground that she, being a divorced Muslim woman, is not entitled to invoke Section 125 of Cr.P.C., especially when he discharged his obligation under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (for short, the Muslim Women Protection Act, 1986), as evident from the terms of Ext.D1 agreement. The Family Court accepted the said contention and disallowed the claim of the 1st petitioner for maintenance. However, the Family Court granted maintenance at the rate of Rs.750/-per month to the 2nd petitioner. This revision petition has been filed by the petitioners, aggrieved by the rejection of the claim of the 1st petitioner for maintenance and the quantum of maintenance awarded to the 2nd petitioner.

4. I have heard Sri. Ravi K.(Pariyarath), the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri.C.M.Kammappu, the learned counsel for the respondent.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that Ext.D1 agreement was void ab initio since the 1st petitioner was a minor at the time of its execution. The learned counsel further submitted that one of the terms of Ext.D1 agreement that the 1st petitioner shall not claim maintenance in future is against public policy and thus unenforceable. The learned counsel also submitted that even in a case where the husband has fulfilled his obligation under personal law, an application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. would be maintainable if it is proved that the amount paid under the personal law is inadequate for the future maintenance of the wife. So far as the maintenance amount granted to the 2nd petitioner, it is submitted that it is too meagre.

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the findings in the impugned order. It is submitted that the respondent had discharged his entire obligation under Section 3 of the Muslim Women Protection Act, 1986 by paying reasonable and fair provision, future maintenance as well as the maintenance during the iddat period and thus the claim of the 1st petitioner for maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. is not sustainable. So far as the maintenance granted to the 2nd petitioner is concerned, it is submitted that considering the requirement of the 2nd petitioner and the means of the respondent, the quantum of maintenance granted by the Family Court is absolutely reasonable.

7. The marriage and paternity are not in dispute. Though the 1st petitioner has challenged the pronouncement of talaq by the respondent, the Family Court, on appreciation of evidence, found that there is a valid talaq. I see no reason to interfere with the said factual finding in this revision petition. That apart, the 1st petitioner, during evidence catego