IMPORTANT POINT
The court established that the waiting period for divorce can be waived in cases of exceptional hardship, emphasizing the need for judicial discretion.

ORDER :

P. Sam Koshy, J.

The present Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 09.12.2023 passed by the Court of the Judge, Principal Family Court-cum-XIII Addl. Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad (for short, ‘the Court below’) in I.A.No.871 of 2023 in OPSR.No.10248 of 2022.

2. Heard Mr. K. Sunil Chowdary, learned counsel for the petitioner.

3. The petitioners have filed a petition under section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter will be referred as ‘H.M. Act’) seeking divorce on mutual consent along with a petition under Section 14(1) of H.M. Act with a prayer to waive the one year period for filing the divorce petition.

4. As could be seen from the order of the Court below while deciding the above interlocutory application in I.A.No.871 of 2023 and as per the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner herein, the marriage of these petitioners was performed on 01.06.2023. The petitioners continued their marital life for few months and thereafter the difference arose between them due to health problems and impotency. Despite exchanging views, both the petitioners are unwilling to continue their current marital relationship. Therefore, they have filed the present petition under the Section 13-B of the H.M. Act seeking a decree of divorce from this Hon'ble Court through mutual consent. Since the petition is filed within one year, they filed I.A.No.871 of 2023 in OPSR.No.10248 of 2022 under Section 14(1) of H.M Act and sought for waiver of one year waiting period. The Court below rejected the said request vide order dated 09.12.2023, therefore the revision.

5. The petitioners have claimed that the Court below erred in dismissing their application and failed to understand the hardship faced by the petitioners that is the personal health issues and impotency, which they had explicitly stated. Their petition under Section 14(1) of H.M. Act was dismissed mechanically, without appropriate examination of the content. They have also pleaded that the Court below dismissed their petition without considering their arguments and the precedents they cited, thus exceeding the scope of the matter.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted before the Court that the petitioners have been waiting for a divorce for ten (10) months and only two (02) more months are required to fulfil the waiting period for mutual consent under Section 14 of the H.M. Act.

7. The petitioner No.2 is forty (40) years old and who appeared personally through video conferencing submitted that she has received a marriage proposal which is at the final stage of settlement. However, things cannot materialise unless the divorce is obtained so far as the present marriage is concerned. She wishes to remarry due to biological complications that can occur with pregnancies at her age, such as a higher risk of miscarriage and potential complications during delivery. The delay in the divorce process is causing her a great deal of anxiety, as she is keenly aware that time is not on her side which is an immediate resolution to her request for divorce.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgment in the case of Amardeep Singh vs. Harveen Kaur, (2017) 8 SCC 746 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that :

“The statutory period contemplated under Section 13-B(2) of the Act is directory and that it is open to the Court to exercise discretion on the facts and circumstances of each case, where there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation”.

9. In the case of Ramnik Kaur vs. Harvinder Pal Singh, 2023 SCC Online P&H 4608, the Hon’ble High Court in paragraph Nos.8, 9, 10 and 11 held as under :

“8. Thus, proviso to the Section 14 of the Act lays down that in case of exceptional hardship to the appellant or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, if it appears t