Computation of limitation period for filing a suit under the C.P. Local Self-Government Act is based on the accrual of the cause of action, which may be influenced by subsequent events affecting the relief obtained.

Niyogi, J—This is an application for revision of an interlocutory order passed on' 3rd September 1937 by the Subordinate Judge, Second Class, Seoni, in Civil Suit No. 25-A of 1937. Upon this application arises a question of limitation. The non-applicant (plaintiff) was employed as a sub-overseer in the service of the District Council, Seoni. By a resolution passed at a special meeting of the District Council on 20th May 1934, it decided to abolish one of two posts of sub-overseers. In pursuance of this resolution the Chairman of the Council issued on 22nd May 1934 an order to the non-applicant informing him that his services were dispensed with, with effect from 25th June 1934. The non-applicant appealed to the Deputy Commissioner who set aside the Chairman's order. The Deputy Commissioner's order was upheld by the Commissioner on 21st August 1935. The District Council thereon moved the Local Government for revision of Commissioner's order and the Hon'ble the Minister for Local Self-Government reversed the Commissioner's order and restored that of the Chairman, District Council. This order which was passed on 3rd March 1936 was communicated to the non-applicant on 7th March 1936. The non-applicant filed the suit out of which this revision application arises on 8th July 1936. In that suit he challenges the legality of the order of the Chairman as well as that of the Hon'ble the Minister for Local Self-Government and prays for damages for wrongful removal from service. He specifically avers that the cause of action for his suit arose on 7th March 1936 on which day the Hon'ble the Minister's order was communicated to him. The lower Court repelled the contention raised by the District Council that the suit was barred by time. This revision petition is directed against that order.

2. On behalf of the applicants it is vigorously argued that the period of limitation, viz. six months prescribed by Sec. 73(2), C.P. Local Self-Government Act, must be computed from the date of the Chairman's order and not from the date of the Hon'ble the Minister's order. It is said that there can be but one cause of action and that it could be no other than the Chairman's order which, entitled the non-applicant to prefer an appeal, and further that when once time began to run no subsequent disability or inability to sue would stop it. The question is not free from difficulty. The principle applicable to such a case as the present has to be deduced from a series of decisions of the Privy Council. They are: Ranee Surno Moyee v. Shooshee Mokhee Burmania, 1868 12 MooIndApp 244, Bassu Kuar v. Dhun Singh, 1888 15 IndApp 211, Baijnath Sahai v. Ramgat Singh, 1896 23 IndApp 45, Rangayya Appa Rao v. Bobba Sriramulu, 1903 31 IndApp 17, Amma Bibi v. Udit Narain Misra, 1908 36 IndApp 44, Nrityamoni Dassi v. Lakhan Chandra Sen, 1916 AIR(PC) 96, Soni Ram v. Kanhaiya Lal, 1913 19 IndCas 291, Mani Singh v. Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad, 1918 50 IndCas 202 and Chandra Mani Saha v. Sreemati Anarjan Bibi,1934 67 MadLJ 79. These cases as pointed out in Sarat Kaminl Dasi v. Nagendra Nath Pal, 1926 29 CalWN 973 and Muthu Korakkal Chetty v. Madar Ammal, 1920 38 MadLJ 1 may be divided into two groups: (l) those in which the starting point of limitation fixed by the statute have been held to have arisen at a subsequent date, that is, those which lay down that a fresh cause of action may arise under some circumstances, (2) those in which the operation of the statute was held to have suspended after it had begun to run. Before dealing with those cases I may briefly advert to the material circumstances of the present case.

3. The Chairman of the District Council served a notice on the non-applicant on 22nd May 1934. That gave him a two-fold right, (a) to prefer an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner under the rules framed by the Local Government, or (b) to file a suit under Sec. 73, C.P. Local Self-Government Act. I may in passing observe that doubts and disputes as to the quest