The main legal point established in the judgment is that the heir of a deceased decree-holder can proceed with execution proceedings by making an application to carry on the proceedings, but the production of a succession certificate is necessary before proceeding with the execution.

1. By S. 214(1)(b), Succession Act, it is provided as follows: (1) No Court shall- (b) proceed, upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled, to execute against such a debtor a decree or order for the payment of his debt, except on the production, by the person so claiming, of (inter alia a succession certificate).

2. Here X obtained a decree (dated 13th March 1933), applied for execution (dated 28th April 1934), and died (dated 12th May 1934). His widow put in what has been called in this matter a ''substitution application'' on 30th, June 1934. That is to say, she applied for her name to be substituted for that of her deceased husband. What was sought however by that application is to be found by reading what was asked for: ''The applicant's name be recorded in place of the deceased decree-holder, and the execution case be proceeded with further.'' The grounds for that prayer were two: (1) the husband had died, and (2) the applicant was his heir.

3. Now it is said she was not proceeding on her application but on his application and therefore S. 214(1)(b) does not apply: Mahomed Yusuf v. Abdur Rahim Bepari, 1899 26 ILR(Cal) 839, and Kshetra Mohan v. Azizullah Mea, 1920 AIR(Cal) 580 which simply follows Mahomed Yusuf v. Abdur Rahim Bepari, 1899 26 ILR(Cal) 839. Mahomed Yusuf v. Abdur Rahim Bepari, 1899 26 ILR(Cal) 839 dissents from a Full Bench judgment reported in Fateh Chand v. Muhammad Bakhsh,1894 16 ILR(All) 259. The latter case however appears to us to be distinguishable, for it was concerned with a suit, not with execution proceedings. Since the new Rule, O. 22, R. 12, was made the old question whether execution proceedings abate on death has been set at rest. Abatement does not apply to execution proceedings. The result of that is however that the heirs need not take steps for substitution under O. 22, R. 3 but may apply to carry on the proceedings or may file a fresh application. In other words, execution proceedings do not abate but live on and, as some one must take the next step and death terminates all agencies, the person entitled, i.e. the personal representative or heir, can come before the Court. That person when he come will be claiming for himself, at least where he, or she, is heir or beneficially interested.

4. The proper application is for leave to carry on (or proceed with) the pending execution proceedings. Such an application would fall within the words ''upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled.'' ''To be so entitled'' means, as is plain from S. 214(1)(a) ''to be entitled to any part of the deceased's estate.'' This widow claims to be so entitled and she makes an application, which is necessary before the Court can proceed with a pending execution. The Court cannot, on that application, proceed with the execution unless a succession certificate is produced. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. We cannot but observe that in this case execution has been avoided for three and a half years because a succession certificate was not produced. We understand there is no difficulty or expense involved in producing a succession certificate and it would seem to be wise in such cases whether a succession certificate is strictly necessary or not to take the course taken by counsel in Fateh Chand v. Muhammad Bakhsh,1894 16 ILR(All) 259 and ask for time to produce the succession certificate.