Jurisdiction of the suit is determined by the place where the cause of action arises, and liability of parties under the Negotiable Instruments Act is influenced by the interpretation of various sections of the Act.

Vivian Bos—On 18th November 1935 Punamchand Bhikamchand of Nagpur who is the owner of the firm Bhikamchand Premchand, which figures here as defendant 7, drew two hundis each for Rs. 1000 at Nagpur on the firm of one Jivraj Agarchand of Bombay in favour of defendant 1 Dalsukh Nathmal of Nagpur. Defendant 1 Dalsukh negotiated these handis in favour of defendant 2 Prabhoolal who resides at Raipur and he in his turn negotiated them in favour of defendant 3 Khundelal also of Raipur. Khundelal then negotiated them in favour of defendant 4, Kastoorchand, a pleader practising at Nagpur. Kastoorchand negotiated them in favour of defendant 5 Chootanlal of Bazargaon, who in his turn negotiated them to Kastoorchand Sunderlal, defendant 6, and he has negotiated them back to defendant 5 Chootanlal who in his turn negotiated them to the plaintiff who resides at Raipur. These hundis were dishonoured and the drawee refused to accept them. Therefore the plaintiff served notices on each of the prior indorsers on 24th February 1936. They not having paid, the plaintiff instituted the present suit at Raipur on the ground that two of the defendants, viz., defendants 2 and 3, live at Raipur. An objection was taken to the venue of the suit but the lower Court held that it had jurisdiction because in its opinion a part of the cause of action arose at Raipur.

2. This raises an interesting point about the place of payment, but before I deal with that, I will dispose of another question. Under S. 20(b), Civil P.C. where there are a number of defendants the suit may foe instituted at the place where any one of them resides or carries on business for gain provided the leave of the Court is obtained. Of course such leave cannot be given arbitrarily and even when the defendants who reside outside jurisdiction do not appear the Court is bound to consider their position before granting leave. This obligation is in no way lessened when they do appear and object and especially when, as here, the objecting defendant seems to be the real person against whom the plaintiff wants to proceed. The other defendants, I am told, have all admitted his claim so it is clear from the attitude of the plaintiff that the person against whom he really wants a decree is the only defendant who is contesting his claim. The plaintiff did not ask for the necessary leave and even when the contesting defendant, who is the applicant here, expressly raised the point in his written statement the plaintiff did not avail himself of the opportunity thus afforded him to ask for leave to amend his plaint so as to disclose a good cause of action against all the defendants, or otherwise to ask for the requisite leave. In these circumstances he cannot rely upon S. 20(b).

3. Therefore what we have to see is whether any part of the cause of action as against the applicant arose at Raipur. The applicant is the payee in both the hundis and the plaintiff is a subsequent holder. Of course no liability attaches to the applicant in his capacity as payee; he comes in because he indorsed the hundis to another holder. In that capacity he has a double liability. Under S. 37, Negotiable Instruments Act he is liable to the plaintiff as a surety for the drawer and under S. 38 he is also liable as a principal debtor. In his capacity as a surety he undertook the same liability as his principal who in this case is the drawer. It is necessary therefore to see what the liability of the drawer is. The hundis were drawn at Nagpur on behalf of defendant 7 on a Bombay firm. They are payable at sight and no place either of presentment or payment is specified in them. The drawer therefore undertook that the hundis would be accepted by the drawee within a reasonable time within business hours and on a business day (S. 61); provided they were presented at the place of business or the usual residence of the drawee (S. 71). Of course the drawer is not a surety for acceptance because the drawee does not become liable until