The main legal point established in the judgment is that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted when a party fails to comply with the order of the Revenue Court within the statutory period, and allowing the suit would lead to a conflict of jurisdictions.

1. This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff Laxmibai for a declaration that the sir and khudkasht fields possessed by her in mouza Kakepar in Bhandara District belong to her exclusively and the defendants who are the cosharers in the said village have no right to claim a share therein in partition proceedings. The plaintiff in her plaint stated that the defendants had filed an application for partition of the village in Revenue Court and laid claim to a share in the lands in suit and that the plaintiff had objected to the partition of the sir and khudkasht lands and claimed them to be her exclusive property. In the plaint the cause of action was stated as having accrued on 21st January 1935 when the defendants claimed a partition of these lands and thus cast a cloud on plaintiff ;s title which necessitated the institution of the present suit under S. 42, Specific Relief Act. The plaint has studiously avoided a reference to any order passed by the Revenue Court in this respect. The suit was filed on 18th December 1935. The defendants raised a preliminary objection and stated that the plaintiff was ordered by the Revenue Court in partition proceedings to file a civil suit within sis months under S. 169(b) to get her exclusive title to the lands in dispute established, that the order was passed on 18th February 1935 and as the present suit was filed more than sis months after the order and not within the six months as provided for under S. 169(b) the Civil Court could not entertain it. The plaintiff in reply admitted that the order was passed on 18th February 1935 and that she failed to institute her suit under S. 169, Land Revenue Act within sis months of the order but maintained that her claim for declaration was one under S. 42, Specific Relief Act and independently of S. 169 of the Act and as such was tenable and governed by sis years ; rule of limitation under Art. 120, Lim. Act. The failure to institute the suit ordered by the Revenue Court was not a bar to the maintainability of the present suit.

2. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the suit was not tenable and dismissed it. The lower Appellate Court has construed the order as one falling under S. 169(a) and not (b) and has held that the suit is tenable. Against this decision of the lower Appellate Court the present appeal is filed. The order of the Revenue Court to which reference is made in the Courts below and in argument is Ex. D-1 in the case. The date of final order in the case is shown as 18th February 1935. On this date the S.D.O., Mr. S.V. Naydu, who was the officer dealing with the partition case passed the order directing Laxmibai to go to Civil Court and get it declared that she is the exclusive owner of the sir and khudkasht lands and that she was entitled to have them allotted to her Patti in the imperfect partition. He ended his order with the following sentence.

I grant her time for six months for this purpose under S. 169(1)(b). Till then this case will pend.

Camp Lakhni

D/- 18th February 1935.

(Sd.) S.Y. Naydu,

S.D.O.

This order bears an endorsement:

Submitted to D.C. for information.

(Sd.) S.V. Naydu,

S.D.O.

18th February 1935

3. There is a further endorsement by D.C. as under:

Seen. It is no use keeping the case pending for six months. It may be filed. Applicant oat renew it after the Civil Court decision.

(Sd.) M.C. Combrie,

D.C.

D/- 22nd February 1935.

4. As stated by us, this order has been construed by the lower Appellate Court as one under S. 169(1)(a) which empowers the Revenue Court to decline to grant the application for partition till the question is decided by competent Court or lawful award or compromise. The appellants have raised two contentions before us: Firstly, it is contended that the lower Appellate Court erred in holding that the order of the Revenue Court was one under S. 169(1)(a) and not under S. 169(1)(b); and secondly, it ought to have been held that the order not having been complied ; with and the suit not