The Insolvency Court has the jurisdiction to recover purchase money from a decree-holder and the validity of an execution sale in insolvency proceedings is determined by the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act.

Niyogi, J—This appeal arises out of in solvency proceedings. The facts are that the appellant Rangappa had obtained a decree in Civil Suit No. 676 of 193 i against one Ganpat and was trying to execute his decree. While execution proceedings were in progress, another creditor Ghanshyam, made an application in the Insolvency Court for adjudication of Ganpat as an insolvent. That petition was admitted on February 23, 1934, by the Insolvency Court which adjudicated Ganpat insolvent on December 21, 1934. After the date of admission of petition in insolvency but before the date of adjudication, the insolvent's property was brought to sale in execution of Rangappa's decree on December 11, 1934, and the purchaser, who presumably was a stranger, paid up the full amount of the purchase money on December 21, into the executing Court which in ordinary course paid all the amount to the decree-holder Rangappa.

2. The Insolvency Court at the instance of Ghanshyam called upon Rangappa to deposit the purchase money that he had received from the executing Court. He contested the order for deposit of that amount on various grounds, but he was overruled in both the Courts below.

3. Rangappa has preferred this appeal. On his behalf it is urged that the Insolvency Court had no jurisdiction to call upon him to refund the purchase money which had been paid to him by the executing Court. Reliance is placed on Govind v. Gopala 9 NLR 182 : 22 Ind. Cas. 69 and Chunilal v. Vithal Balaji,1933 28 NLR 317 in support of the contention that the Insolvency Court could at best have declared the execution sale void but could not recover the purchase money which was already paid by the executing Court to him as a decree-holder. The facts in Govind v. Gopala 9 NLR 182 : 22 Ind. Cas. 69 varying from those in the present case. '': In the cited case the insolvent had surrendered his ordinary tenancy holding to the malguzar for some consideration which was withheld by the malguzar and consequently the insolvent was entitled to recover that amount as a debt. The Insolvency Court ordered the malguzar to deposit that amount into Court. It was held by Mittra, A.J.C. that the Court had no power to compel the insolvent's debtor to pay money into the Insolvency Court. The ratio decidendi of that case was that the Insolvency Court has power to enquire into the claims against the insolvent's estate and not into claims by or on behalf of the estate. That proposition is unexceptional at the lime when it was declared but it certainly requires modification in view of the introduction of Section 4 in the Provincial Insolvency Act in the year 1920 Govind v. Gopala 9 NLR 182 : 22 Ind. Cas. 69 has in my opinion, no bearing on this case and lends no support to the appellant's argument.

4. The other case namely Chunilal v. Vithal Balaji,1933 28 NLR 317. 28 comes much nearer the present case, but it is distinghisbable for the reason that there the decree-holder had purchased the judgment-debtor's property in execution being fully aware of the pendency of insolvency proceedings. The case was, therefore, held to be outside the ambit of Section 51(3) of the Provincial Insolvency Act as he was not a bona fide purchaser.

5. In the present case there has been unfortunately a mistake on the part of the ministerial officers of the Insolvency Court. The non-applicant Ghanshyam had on December 10, 1934, that is one day before the execution sale (held on December 11, 1934,) had moved the Insolvency Court to give notice to the executing Court about the admission of the petition in |insolvency but that application, however, did not come to the attention of the Insolvency Court until December 21, 1934, and the result was that the execution Court held the sale without notice of the insolvency proceedings. The question is whether the execution of sale was void as contended for by the appellant here or it was valid so far as the purchaser was concerned, as contended for the other side. Even if the pur