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1936 Supreme(Nagpur) 196

HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Stone, Niyogi
GANPAT RAO AND OTHERS – Appellant
Versus
ISHWAR SING AND ANOTHER – Respondent
First Appeal No. 112 of 1933
Decided on : 18-09-1936

Advocates Appeared:
B L Gupta, M R Bobde, T L Sheode, W B Pendharkar, W R Puranik, Advocates

The main legal point established in the judgment is that communication is essential for an act of affirmation, ratification, or election to become irrevocable, and that the loan must be for legal necessity, not just for a necessary purpose.

Headnote:

mortgage bond - affirmation, ratification, or election - S. 197, Contract Act - legal necessity or the benefit of the estate - Exs. 1 D-1 and 1 D-2 - Katiar's Law of Agency - Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gonnden, 1918 AIR(PC) 196 - Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi,1907 AIR(Cal) 329 - Rajagopalacharyulu v. Secretary of State, 1914 AIR(Mad) 174 - Scari v. Jardine,1882 7 AC 345 - Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad, 1924 AIR(PC) 50

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiffs appealed against the dismissal of their suit on a mortgage bond against defendants 2 and 3, who were minors at the time of the transaction. The plaintiffs sought to make the minors liable on the grounds of legal necessity or affirmation when adults.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the minors were not bound by the affirmation, ratification, or election as there was no communication before the act became irrevocable. The court also determined that the mortgage transaction was not for legal necessity or the benefit of the estate.

Issues: The issues revolved around the liability of the minors based on affirmation, ratification, or election, as well as the determination of whether the mortgage transaction was for legal necessity or the benefit of the estate.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that communication is necessary for an act of affirmation, ratification, or election to become irrevocable. Additionally, the court emphasized that the loan must be for legal necessity, not just for a necessary purpose, and that the lender must satisfy himself about the necessity for the loan.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT

1. This appeal is by the plaintiffs whose suit on a morgage bond has been dismissed against defendants 2 and 3, members of the joint Hindu family whose managing member executed the bond and who were minors at the time of the transaction. The relationship between the managing member and the minors was that of step-brothers. It is accordingly sought to make the minors liable on one of two grounds: (a) legal necessity or the benefit of the estate; (b) affirmation when adults. It will be convenient to examine the second ground first. Different terms have been used to express the legal consequence of the acknowledgments alleged to have been made. It has been said that the minors, when they came of age, either affirmed, or ratified, or elected to be bound by the transaction. The matter does not turn on the expression used, but on the legal consequences of the facts which are as follows: The pleadings allege pressure, a threatened suit, an admission of liability, a request for time and a giving of time. This alleges in effect a new contract based on consideration-the giving of time. That new contract has not been pressed before us, and the argument did not proceed on any such basis. What was urged was that Ex. 1 D-1 and Ex. 1 D-2 amount to an affirmation, ratification, or election.

2. Exhibit 1 D-1 is a document to which the three brothers Himmatsingh, Ishwarsingh and Lalsingh were parties. Of them Himmatsingh was the managing member, executant of the suit bond. The other two were minors at the date of the bond, majors at the date of Ex. 1 D-1. This document reciteg that the estate is encumbered, that it is wholly mortgaged to Dewaji (the first of the mortgagees under the suit mortgage bond which was in favour of six mortgagees). It proceeds:

We are indebted to faint and Ghatateand others. It is necessary for us to repay their debts. We should repay the debts now....but it is not possible to repay the debts entirely.

3. They then state what is to be done to improve the management of the estate so as to make it possible to get clear of debt, the scheme being to appoint a manager who is to be free from the interference of any of the brothers and who is to pay none of them more than sufficient for bare needs and to accumulate the income after allowing for the necessary outgoings. Ex. 1 D-2 is a letter written by Ishwarsingh to Himmatsingh which contains the following relevant sentences: ''We owe moneys to Dewaji Sonar and others. We all admit the said debts.'' It is said that as a consequence of these two documents, though un-communicated to the plaintiffs, and though not acted upon by the plaintiffs, Ishwarsingh and Lalsingh cannot now be heard to say that they are not bound (that is, estoppel applies) or must be treated as having adopted, ratified, or elected to be bound by the transaction.

4. In support of this proposition Katiar's Law of Agency (pp. 287 and 288) was referred to. The learned author is there considering the outstanding features of ratification of an agent's acts by a principal. On the other hand in Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gonnden, 1918 AIR(PC) 196the Judicial Committee considered the term to use when a reversioner affirms or disaffirms an alienation by a widow. Lord Dunedin there observes:

If therefore a reversioner, after he became in titulo to reduce the estate to possession and knew of the alienation, did something which showed that he treated the alienation as good he would lose his right of complaint. This may be spoken of, though scarcely accurately, as ratification. In soma cases it has been expressed as an election to hold the deed good.

5. In a case of a widow's alienation which raised the discussion whether as against a reversioner it was voidable or void, Lord Davey in Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi,1907 AIR(Cal) 329 expressed the opinion of the Judicial Committee as follows:

Her alienation is not therefore absolutely void, bat it is prima facie voidable at the election of the reversion















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