The burden of proof in defamation cases is on the accused to establish a plea of justification.

Bose, J—The main ground urged in this application for revision is that the judgment of the trial Court is illegal, because it does not conform to the provisions of Section 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which lays down among other things, that a judgment mast contain the points for decision, the decision thereon, and the reasons, therefor. It is true the judgment nowunder review is not an ideal one, but Section 367 does not lay down any particular form which a judgment must take. It is enough if the points, the decision, andc., can be gathered from the bcdy of the judgment itself.

2. The point in the present case were simple. The prosecution was for defamation in which the accused is said to have slandered a married woman by stating that her husband was impotent, and that the child born to her was by another man. These facts are set out in para. (1) of the judgment where the case for the prosecution is set forth. The learned Magistrate then states ''the complainant in support of the prosecution story examined three witnesses who supported the prosecution fully.'' He also stated that the case was for defamation under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. It is clear from the facts that I have given that the points for decision can be gathered from the body of the judgment; also that the learned Magistrate accepted the deposition of the prosecution witnesses, because he states they support the prosecution fully, and he convicts the accused.

3. In any case an error of this type would be a mere irregularity which would be curable, unless it caused prejudice to the accused. I was not shown in what way the accused has been prejudiced in this case. I have been through the evidence of the three witnesses on which the learned Magistrate appears to rely, and I find that they do support the prosecution case. I can see no reason why they should be disbelieved, especially as the accused has not attempted to prove justification. The complainant herself has gone into the witness-box, and states definitely that her husband is not impotent, and that the child born to her is his. In the circumstsnces, even if there is an irregularity in the form of the judgment, it has not caused any prejudice to the accused.

4. It is then argued on the stength of Emperor v. Umed Singh, 1924 AIR(All) 299 that the burden is on the complainant to prove that the statements of which she complains are false. It is true Walsh, J., goes to that extent in the Allahabad case, but with the utmost deference, I am unable to agree with him. To impute unchasiity to a married woman is regarded so seriously in England that it is actionable per se in civil cases for slander. I have yet to learn that the people of India, taken as a whole, value the chastity of their women any less highly. This is especially so when, as here, an imputation of this kind is taken so seriously that outcasting promptly follows any suspicion of infidelity. It would be unfortunate for Courts to apply any lesser standard in India, except of course among particular tribes or castes, where, according to the standard of morals prevalent among them, such lapses from virtue are either permitted or openly condoned. In my opinion the law enunciated by Walsh, J., not only contravenes Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, but also all known rules about defamation. It also cuts at the root of the very strong presumptions which the law raises in favour of legitimacy. Therefore, as I have said, with the utmost respect i am unable to agree with Walsh, J. the law, as i understand it, is correctly stated in Baga Mahar v. Emperor,1924 AIR(Nag) 172, where the burden is placed on the accused to establisn a plea of justification.

5. As regards the plea of alibi, that has been disbelieved, it has been carefully examined by the learned Magistrate, and I see no reason to intefera with his decision on the point. The application is rejected.

Final Result : Dismissed